Saturday, February 04, 2017

SIMPOSIUM NASIONAL. “Membedah Tragedi 1965” Pendekatan Kesejarahan



SIMPOSIUM NASIONAL

“Membedah Tragedi 1965
Pendekatan Kesejarahan

 
Benang Merah
Antara Tragedi Nasional I, 1948
Dengan Tragedi Nasional II, 1965



 
Oleh Batara R. Hutagalung

Hotel Arya Duta, Jakarta
18 dan 19 April 2016


Pendahuluan
Terlebih dahulu penjelasan mengapa saya sepakat menggunakan istilah TRAGEDI NASIONAL. Bahwa sesama anak-bangsa saling membunuh untuk kepentingan asing, atau diadu-domba oleh asing, merupakan suatu tragedi nasional.

Sebagaimana pada berbagai peristiwa, tragedi nasional yang terjadi tahun 1965 juga tidak berdiri sendiri.Namun ada pihak-pihak dan Negara-negara tertentu yang hanya melakukan analisis, menulis berita, membuat film, peristiwa yang terjadisetelah tanggal 30 September/1 Oktober 1965. Seolah-olah, sebelum terjadi peristiwa tersebut, tidak ada peristiwa-peristiwa yang mendahuluinya.

Banyak angkatan ’45 yang terlibat, baik dalam peristiwa tahun 1948 maupun tahun 1965, melihat ada kesamaan –BENANG MERAH- kedua peristiwa tersebut, baik dalam dalang peristiwa, disain maupun pelaksanaan. Namun di zaman Orde Baru, tidak mungkin pendapat yang berbeda dari pendapat penguasa waktu itu, dapat dipublikasikan atau disebarluaskan.

Setelah runtuhnya Orde Baru, bermunculanlah berbagai versi mengenai peristiwa tahun 1965, namun hampir tidak ada yang melakukan analisis, hubungan antara peristiwa tahun 1948 dengan peristiwa tahun 1965.

Demikian juga pandangan dan penilain sejumlah angkatan ’45, yang terlibat atau ikut dalam kedua peristiwa Tragedi Nasional tersebut.

Dalam tulisan ini, saya tidak merinci mengenai peristiwa tahun 1965, karena sudah sangat banyak versi yang dipublikasikan, yang bertentangan satu dengan lainnya. Di sini saya akan focus pada “Benang Merah” peristiwa tahun 1948 dengan peristiwa 1965.



Agresi Militer Jepang 1942. Belanda Menyerah Kepada Jepang

Di tengah berkecamuknya perang di Eropa yang terjadi sejak tahun 1939,  pada 7 Desember 1941 Jepang memulai melancarkan agresi militernya ke Asia Timur dan Asia Tenggara. Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, Panglima Angkatan Laut Jepang, mengembangkan strategi perang yang sangat berani, yaitu mengerahkan seluruh kekuatan armada di bawah komandonya untuk dua operasi besar. Seluruh potensi Angkatan Laut Jepang mencakup 6 kapal induk (pengangkut pesawat tempur), 10 kapal perang besar, 18 kapal penjelajah berat, 20 kapal penjelajah ringan, 4 kapal pengangkut perlengkapan, 112 kapal perusak (destroyer), 65 kapal selam serta 2.274 pesawat tempur.

Kekuatan pertama, yaitu 6 kapal induk, 2 kapal perang, 11 kapal perusak serta lebih dari 1.400 pesawat tempur, tanggal 7 Desember 1941, akan menyerang secara mendadak basis Armada Pasifik Amerika Serikat di Pearl Harbor di kepulauan Hawaii.
Sedangkan kekuatan kedua, sisa kekuatan Angkatan Laut yang mereka miliki, mendukung Angkatan Darat dalam Operasi Selatan, yaitu penyerangan atas Filipina dan Malaya/Singapura, yang akan dilanjutkan ke Jawa. Kekuatan yang dikerahkan ke Asia Tenggara adalah 11 Divisi Infantri yang didukung oleh 7 resimen tank serta 795 pesawat tempur. Seluruh operasi direncanakan selesai dalam 150 hari. Admiral Chuichi Nagumo memimpin armada yang ditugaskan menyerang Pearl Harbor.

Hari minggu pagi tanggal 7 Desember 1941, 353 pesawat tempur dan pesawat terbang pembawa torpedo diberangkatkan dalam dua gelombang. Sebelumnya, 31 kapal selam kelas Midget telah diberangkatkan menuju Pearl harbor, dan telah siap menunggu komando untuk penyerangan. Serangan mendadak tersebut mengakibatkan kerugian yang sangat besar dipihak Amerika.

Pada bulan Januari 1942 Sekutu membentuk ABDACOM (American, British, Dutch, Australian Command), yang kerjasamanya di Indonesia masih terlihat sampai sekarang tahun 2016.

Selain itu, setelah melihat serbuan balatentara Dai Nippon tidak terbendung lagi, Gubernur Jenderal Belanda ke 64, juga yang terakhir, Tjarda van Starckenborgh-Stachouwer menugaskan Charles Olke van der Plas, Gubernur Jawa Timur, untuk membangun jaringan bawah tanah untuk  melawan pendudukan tentara Jepang. Van der Plas fasih berbahasa Arab dan pakar Islam, seperti halnya Snouck Hurgronje dan Thomas Edward Lawrence yang kemudian dikenal sebagai Lawrence of Arabia. Van der Plas merekrut kelompok sosialis yang menentang fasisme Jepang. Termasuk di bawah koordinasinya adalah tokoh-tokoh kiri seperti Sutan Syahrir dan Amir Syarifuddin Harahap, keduanya kemudian pernah menjadi Perdana Menteri Republik Indonesia. Jaringan van der Plas yang kemudian dikenal sebagai “van der Plas Connection”, yang sangat berperan dalam “mendisain” Peristiwa Madiun 1948, masih eksis sampai tahun 2016, dan ikut “bermain” dalam peristiwa tahun 1965 di Indonesia.

Agresi militer Jepang tak terbendung. Pada 9 Maret 1942 di Kalijati, Belanda resmi menyerah kepada Jepang. Di sini berkahirnya penjajahan Belanda di Bumi Nusantara.




Jepang Menyerah Kepada Sekutu, Belanda ingin menjajah Indonesia

Pada 15 Agustus 1945, Jepang menyatakan menyerah tanpa syarat kepada tentara Sekutu.Pada 15 Agustus itu juga tecapai kesepakatan antara pihak Sekutu dengan Pemerintah Jepang mengenai tata cara penyerahan Jepang, dan Kaisar Jepang, Hirohito, mengeluarkan perintah secara sepihak, agar tentara Jepang segera menghentikan pertempuran. Jepang menyerah tanpa syarat!

Kapitulasi Jepang secara resmi ditandatangani tanggal 2 September 1945, pukul 09.04, di atas kapal perang AS Missouri, di teluk Tokyo. Dari pihak Sekutu, Jenderal Douglas MacArthur sebagai Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers mewakili tentara Sekutu; Admiral C.W. Nimitz, mewakili Pemerintah Amerika Serikat.

Serah terima dari tentara Jepang di Asia Tenggara dilakukan di Singapura, pada 12 September 1945, pukul 03.41 GMT. Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, Supreme CommanderSouth East Asia Command, mewakili Sekutu, sedangkan Jepang diwakili oleh Letnan Jenderal Seishiro Itagaki, yang mewakili Marsekal Hisaichi Terauchi, Panglima Tertinggi Balatentara Kekaisaran Jepang untuk Wilayah Selatan.

Berita mengenai proklamasi kemerdekaan Republik Indonesia tanggal 17 Agustus 1945, tentu sangat mengejutkan pemerintah Belanda. Belanda ingin berkuasa kembali di bekas jajahannya, namun Belanda tidak memiliki angkatan perang yang kuat. Tentaranya di Belanda telah dihancurkan oleh Jerman, dan pasukannya di India-Belanda telah menyerah kepada tentara Jepang. Setelah diinternir di kamp-kamp interniran dengan kondisi yang sangat mengenaskan, para mantan tentara Belanda tersebut kondisi fisiknya sangat lemah, dan tidak siap untuk dikirim perang.

Setelah penyerahan wewenang atas Jawa, Bali, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, serta daerah-daerah lain yang termasuk wilayah bekas India Belanda dari Letnan Jenderal MacArthur kepada Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, Pemerintah Belanda meminta bantuan kepada sekutunya, Inggris. Setelah melakukan serangkaian pertemuan dan lobi dengan Pemerintah Inggris, pada 24 Agustus 1945, di Chequers dekat London, Belanda dan Inggris menandatangani Civil Affairs Agreement (CAA):

Butir yang terpenting untuk Belanda adalah, penyerahan wilayah Indonesia yang telah “dibersihkan” oleh tentara Inggris kepada Netherlands Indies Civil Administration (NICA). Chequers, tempat peristirahatan Perdana Menteri Inggris, menjadi tempat pertemuan penting untuk perundingan-perundingan dengan pemerintah Belanda. Di sinilah berulang kali diadakan pertemuan antara Pemerintah Inggris dengan delegasi Pemerintah Belanda.

Konferensi Yalta pada bulan Februari 1945, ternyata bukan hanya membagi Eropa menjadi dua blok: Barat dan Timur, melainkan juga menghasilkan suatu keputusan yang sangat fatal bagi negara-negara bekas jajahan negara Eropa. Dalam suatu pembicaraan rahasia antara Roosevelt dan Churchill, disepakati untuk mengembalikan situasi di Asia kepada  status quo, seperti sebelum invasi Jepang Desember 1941. Kesepakatan rahasia keduanya ini dipertegas dan diformalkan dalam deklarasi Potsdam pada 26 Juli 1945.

Dengan bantuan 3 Divisi tentara Inggris dan 2 divisi tentara Australia,, Belanda berhasil masuk ke wilayah Republik Indonesia, dan menguasai seluruh wilayah Indonesia Timur.
Kekuatan pasukan Belanda yang menggantikan pasukan Inggris dan Australia, tidak sanggup mengalahkan TNI. Belanda menggunakan taktik mengulur waktu melalui perundingan Linggajati 1947 dan Renville  1948, untuk memperkuat pasukannya.



Tragedi Nasional I, Madiun Affairs 1948
(Ideological Proxy War)

Mencermati sepak terjang Belanda sejak Agresi I, pimpinan militer Indonesia memperkirakan, Belanda tetap akan berusaha menguasai seluruh Indonesia. Sejak datang dengan membonceng tentara Sekutu, hampir setiap bulan Belanda mendatangkan tambahan pasukan dari Belanda, serta merekrut kembali pribumi yang pernah menjadi tentara KNIL sebelum invasi Jepang tahun 1942. Selain merekrut pribumi menjadi tentara Belanda –KNIL- Belanda juga membentuk pasukan Cakra di Madura, dan di berbagai kota di Indonesia mempersenjatai warga keturunan Tionghoa yang tergabung dalam organisasi yang bernama Poh (Pao) An Tui.

Pimpinan TNI memperkirakan bahwa Belanda, akan segera mengerahkan semua kekuatan militernya untuk menghancurkan Republik Indonesia.

Perundingan-perundingan yang memakan waktu berminggu-minggu dan bahkan beberapa bulan sampai diratifikasi oleh otoritas masing-masing negara, dipergunakan oleh Belanda untuk mendatangkan pasukan dari Belanda, merekrut terus pribumi yang bersedia menjadi serdadu KNIL dan memperkuat posisi pertahanan serta persiapan untuk agresi militernya.

Dengan pengalaman Agresi I yang telah dilancarkan Belanda, pimpinan militer  Republik memikirkan langkah-langkah untuk mengantisipasi serangan Belanda. Hal ini antara lain dilakukan oleh Letkol Daan Yahya, pimpinan Divisi Siliwangi yang Hijrah dari Jawa Barat. Pada bulan Maret 1948, dia menyampaikan memorandum kepada Perdana Menteri/Menteri Pertahanan RI Drs. M. Hatta, yang isinya pemikiran untuk  mengantisipasi kemungkinan terjadinya serangan Belanda. Hal yang sama juga diungkapkan oleh Sutan Syahrir.

Beberapa kalangan militer berpendapat, ruang gerak di Pulau Jawa terlalu kecil untuk gerilya total. Pusat Pemerintahan semasa perang gerilya tidak boleh di pulau Jawa.

Setelah beberapa kali bersidang dan membahas semua masukan serta memperhitungkan segala kemungkinan, Dewan Siasat Militer merumuskan:
-          Tempat pimpinan Negara RI beraktivitas untuk bidang luar negeri ditetapkan di India,
-          Pusat Pemerintahan Darurat RI ditetapkan di Sumatera (salah satu daerah di Sumatera),
-          Di Jawa, orang Pemerintah Pusat akan langsung ikut bergerilya.

Dewan Siasat Militer adalah badan tertinggi yang menentukan strategi yang akan dijalankan oleh negara, terutama mengenai masalah pertahanan negara. Dewan tersebut terdiri dari pimpinan politik dan militer tertinggi. Ketua merangkap anggota adalah Presiden/Panglima Tertinggi Angkatan Perang. Anggota lainnya adalah Wakil Presiden, Perdana Menteri, Panglima Besar Angkatan Perang serta menteri dan perwira yang dianggap perlu dilibatkan.

Langkah-langkah antisipasi segera dimulai. Bulan Mei 1948, Wakil Presiden/Perdana Menteri M. Hatta mengirim rombongan pertama dari tiga gelombang, guna mempersiapkan basis perlawanan di Bukittinggi, Sumatera. Rombongan kedua berangkat bulan Agustus, dipimpin oleh Letkol Alex Evert Kawilarang.

Panglima Besar Sudirman menugaskan Kolonel A.H. Nasution untuk menyusun konsep pertahanan, yang kemudian dikenal sebagai Perintah Siasat No. 1, yang dikeluarkan oleh Panglima Besar sebagai Perintah Siasat No. 1/Stop/48 tertanggal 12 Juni 1948.

Perintah Siasat tersebut disahkan oleh pemerintah pada tanggal 9 November 1948 dan menjadi Peraturan Pemerintah No. 30 dan 70, tahun 1948.Menyadari bahwa kekuatan persenjataan TNI jauh di bawah persenjataan tentara Belanda, sehingga sistim pertahanan linier tidak dapat dilakukan dan telah terbukti pada waktu agresi militer Belanda pertama, maka disusun rencana perang gerilya serta sistim pertahanan Wehrkreis (bahasa Jerman: wilayah pertahanan), sebagaimana tertuang dalam butir 2 Perintah Siasat tersebut, yang menetapkan garis besar bentuk perlawanan:

Selama technische uitrusting (perlengkapan teknis) dari TNI serba sederhana, maka pertahanan Republik tetap berdasarkan pertahanan rakyat total, yang tersusun dalam wehrkreise stelsel yang berarti:
a.    aksi vertragend untuk memberi tempo untuk b, c, dan d.
b.    bumi hangus.
c.    pertahanan guerilla daerah (distrik militer yang akan menjelmakan kantong-kantong).
d.    Serangan guerilla atas kota-kota dan phb musuh (oleh kesatuan-kesatuan mobiel).

Letnan Kolonel dr. Wiliater Hutagalung, pada bulan September 1948 diangkat menjadi perwira teritorial Kementerian Pertahanan. Tugas pertama, selain membentuk pasukan teritorial di wilayah III/Jawa Tengah, adalah membuat jaringan teritorial di wilayah Divisi II dan III, dalam mempersiapkan perang gerilya. Untuk mempersiapkan hal-hal seperti tertera pada butir 2 Perintah Siasat, bersama Panglima Divisi III Kolonel Bambang Sugeng dan ajudan masing-masing, Hutagalung mendata jembatan serta bangunan yang akan diledakkan/dihancurkan, apabila Belanda menyerang. Tujuannya adalah, di samping menghambat laju gerakan tentara Belanda, juga agar supaya bangunan tersebut tidak dapat dipergunakan oleh Belanda. Berbagai peralatan (a.l. mesin cetak), perlengkapan serta amunisi mulai dipindahkan ke daerah-daerah yang akan dijadikan basis/markas, terutama ke Gunung Sumbing, yang akan dijadikan basis Divisi III.

Bersama Suripno, Wakil Indonesia di Praha, Musso, salah satu tokoh pemberontakan PKI tahun 1926 terhadap Pemerintah India Belanda, kembali dari Moskow, Rusia. Tanggal 11 Agustus, Musso tiba di Yogyakarta dan segera menempati kembali posisi di pimpinan Partai Komunis Indonesia. Banyak politisi sosialis dan komandan pasukan bergabung dengan Musso, a.l. Mr. Amir Syarifuddin Harahap, dr. Setiajid, kelompok diskusi Patuk, dll.

Aksi saling menculik dan membunuh mulai terjadi, dan masing-masing pihak menyatakan, bahwa pihak lainlah yang memulai. Beberapa perwira TNI pendukung Pemerintah RI dan juga Ketua Mahkamah Agung, Suryo, dibunuh demikian juga dr. Muwardi dari golongan kiri, diculik dan dibunuh. Tuduhan langsung dilontarkan, bahwa pihak lainlah yang melakukannya.

Kelompok kiri menuduh sejumlah petinggi Pemerintah RI, termasuk Wakil Presiden Hatta telah dipengaruhi oleh Amerika Serikat untuk menghancurkan Partai Komunis Indonesia, sejalan dengan doktrin Harry S. Truman, Presiden AS, yang mengeluarkan gagasan “Domino Theory”.  Pada bulan Maret 1948, sebelum kembali ke Amerika, Graham bertemu dengan Sukarno untuk membicarakan kemungkinan bantuan AS kepada Republik Indonesia.

Kemudian pada 21 Juli 1948 telah diadakan pertemuan rahasia di hotel "Huisje Hansje" Sarangan, dekat Madiun yang dihadiri oleh Sukarno, Hatta, Sukiman, Menteri Dalam Negeri, Mohamad Rum (anggota Masyumi) dan Kepala Polisi Sukanto. Di pihak Amerika hadir Gerald Hopkins (penasihat politik Presiden Truman), Merle Cochran (pengganti Graham yang mewakili Amerika dalam Komisi Jasa Baik PBB).

 Dalam pertemuan Sarangan, yang belakangan dikenal sebagai "Perundingan Sarangan", diberitakan bahwa Pemerintah Republik Indonesia menyetujui "Red Drive Proposal"  (proposal pembasmian kelompok merah).

Sebagai “imbalan” kesediaan Pemerintah Indonesia untuk membasmi komunisme di Indonesia, maka Indonesia pun mendapat kucuran dana sebesar 60 juta US $, yaitu bantuan untuk kepolisian RI. Namun ditekankan, bahwa bantuan tersebut tidak boleh dipergunakan untuk melawan Belanda.

Dengan bantuan Arturo Campbell, Sukanto berangkat ke Amerika guna menerima bantuan untuk kepolisian RI. Campbell yang menyandang gelar resmi Atase Konsuler pada Konsulat Jenderal Amerika di Jakarta, sesungguhnya adalah anggota Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

Memang kelompok kiri termasuk Amir Syarifuddin Harahap, tengah membangun kekuatan untuk menghadapi Pemerintah RI, yang dituduh telah cenderung kepada kaum imperialis AS. Hal ini diungkapkan oleh dr. Wiliater Hutagalung, yang juga diminta oleh Amir Syarifuddin untuk ikut bergabung dengan gerakan mereka. Hutagalung menuturkan pembicaraannya dengan Amir Syarifuddin, yang telah dikenalnya sejak awal tahun 40-an di Surabaya:

Pada suatu hari, sekitar pertengahan tahun 1948, kami bertemu dan Amir Syarifuddin menceriterakan mengenai rencana gerakan mereka, kekuatan pendukungnya serta rencana pengembangan pasukan pendukungnya. Dia tentu, mengetahui peran penulis dalam pertempuran di Surabaya Oktober/November 1945 dan selama perang gerilya di Jawa Timur.

Kemudian dia mengatakan: “Bung Willy, pimpinlah pasukan kami. Saya angkat saudara menjadi Mayor Jenderal.”

Saya menjawab: “Bung Amir, kau dibohongi orang-orangmu. Pasukanmu tidak begitu kuat dan tidak betul berpenglaman. Juga tidak betul senjatanya begitu banyak. Saya mengetahui dengan jelas jumlah pasukan beserta persenjataannya dan saya dari permulaan di daerah pertempuran di Jawa Timur. Saya tidak pernah melihat pasukan yang Bung Amir sebutkan. Di rumah sakit selalu didaftar mengenai korban, dari pasukan atau laskar mana, di mana kejadiannya, luka-lukanya karena apa. Tidak pernah saya lihat di daftar-daftar rumah sakit catatan pasukan-pasukan yang Bung Amir maksud. Untuk membangun pasukan yang Bung Amir rencanakan untuk merebut kekuasaan, perlu dana yang sangat besar. Selain itu saya tidak tertarik dengan pangkat Mayor Jenderal.”[1]

Saya juga mengemukakan, bahwa pergerakan sebesar itu memerlukan dana yang sangat besar, namun Amir Syarifuddin menjelaskan, bahwa ‘teman-temannya’ akan membantu menyediakan dana yang dia butuhkan. Saya ingat, bahwa Amir pernah menyatakan telah menerima uang dari Idenburg untuk membangun jaringan bawah tanah melawan tentara Jepang, dan yang dimaksud dengan temannya itu adalah Idenburg.

Ketika Perang Dunia II, baik di Eropa maupun di Asia kelompok kiri Indonesia menjadi sekutu Belanda melawan fasisme Jerman dan Jepang. Namun setelah Perang Dunia (PD) II usai, berkembangnya pengaruh kelompok kiri di Indonesia yang juga mendukung kemerdekaan RI membuat Pemerintah Belanda kuatir. Ketika Amerika Serikat datang dengan gagasan pembasmian komunisme di seluruh dunia, termasuk di Indonesia, Belanda langsung menyetujuinya dan bahkan ikut berperan dengan bermuka dua, yaitu membantu kelompok kiri yang adalah mantan sekutunya selama PD II, dan kepada Pemerintah Indonesia menawarkan “bantuan” untuk membasmi komunisme.

. Bagi saya jelas, bahwa Belanda juga berada di balik gerakan Musso-Amir Syarifuddin.

Demikian penuturan dr. Wiliater Hutagalung.

Ketika Jepang menduduki Indonesia, Amir Syarifuddin mengakui telah menerima uang sebesar 25.000 gulden dari Dr. Idenburg untuk melakukan gerakan bawah tanah melawan Jepang. Namun sejumlah kalangan menyebutkan, bahwa melihat besarnya dana yang dikeluarkan oleh Syarifuddin, dana yang diberikan lebih dari itu, diperkirakan sebesar 50.000 gulden. Bagi Belanda, dan beberapa negara Eropa Barat, untuk melawan negara fasis seperti Jepang dan Jerman, termasuk orang-orang yang dipandang sebagai kolaborator fasis Jepang seperti Sukarno-Hatta, segala cara ditempuh, termasuk kerjasama dengan pihak sosialis dan komunis, dalam hal ini dengan Partai Komunis Indonesia dan kelompok sosialis di Indonesia.

Diisukan, bahwa Sumarsoso tokoh Pesindo, pada 18 September 1948 melalui radio di Madiun telah mengumumkan terbentuknya Pemerintah Front Nasional bagi Karesidenan Madiun. Pada 19 September 1948, Presiden Sukarno dalam pidato yang disiarkan melalui radio menyerukan kepada seluruh rakyat Indonesia, untuk memilih: Musso atau Sukarno-Hatta.

Namun Soemarsono membantah tuduhan, bahwa pada 18 September 1948 dia mengumumkan terbentuknya Front Nasional Daerah (FND), dan telah terjadi pemberontakan PKI. Justru kebalikannya, bahwa FND dibentuk sebagai perlawanan terhadap ancaman dari Pemerintah Pusat. Maka muncullah tudingan adanya “provokasi” dari Pemerintah Republik, berdasarkan suatu putusan yang telah diambil pemimpin-pemimpin Republik dengan wakil-wakil AS.

Sumarsono yang kini menetap di Sidney, Australia, mengungkap hal tersebut kepada Radio Nederland dalam kunjungannya ke Belanda bulan Oktober 2002. Dia juga menyatakan, bahwa Letkol. Suharto yang diutus oleh Panglima Besar Sudirman untuk memantau situasi di Madiun pada awal bulan September sebenarnya sangat mengetahui hal ini, namun mendiamkannya.

Pada waktu itu telah berkobar “perang dingin” antara Blok Barat/Kapitalis (Negara-negara Eropa Barat dan Australia) yang dipimpin Amerika Serikat dengan Blok Timur/Komunis (Negara-negara Eropa Timur) yang dipimpin oleh Uni Sovyet.

Maka pecahlah konflik bersenjata, yang pada waktu itu disebut sebagai Madiun Affairs (Peristiwa Madiun), dan di zaman Orde Baru kemudian dinyatakan sebagai pemberontakan PKI.

Panglima Besar Sudirman menyampaikan kepada pemerintah, bahwa TNI dapat menumpas pasukan-pasukan pendukung Musso dalam waktu 2 minggu. Memang benar, kekuatan inti pasukan-pasukan pendukung Musso dapat dihancurkan dalam waktu singkat. Kekuatan pasukan pendukung Musso digempur dari dua arah: Dari barat oleh pasukan Divisi II di bawah pimpinan Kolonel Gatot Subroto serta pasukan dari Divisi Siliwangi, sedangkan dari timur diserang oleh pasukan dari Divisi I, di bawah pimpinan Kolonel Sungkono[2] dan pasukan Mobiele Brigade Besar (MBB) Jawa Timur, di bawah pimpinan M. Yasin. Batalyon Kala Hitam (Divisi Siliwangi), dipimpin oleh Mayor Kemal Idris, ikut dalam penyerbuan terhadap pendukung Musso di daerah Yogyakarta.

Tanggal 30 September 1948, kota Madiun dapat dikuasai seluruhnya. Pasukan Republik yang datang dari arah timur dan pasukan yang datang dari arah barat, bertemu di Hotel Merdeka di Madiun. Yasin menggambarkan peristiwa tersebut seperti situasi di Jerman, yaitu ketika pasukan Amerika Serikat dan pasukan Rusia bertemu di kota Berlin pada tahun 1945. Namun pimpinan kelompok kiri beserta beberapa pasukan pendukung mereka, lolos dan melarikan diri ke beberapa arah, sehingga tidak dapat segera ditangkap. Baru pada akhir bulan November 1948 seluruh pimpinan dan pasukan pendukung Musso tewas atau dapat ditangkap.

Pada 19 Desember 1948, ketika seluruh kekuatan Republik Indonesia masih berada di Jawa Timur, Belanda melancarkan agresi militernya secara besar-besaran. Karena TNI tidak mau dibebani dengan tawanan di masa perang melawan agresi militer Belanda, maka atas perintah Kol. Gatot Subroto sebelas pimpinan kelompok kiri, termasuk Mr. Amir Syarifuddin Harahap, mantan Perdana Menteri RI, dieksekusi pada 20 Desember 1948.

Untuk  peristiwa Madiun, pemerintah Republik Indonesia mengerahkan seluruh pasukan, baik dari Divisi I Jawa Timur, Divisi II Jawa Tengah Bagian Timur, Divisi III, Jawa Tengah Bagian Barat dan Divisi Siliwangi, yang akibat Perjanjian Renville, harus keluar dari Jawa Barat. Hal ini menyebabkan di Ibukota Yogyakarta tidak terdapat pasukan yang kuat apabila terjadi serangan dari tentara Belanda.

Di tahun 60-an, banyak angkatan ’45 sering mengadakan pertemuan dan mengevaluasi berbagai peristiwa selama agresi militer Belanda, termasuk peristiwa Madiun. Diperoleh informasi, bahwa ternyata tokoh-tokoh kiri yang kembali ke Indonesia dari Eropa, tibanya hampir bersamaan pada bulan Agustus 1948, dan yang sangat menyolok adalah, hampir semua melalui Belanda.

Namun apabila dianalisa lebih dalam, seandainya kelompok kiri ingin merebut kekuasaan pada bulan September seperti diisukan sebelumnya, ada sejumlah kejanggalan, a.l., Amir Syarifuddin mengetahui dengan jelas, pasukan pendukung gerakannya sangat kecil. Musso dan yang lain yang kembali dari Eropa baru tiba di Indonesia pertengahan Agustus 1948, pasti belum mendapat gambaran yang jelas mengenai situasi di Indonesia yang telah mereka tinggalkan selama belasan tahun, bahkan Musso telah melarikan diri ke Eropa sejak kegagalan pemberontakan PKI terhadap Belanda tahun 1926. Selain itu, ketika peristiwa tersebut pecah pada 19 September 1948, Musso dan beberapa tokoh PKI tidak berada di Madiun.

Pada awal konflik Madiun, pemerintah Belanda berpura-pura menawarkan bantuan untuk menumpas pemberontakan tersebut, namun tawaran itu jelas ditolak oleh pemerintah Republik Indonesia. Pimpinan militer Indonesia bahkan memperhitungkan, Belanda akan segera memanfaatkan situasi tersebut untuk melakukan serangan total terhadap kekuatan bersenjata Republik Indonesia.

Namun sampai bulan November, belum seluruh pasukan pendukung Musso dihancurkan, sehingga belum ada pasukan yang kembali ke Yogyakarta. Selain itu pecah juga konflik bersenjata dengan pasukan pendukung Tan Malaka, yang telah dibebaskan dari penjara. Selama di penjara, Tan Malaka berhasil mendapat simpati dari Sabaruddin, yang mempunyai satu Batalyon pasukan.

Pertempuran berlangsung di Jawa Timur, dan dalam pertempuran sengit bulan April 1949 di lereng Gunung Wilis, pasukan Sabaruddin dapat dihancurkan oleh pasukan Divisi I. Tan Malaka dan Sabaruddin ditembak mati.

Untuk banyak orang di pihak Republik, bahkan para petinggi militernya, terjadinya peristiwa Madiun merupakan misteri, yang baru dikemudian hari diperoleh jawabannya, setelah para pelaku peristiwa Madiun di tahun 60-an bertemu dan melakukan evaluasi .

Wakil Kepala Staf Angkatan Perang (WAKSAP) waktu itu, Kol. TB Simatupang menyebut peristiwa Madiun sebagai tragedi nasional. Dalam catatan hariannya, Simatupang menulis a.l.:[3]

“… Saya sendiri yakin, bahwa anak-anak biasa, yakni prajurit-prajurit dan pemuda-pemuda yang telah gugur pada kedua pihak selama peristiwa Madiun ini umumnya tidak tahu menahu tentang persoalan-persoalan yang berada di belakang tragedi nasional ini…
… Sejak di sekolah militer telah saya pelajari bahwa perang saudara selalu membangkitkan emosi-emosi kebencian-kebencian yang jauh lebih mendalam dengan segala tindakan-tindakan yang diakibatkannya daripada dalam perang yang biasa. Sekarang bangsaku telah mengalami kebenaran dari pendapat ini…
… Saya hendak mencoba untuk memahami tragedi yang telah terjadi di kalangan bangsa kita ini…”

Kecurigaan yang dirasakan tahun 1948, setelah dilakukan analisis yang mendalam, kini terlihat jelas, bahwa Peristiwa Madiun yang disebut sebagai tragedi nasional Indonesia, adalah maneuver perang Belanda untuk mengalihkan perhatian ke Madiun dan mengerahkan seluruh pasukan TNI, baik dari Jawa Tengah maupun dari Jawa Timur, termasuk Brimob Kepolisian dan pasukan Siliwangi yang Hijrah dari Jawa Barat, yang mengakibatkan Ibukota Republik Indonesia tidak dijaga oleh pasukan yang kuat.
Selain itu terjadi pengkhianatan yang menyebabkan lapangan udara Maguwo lumpuh, sehingga tentara Belanda dengan mudah dan tanpa satupun korban jiwa, dapat dengan mudah menguasai Maguwo, yang menjadi basis serangan terhadap Yogyakarta.

Kedua hal tersebut di atas yang tidak diprediksi oleh pimpinan TNI ketika mengantisipasi agresi militer Belanda ke II, yaitu di tengah perundingan perdamaian yang difasilitasi oleh PBB, Belanda melakukan manuver untuk memancing TNI mengerahkan seluruh pasukan. Kedua adalah pengkhianatan, yang mengakibatkan satu-satunya lapangan terbang dekat Yogya, yaitu Maguwo, dengan mudah jatuh ke tangan tentara Belanda.

Tanggal 18 Desember 1948 pukul 23.30, siaran radio dari Jakarta menyebutkan, bahwa besok pagi Wakil Tinggi Mahkota Belanda, Dr. Beel, akan menyampaikan pidato yang penting.

Sementara itu Jenderal Spoor yang telah berbulan-bulan mempersiapkan rencana “pemusnahan” TNI memberikan instruksi kepada seluruh tentara Belanda di Jawa dan Sumatera untuk memulai penyerangan terhadap kubu Republik. Operasi tersebut dinamakan “Operasi Kraai” (Operasi Burung Gagak).

Pukul 02.00 pagi 1e para-compgnie (pasukan parasutis I) KST di Andir memperoleh parasut mereka dan memulai memuat keenambelas pesawat transportasi, dan pukul 03.30 dilakukan briefing terakhir.

Pukul 03.45 Mayor Jenderal Engles tiba di bandar udara Andir, diikuti oleh Jenderal Spoor 15 menit kemudian. Dia melakukan inspeksi dan mengucapkan pidato singkat. Pukul 04.20 pasukan elit KST di bawah pimpinan Kapten Eekhout naik ke pesawat dan pukul 04.30 pesawat Dakota pertama tinggal landas. Rute penerbangan ke arah timur menuju Maguwo diambil melalui Lautan Hindia. Pukul 06.25 mereka menerima berita dari para pilot pesawat pemburu, bahwa zona penerjunan telah dapat dipergunakan. Pukul 06.45 pasukan para mulai diterjunkan di Maguwo.

Seiring dengan penyerangan terhadap bandar udara Maguwo, pagi hari tanggal 19 Desember 1948, WTM Beel berpidato di radio dan menyatakan, bahwa Belanda tidak lagi terikat dengan Persetujuan Renville. Penyerbuan terhadap semua wilayah Republik di Jawa dan Sumatera, termasuk serangan terhadap Ibukota RI, Yogyakarta, yang kemudian dikenal sebagai Agresi II telah dimulai. Belanda konsisten dengan menamakan agresi militer ini sebagai “Aksi Polisional”, walaupun yang dikirim bukanlah polisi, melainkan pasukan elit tempur angkatan darat dan udara.

Penyerangan terhadap Ibukota Republik, diawali dengan pemboman atas lapangan terbang Maguwo di pagi buta. Pukul 05.45 lapangan terbang Maguwo dihujani bom dan tembakan mitraliur oleh 5 pesawat Mustang dan 9 pesawat Kittyhawk. Pertahanan TNI di Maguwo hanya terdiri dari 150 orang pasukan pertahanan pangkalan udara dengan persenjataan yang sangat minim, yaitu beberapa senapan dan satu senapan anti pesawat kaliber 12,7. Senjata berat lain sedang dalam keadaan rusak. Pertahanan pangkalan hanya diperkuat dengan satu kompi TNI bersenjata lengkap.

Pukul 06.45, 15 pesawat Dakota menerjunkan pasukan KST Belanda di atas Maguwo. Pertempuran merebut Maguwo hanya berlangsung sekitar 25 menit. Pukul 7.10 bandara Maguwo telah jatuh sepenuhnya ke tangan pasukan Kapten Eekhout. Di pihak Republik tercatat 128 tentara tewas, sedangkan di pihak penyerang, tidak  ada satu pun korban jiwa.

Dari beberapa orang serdadu TNI yang selamat diperoleh informasi, bahwa sebelum penyerangan tentara Belanda ada perintah yang tidak diketahui sumbernya, bahwa senjata berat, termasuk senjata penangkis serangan udara ditarik dari Maguwo, dan yang tersisa hanya senjata ringan dan senjata berat yang rusak. Selain itu seluruh ranjau di sekitar lapangan terbang telah dibersihkan. Pada waktu itu, setelah tentara Belanda menguasai Yogyakarta, tidak dapat dilakukan penyelidikan, siapa yang memberikan perintah tersebut. Yang jelas ini adalah suatu sabotage dan pengkhianatan terhadap Republik Indonesia. Tentara Belanda benar-benar telah mempersiapkan agresinya dengan sangat matang.

Dengan demikian, PERANG antara Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI) melawan pasukan pendukung Musso dapat dikategorikan sebagai “Perang Perwakilan Ideologi” (Ideological Proxy War) pertama di dunia.



Tragedi Nasional II

Dari dokumen-dokumen rahasia yang telah diungkap dalam rangka deklasifikasi dari beberapa Negara NATO, sebenarnya telah sangat gambling mengenai siapa-siapa yang “ikut bermain” dalam Tragedi Nasional II di Indonesia tahun 1965.

Dokumen BND (Bundesnachrichten Dienst), Dinas Rahasia Jerman, yang sehubungan dengan Indonesia, telah dibuka untuk umum tahun 1985. Kemudian dokumen-dokumen dari CIA (Central Intelligence Agency, Amerika Serikat) dan MI-6 (Military Intelligence, Inggris), telah dibuka tahun 1995, Bagian-bagian yang sehubungan dengan Indonesia telah dipublikasikan.

Bahkan notulen pembicaraan Presiden Suharto dengan Presiden Amerika Gerald Ford, sehubungan dengan rencana untuk menduduki Timor Timur tahun 1975, kini juga sudah dapat diakses oleh publik.

Dokumen yang paling jelas adalah dari MI-6 sehubungan dengan konspirasi untuk menggulingkan Presiden Sukarno. Seorang spesialis, Norman Reddaway, dibekali dengan dana tunai sebesar 100.000 Pound Sterling, diberi tugas, untuk melakukan segala-sesuatunya untuk menggulingkan Sukarno.
Di Belanda, menjelang bulan September 2015, bermunculan berita mengenai penelitian peran Belanda dalam menggulingkan Presiden Sukarno. Salahsatu sosok yang paling disorot dan yang paling misterius adalah Pater Josephus Gerardus (Joop) Beek, seorang pendeta Katolik, yang kemudian ternyata adalah agen CIA.

Sepak-terjang dari Pater Beek yang sangat dikenal adalah KASEBUL-nya, yaitu Kaderisasi Sebulan, di mana dia membina para pemuda katolik di Indonesia untuk mengambil bagian dalam menggulingkan Sukarno dan menghancurkan PKI.

Secara singkat, yang berperan di balik Tragedi Nasional I, 1948 adalah:
1.    ABDACOM (America, British, Dutch, Australian Command),
2.    Peran besar Belanda: Van der Plas Connection dan Idenburg.

Yang berperan di balik Tragedi Nasional II, 1965:
1.    ABDACOM (Peran besar dari Inggris: Norman Reddaway. Dari Amerika; Marshall Green)
2.    Dari Belanda: Van der Plas Connection dan Pater Beek.
3.    Yang ikut “bermain”: KGB, Rusia, BND Jerman, Jepang dan RRT.

Sekarang, setelah penggalan-penggalan “Puzzle” dapat disusun, nampak dengan jelas BENANG MERAH ANTARA TRAGEDI NASIONAL I, 1948 DENGAN TRAGEDI NASIONAL II, 1965, yaitu kesamaan sebagian besar aktor yang “bermain” di belakang kedua Tragedi Nasional Indonesia, yang mengakibatkan sesama anak bangsa saling membunuh, dan meninggalkan luka yang sangat dalam di tubuh Bangsa Indonesia.

Yang sangat penting harus dilakukan oleh bangsa Indonesia adalah, sesegera mungkin menyelesaikan tragedi nasional I dan II serta berbagai konflik kekerasan, yang sebagian besar adalah upaya Negara-negara asing yang terus berusaha memecah-belah bangsa Indonesia, dengan tujuan akhir –sejak ratusan tahun, menguasai Sumber Daya Alam Indonesia yang masih berlimpah.

Dengan hancurnya Imperium komunis Uni Sovyet dan Pakta Warsawa, Negara-negara barat telah mendisain “common enemy” (musuh bersama) baru, yaitu menciptakan Benturan Peradaban (Samuel Huntington: The Clash of Civilizations). Yang dimaksud peradaban di sini adalah agama.

Perkembangan di Indonesia beberapa tahun belakangan, seiring dengan “The Arab Spring”, yaitu gejolak yang terjadi di negara-negara Arab sejak lima tahun yerakhir menunjukkan, bahwa perlahan-lahan semakin terasa adanya Peradaban yang dibenturkan (The Clashed Civilization). Dan ini akan mengarah kepada TRAGEDI NASIONAL INDONESIA KE III.




 Catatan kaki


[1] Pada waktu itu, dr. W. Hutagalung berpangkat Kolonel. Pangkat Brigadir Jenderal belum dikenal di TNI,
      sehingga pangkat setelah Kolonel adalah Mayor Jenderal.
[2] Kol. Sungkono diangkat menjadi Gubernur Militer Jawa Timur, tanggal 19 September 1948. Diumumkan
     melalui radio, sedangkan surat pengangkatan baru diterima kemudian.
[3]Simatupang, Mayjen. TNI (Purn.) T.B., Laporan dari Banaran.  Kisah pengalaman seorang prajurit selama perang kemerdekaan, Penerbit Sinar Harapan, Jakarta, 1980, hlm. 85



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LAMPIRAN – LAMPIRAN







Lampiran I

hplogoDezinformatsiya

John Barron
In practising what it calls disinformation, the Soviet union has for years sponsored grand deceptions calculated to mislead, confound, or inflame foreign opinion. Some of these subterfuges have had a considerable impact on world affairs. Some also have had unforeseeable consequences severely detrimental to Soviet interests. Ultimately, they have made the Soviet Union the victim of its own deceit...
With KGB approval and support, the Czech STB in the autumn of 1964 initiated a vast deception campaign to arouse Indonesian passions against the United States. Through an Indonesian ambassador they had compromised with female agents, the Czechs purveyed to President Sukarno a series of forged documents and fictitious reports conjuring up CIA plots against him. One forgery suggested that the CIA planned to assassinate Sukarno; another 'revealed' a joint American-British plan to invade Indonesia from Malaysia. The unstable Sukarno responded with anti-American diatribes, which some Indonesian journalists in the pay of the KGB and STB amplified and Radio Moscow played back to the Indonesian people. Incited mobs besieged American offices in Djakarta, anti-American hysteria raged throughout the country, and US influence was eradicated. The former STB deception specialist Ladislav Bittman has written a history and analysis of the operation in which he participated. He states, 'We ourselves were surprised by the monstrous proportions to which the provocation grew.'
This brilliant tactical success, however, ended in a débâcle. Bittman notes: 'Czechoslovak and Soviet disinformation departments, intoxicated by potential gains in the battle against the main enemy, deliberately shut their eyes to the danger that the consequences could also be the heightening of internal tension and intensification of Chinese influence in the country.' Encouraged by the increasingly influential Chinese and misled by the climate the Czechs and Russians had created, Indonesian communists concluded that the time was propitious for a coup. The night of September 30, 1965, they murdered six Indonesian generals and attempted to seize the government. The Indonesian military reacted by slaughtering tens of thousands of communists and annihilating the Party, then one of the largest in the world. Indonesia, which seemed destined to slip irretrievably into the communist orbit, emerged as an independent nation with a strong government determined to retain its independence.
Despite such fiascos, Soviet rulers have shown no disposition to abandon organized deception as an instrument of national policy. The practice is another legacy of Lenin embedded in Soviet custom. Just as Lenin admired terror, he extolled the 'poisoned weapons' of deceit, duplicity, and slander. He wrote:
'The communists must be prepared to make every sacrifice and, if necessary, even resort to all sorts of cunning schemes and stratagems, to employ illegal methods, to evade and conceal the truth... The practical part of communist policy is to incite one [enemy] against another... We communists must use one country against another.. My words were calculated to evoke hatred, aversion, and contempt... not to convince but to break up the ranks of the opponent, not to correct an opponent's mistake but to destroy him, to wipe his organization off the face of the earth. This formulation is indeed of such a nature as to evoke the worst thoughts, the worst suspicions about the opponent.'
Out of these 'Principles of Leninism' the contemporary Soviet concept of Dezinformatsiya, or disinformation, has evolved. The Russians define disinformation as 'the dissemination of false and provocative information.' As practised by the KGB, disinformation is far more complex than the definition implies. It entails the distribution of forged or fabricated documents, letters, manuscripts, and photographs; the propagation of misleading or malicious rumours and erroneous intelligence by agents; the duping of visitors to the Soviet Union; and physical acts committed for psychological effect. These techniques are used variously to influence policies of foreign governments, disrupt relations among other nations, undermine the confidence of foreign populations in their leaders and institutions, discredit individuals and groups opposed to Soviet policies, deceive foreigners about Soviet intentions and conditions within the Soviet Union, and, at times, simply to obscure depredations and blunders of the KGB itself.
Disinformation operations differ from conventional propaganda in that their true origins are concealed, and they usually involve some form of clandestine action. For this reason, Soviet rulers always have charged their clandestine apparatus with primary responsibility for disinformation.
The Cheka and each of its organizational descendants had a 'Disinformation Desk' until reorganization of the KGB in 1959 produced a full-fledged Disinformation Department known as Department D of the First Chief Directorate. The first director was General Ivan Ivanovich Agayants, a tall aloof Armenian with grizzled hair and a thin gray mustache. Ascetic and solemn, Agayants combined personal puritanism with a penchant for professional ruthlessness. He gathered a staff of some fifty officers at the Centre and stationed another fifteen to twenty at the KGB's Karlshorst Residency in East Berlin. Additionally, he received authorization to engage scientists, technical specialists, and military officers as consultants whenever needed. After the death of Agayants and another reorganization in 1968, the Disinformation Department became Department A, acquiring more stature in the Foreign Directorate bureaucracy and, reportedly, more personnel.
Occasionally Disinformation Department officers travel abroad to participate in operations. Agayants slipped into Sweden in 1963 and Pakistan in 1965. He also went to Indonesia in 1965 and periodically visited Eastern Europe to inspect satellite disinformation departments. His deputy, Sergei Aleksandrovich Kondrashev, travelled to Bonn in 1966 hunting material for slandering West German political leaders. Another Disinformation Department Officer, Yuri Ivanovich Lyudin, using the alias Yuri Ivanovich Modin, spent ten months in New Delhi preparing the forgeries that the KGB released to influence the 1967 Indian elections. A few disinformation officers, such as Vladimir Aleksandrovich Chuchukin, a first secretary of the Soviet UN mission in New York, are permanently stationed abroad. However, for most field work abroad, Department A relies upon officers and agents from the First Chief Directorate's geographic divisions. It also may avail itself of saboteurs from Department V or bona fide Soviet diplomats who at times are employed to plant rumours, wittingly or unwittingly.

John Barron, KGB, Hodder & Stoughton, 1974. In The Penguin Book of Lies, pp. 420-423


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Lampiran II

This article is from Pacific Affairs, 58, Summer 1985, pages 239-264. Peter Dale Scott is a professor of English at the University of California in Berkeley, and a member of the advisory board at Public Information Research.

The United States and the Overthrow of Sukarno, 1965-1967

Peter Dale Scott
In this short paper on a huge and vexed subject, I discuss the U.S. involvement in the bloody overthrow of Indonesia's President Sukarno, 1965-67. The whole story of that ill-understood period would transcend even the fullest possible written analysis. Much of what happened can never be documented; and of the documentation that survives, much is both controversial and unverifiable. The slaughter of Sukarno's left-wing allies was a product of widespread paranoia as well as of conspiratorial policy, and represents a tragedy beyond the intentions of any single group or coalition. Nor is it suggested that in 1965 the only provocations and violence came from the right-wing Indonesian military, their contacts in the United States, or (also important, but barely touched on here) their mutual contacts in British, German and Japanese intelligence.
And yet, after all this has been said, the complex and ambiguous story of the Indonesian bloodbath is also in essence simpler and easier to believe than the public version inspired by President Suharto and U.S. government sources. Their problematic claim is that in the so-called Gestapu (Gerakan September Tigahpuluh) coup attempt of September 30, 1965 (when six senior army generals were murdered), the left attacked the right, leading to a restoration of power, and punitive purge of the left, by the center.1 This article argues instead that, by inducing, or at a minimum helping to induce, the Gestapu "coup," the right in the Indonesian Army eliminated its rivals at the army's center, thus paving the way to a long-planned elimination of the civilian left, and eventually to the establishment of a military dictatorship.2 Gestapu, in other words, was only the first phase of a three-phase right-wing coup -- one which had been both publicly encouraged and secretly assisted by U.S. spokesmen and officials.3
Before turning to U.S. involvement in what the CIA itself has called "one of the worst mass murders of the twentieth century,"4 let us recall what actually led up to it. According to the Australian scholar Harold Crouch, by 1965 the Indonesian Army General Staff was split into two camps. At the center were the general staff officers appointed with, and loyal to, the army commander General Yani, who in turn was reluctant to challenge President Sukarno's policy of national unity in alliance with the Indonesian Communist party, or PKI. The second group, including the right-wing generals Nasution and Suharto, comprised those opposed to Yani and his Sukarnoist policies.5 All of these generals were anti-PKI, but by 1965 the divisive issue was Sukarno.
The simple (yet untold) story of Sukarno's overthrow is that in the fall of 1965 Yani and his inner circle of generals were murdered, paving the way for a seizure of power by right-wing anti-Yani forces allied to Suharto. The key to this was the so-called Gestapu coup attempt which, in the name of supporting Sukarno, in fact targeted very precisely the leading members of the army's most loyal faction, the Yani group.6 An army unity meeting in January 1965, between "Yani's inner circle" and those (including Suharto) who "had grievances of one sort or another against Yani," lined up the victims of September 30 against those who came to power after their murder.7
Not one anti-Sukarno general was targeted by Gestapu, with the obvious exception of General Nasution.8 But by 1961 the CIA operatives had become disillusioned with Nasution as a reliable asset, because of his "consistent record of yielding to Sukarno on several major counts."9 Relations between Suharto and Nasution were also cool, since Nasution, after investigating Suharto on corruption charges in 1959, had transferred him from his command.10
The duplicitous distortions of reality, first by Lt. Colonel Untung's statements for Gestapu, and then by Suharto in "putting down" Gestapu, are mutually supporting lies.11 Untung, on October 1, announced ambiguously that Sukarno was under Gestapu's "protection" (he was not); also, that a CIA-backed Council of Generals had planned a coup for before October 5, and had for this purpose brought "troops from East, Central, and West Java" to Jakarta.12 Troops from these areas had indeed been brought to Jakarta for an Armed Forces Day parade on October 5th. Untung did not mention, however, that "he himself had been involved in the planning for the Armed Forces Day parade and in selecting the units to participate in it;"13 nor that these units (which included his own former battalion, the 454th) supplied most of the allies for his new battalion's Gestapu activities in Jakarta.
Suharto's first two broadcasts reaffirmed the army's constant loyalty to "Bung Karno the Great Leader," and also blamed the deaths of six generals on PKI youth and women, plus "elements of the Air Force" -- on no other evidence than the site of the well where the corpses were found.14 At this time he knew very well that the killings had in fact been carried out by the very army elements Untung referred to, elements under Suharto's own command.15
Thus, whatever the motivation of individuals such as Untung in the Gestapu putsch, Gestapu as such was duplicitous. Both its rhetoric and above all its actions were not simply inept; they were carefully designed to prepare for Suharto's equally duplicitous response. For example, Gestapu's decision to guard all sides of the downtown Merdeka Square in Jakarta, except that on which Suharto's KOSTRAD [Army Strategic Reserve Command] headquarters were situated, is consistent with Gestapu's decision to target the only army generals who might have challenged Suharto's assumption of power. Again, Gestapu's announced transfer of power to a totally fictitious "Revolutionary Council," from which Sukarno had been excluded, allowed Suharto in turn to masquerade as Sukarno's defender while in fact preventing him from resuming control. More importantly, Gestapu's gratuitous murder of the generals near the air force base where PKI youth had been trained allowed Suharto, in a Goebbels-like manoeuvre, to transfer the blame for the killings from the troops under his own command (whom he knew had carried out the kidnappings) to air force and PKI personnel who where ignorant of them.16
From the pro-Suharto sources -- notably the CIA study of Gestapu published in 1968 -- we learn how few troops were involved in the alleged Gestapu rebellion, and, more importantly, that in Jakarta as in Central Java the same battalions that supplied the "rebellious" companies were also used to "put the rebellion down." Two thirds of one paratroop brigade (which Suharto had inspected the previous day) plus one company and one platoon constituted the whole of Gestapu forces in Jakarta; all but one of these units were commanded by present or former Diponegoro Division officers close to Suharto; and the last was under an officer who obeyed Suharto's close political ally, Basuki Rachmat.17
Two of these companies, from the 454th and 530th battalions, were elite raiders, and from 1962 these units had been among the main Indonesian recipients of U.S. assistance.18 This fact, which in itself proves nothing, increases our curiosity about the many Gestapu leaders who had been U.S.-trained. The Gestapu leader in Central Java, Saherman, had returned from training at Fort Leavenworth and Okinawa, shortly before meeting with Untung and Major Sukirno of the 454th Battalion in mid-August 1965.19 As Ruth McVey has observed, Saherman's acceptance for training at Fort Leavenworth "would mean that he had passed review by CIA observers."20
Thus there is continuity between the achievements of both Gestapu and the response to it by Suharto, who in the name of defending Sukarno and attacking Gestapu continued its task of eliminating the pro-Yani members of the Army General Staff, along with such other residual elements of support for first Yani and then Sukarno as remained.21
The biggest part of this task was of course the elimination of the PKI and its supporters, in a bloodbath which, as some Suharto allies now concede, may have taken more than a half-million lives. These three events -- Gestapu, Suharto's response, and the bloodbath -- have nearly always been presented in this country as separately motivated: Gestapu being described as a plot by leftists, and the bloodbath as for the most part an irrational act of popular frenzy.
U.S. officials, journalists and scholars, some with rather prominent CIA connections, are perhaps principally responsible for the myth that the bloodbath was a spontaneous, popular revulsion to what U.S. Ambassador Jones later called PKI "carnage."22 Although the PKI certainly contributed its share to the political hysteria of 1965, Crouch has shown that subsequent claims of a PKI terror campaign were grossly exaggerated.23 In fact systematic killing occurred under army instigation in staggered stages, the worst occurring as Colonel Sarwo Edhie's RPKAD [Army Paracommando Regiment] moved from Jakarta to Central and East Java, and finally to Bali.24
Civilians involved in the massacre were either recruited and trained by the army on the spot, or were drawn from groups (such as the army- and CIA-sponsored SOKSI trade unions [Central Organization of Indonesian Socialist Employees], and allied student organizations) which had collaborated for years with the army on political matters. It is clear from Sundhaussen's account that in most of the first areas of organized massacre (North Sumatra, Aceh, Cirebon, the whole of Central and East Java), there were local army commanders with especially strong and proven anti-PKI sentiments. Many of these had for years cooperated with civilians, through so-called "civic action" programs sponsored by the United States, in operations directed against the PKI and sometimes Sukarno. Thus one can legitimately suspect conspiracy in the fact that anti-PKI "civilian responses" began on October 1, when the army began handing out arms to Muslim students and unionists, before there was any publicly available evidence linking Gestapu to the PKI.25
Even Sundhaussen, who downplays the army's role in arming and inciting the civilian murder bands, concludes that, whatever the strength of popular anti-PKI hatred and fear, "without the Army's anti-PKI propaganda the massacre might not have happened."26 The present article goes further and argues that Gestapu, Suharto's response, and the bloodbath were part of a single coherent scenario for a military takeover, a scenario which was again followed closely in Chile in the years 1970-73 (and to some extent in Cambodia in 1970).
Suharto, of course, would be a principal conspirator in this scenario: his duplicitous role of posing as a defender of the constitutional status quo, while in fact moving deliberately to overthrow it, is analogous to that of General Pinochet in Chile. But a more direct role in organizing the bloodbath was played by civilians and officers close to the cadres of the CIA's failed rebellion of 1958, now working in so-called "civic action" programs funded and trained by the United States. Necessary ingredients of the scenario had to be, and clearly were, supplied by other nations in support of Suharto. Many such countries appear to have played such a supporting role: Japan, Britain, Germany,27 possibly Australia. But I wish to focus on the encouragement and support for military "putschism" and mass murder which came from the U.S., from the CIA, the military, RAND, the Ford Foundation, and individuals.28

The United States and the Indonesian Army's "Mission"

It seems clear that from as early as 1953 the U.S. was interested in helping to foment the regional crisis in Indonesia, usually recognized as the "immediate cause" that induced Sukarno, on March 14, 1957, to proclaim martial law, and bring "the officer corps legitimately into politics."29
By 1953 (if not earlier) the U.S. National Security Council had already adopted one of a series of policy documents calling for "appropriate action, in collaboration with other friendly countries, to prevent permanent communist control" of Indonesia.30 Already NSC 171/1 of that year envisaged military training as a means of increasing U.S. influence, even though the CIA's primary efforts were directed towards right-wing political parties ("moderates ... on the right," as NSC 171 called them): notably the Masjumi Muslim and the PSI "Socialist" parties. The millions of dollars which the CIA poured into the Masjumi and the PSI in the mid-1950s were a factor influencing the events of 1965, when a former PSI member -- Sjam -- was the alleged mastermind of Gestapu,31 and PSI-leaning officers -- notably Suwarto and Sarwo Edhie -- were prominent in planning and carrying out the anti-PKI response to Gestapu.32
In 1957-58, the CIA infiltrated arms and personnel in support of the regional rebellions against Sukarno. These operations were nominally covert, even though an American plane and pilot were captured, and the CIA efforts were accompanied by an offshore task force of the U.S. Seventh Fleet.33 In 1975 a Senate Select Committee studying the CIA discovered what it called "some evidence of CIA involvement in plans to assassinate President Sukarno"; but, after an initial investigation of the November 1957 assassination attempt in the Cikini district of Jakarta, the committee did not pursue the matter.34
On August 1, 1958, after the failure of the CIA-sponsored PRRI-Permesta regional rebellions against Sukarno, the U.S. began an upgraded military assistance program to Indonesia in the order of twenty million dollars a year.35 A U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff memo of 1958 makes it clear this aid was given to the Indonesian Army ("the only non-Communist force ... with the capability of obstructing the ... PKI") as "encouragement" to Nasution to "carry out his 'plan' for the control of Communism."36
The JCS had no need to spell out Nasution's "plan," to which other documents at this time made reference.37 It could only imply the tactics for which Nasution had distinguished himself (in American eyes) during the crushing of the PKI in the Madiun Affair of 1948: mass murders and mass arrests, at a minimum of the party's cadres, possibly after an army provocation.38 Nasution confirmed this in November 1965, after the Gestapu slaughter, when he called for the total extinction of the PKI, "down to its very roots so there will be no third Madiun."39
By 1958, however, the PKI had emerged as the largest mass movement in the country. It is in this period that a small group of U.S. academic researchers in U.S. Air Force- and CIA-subsidized "think-tanks" began pressuring their contacts in the Indonesian military publicly, often through U.S. scholarly journals and presses, to seize power and liquidate the PKI opposition.40 The most prominent example is Guy Pauker, who in 1958 both taught at the University of California at Berkeley and served as a consultant at the RAND Corporation. In the latter capacity he maintained frequent contact with what he himself called "a very small group" of PSI intellectuals and their friends in the army.41
In a RAND Corporation book published by the Princeton University Press, Pauker urged his contacts in the Indonesian military to assume "full responsibility" for their nation's leadership, "fulfill a mission," and hence "to strike, sweep their house clean."42 Although Pauker may not have intended anything like the scale of bloodbath which eventually ensued, there is no escaping the fact that "mission" and "sweep clean" were buzz-words for counterinsurgency and massacre, and as such were used frequently before and during the coup. The first murder order, by military officers to Muslim students in early october, was the word sikat, meaning "sweep," "clean out," "wipe out," or "massacre."43
Pauker's closest friend in the Indonesian army was a U.S.-trained General Suwarto, who played an important part in the conversion of the army from a revolutionary to a counterinsurgency function. In the years after 1958, Suwarto built the Indonesian Army Staff and Command School in Bandung (SESKOAD) into a training-ground for the takeover of political power. SESKOAD in this period became a focal-point of attention from the Pentagon, the CIA, RAND, and (indirectly) the Ford Foundation.44
Under the guidance of Nasution and Suwarto, SESKOAD developed a new strategic doctrine, that of Territorial Warfare (in a document translated into English by Pauker), which gave priority to counterinsurgency as the army's role. Especially after 1962, when the Kennedy administration aided the Indonesian Army in developing Civic Mission or "civic action" programs, this meant the organization of its own political infrastructure, or "Territorial Organization," reaching in some cases down to the village level.45 As the result of an official U.S. State Department recommendation in 1962, which Pauker helped write, a special U.S. MILTAG (Military Training Advisory Group) was set up in Jakarta, to assist in the implementation of SESKOAD's Civic Mission programs.46
SESKOAD also trained the army officers in economics and administration, and thus to operate virtually as a para-state, independent of Sukarno's government. So the army began to collaborate, and even sign contracts, with U.S. and other foreign corporations in areas which were now under its control. This training program was entrusted to officers and civilians close to the PSI.47 U.S. officials have confirmed that the civilians, who themselves were in a training program funded by the Ford Foundation, became involved in what the (then) U.S. military attache called "contingency planning" to prevent a PKI takeover.48
But the most significant focus of U.S. training and aid was the Territorial Organization's increasing liaison with "the civilian administration, religious and cultural organizations, youth groups, veterans, trade unions, peasant organizations, political parties and groups at regional and local levels."49 These political liaisons with civilian groups provided the structure for the ruthless suppression of the PKI in 1965, including the bloodbath.50
Soon these army and civilian cadres were together plotting disruptive activities, such as the Bandung anti-Chinese riots of May 1963, which embarrassed not just the PKI, but Sukarno himself. Chomsky and Herman report that "Army-inspired anti-Chinese programs that took place in West Java in 1959 were financed by U.S. contributions to the local army commander"; apparently CIA funds were used by the commander (Colonel Kosasih) to pay local thugs in what Mozingo calls "the army's (and probably the Americans') campaign to rupture relations with China."51 The 1963 riot, which took place in the very shadow of SESKOAD, is linked by Sundhaussen to an army "civic action" organization; and shows conspiratorial contact between elements (an underground PSI cell, PSI- and Masjumi-affiliated student groups, and General Ishak Djuarsa of the Siliwangi Division's "civic action" organization) that would all be prominent in the very first phase of Suharto's so-called "response" to the Gestapu.52
The May 1963 student riots were repeated in October 1965 and (especially in Bandung) January 1966, at which time the liaison between students and the army was largely in the hands of PSI-leaning officers like Sarwo Edhie and Kemal Idris.53 The CIA Plans Directorate was sympathetic to the increasing deflection of a nominally anti-PKI operation into one embarrassing Sukarno. This turn would have come as no surprise: Suwarto, Kemal Idris and the PSI had been prominent in a near-coup (the so-called "Lubis affair") in 1956.54
But increasingly Suwarto cultivated a new student, Colonel Suharto, who arrived at SESKOAD in October 1959. According to Sundhaussen, a relatively pro-Suharto scholar: "In the early 1960s Soeharto was involved in the formation of the Doctrine of Territorial Warfare and the Army's policy on Civic Mission (that is, penetration of army officers into all fields of government activities and responsibilities).55 Central to the public image of Gestapu and Suharto's response is the much-publicized fact that Suharto, unlike his sometime teacher Suwarto, and his long-time chief of staff Achmad Wiranatakusuma, had never studied in the United States. But his involvement in Civic Mission (or what Americans called "civic action") programs located him along with PSI-leaning officers at the focal point of U.S. training activities in Indonesia, in a program which was nakedly political.56
The refinement of Territorial Warfare and Civic Mission Doctrine into a new strategic doctrine for army political intervention became by 1965 the ideological process consolidating the army for political takeover. After Gestapu, when Suwarto was an important political advisor to his former SESKOAD pupil Suharto, his strategic doctrine was the justification for Suharto's announcement on August 15, 1966, in fulfillment of Pauker's public and private urgings, that the army had to assume a leading role in all fields.57
Hence the army unity meeting of January 1965, arranged after Suharto had duplicitously urged Nasution to take "a more accommodating line"58 towards Sukarno, was in fact a necessary step in the process whereby Suharto effectively took over from his rivals Yani and Nasution. It led to the April 1965 seminar at SESKOAD for a compromise army strategic doctrine, the Tri Ubaya Cakti, which "reaffirmed the army's claim to an independent political role."59
On August 15, 1966, Suharto, speaking to the nation, justified his increasing prominence in terms of the "Revolutionary Mission" of the Tri Ubaya Cakti doctrine. Two weeks later at SESKOAD the doctrine was revised, at Suharto's instigation but in a setting "carefully orchestrated by Brigadier Suwarto," to embody still more clearly Pauker's emphasis on the army's "Civic Mission" or counterrevolutionary role.60 This "Civic Mission," so important to Suharto, was also the principal goal and fruit of U.S. military aid to Indonesia.
By August 1964, moreover, Suharto had initiated political contacts with Malaysia, and hence eventually with Japan, Britain, and the United States.61 Although the initial purpose of these contacts may have been to head off war with Malaysia, Sundhaussen suggests that Suharto's motive was his concern, buttressed in mid-1964 by a KOSTRAD intelligence report, about PKI political advances.62 Mrazek links the peace feelers to the withdrawal of "some of the best army units" back to Java in the summer of 1965.63 These movements, together with earlier deployment of a politically insecure Diponegoro battalion in the other direction, can also be seen as preparations for the seizure of power.64
In Nishihara's informed Japanese account, former PRRI / Permesta personnel with intelligence connections in Japan were prominent in these negotiations, along with Japanese officials.65 Nishihara also heard that an intimate ally of these personnel, Jan Walandouw, who may have acted as a CIA contact for the 1958 rebellion, later again "visited Washington and advocated Suharto as a leader."66 I am reliably informed that Walandouw's visit to Washington on behalf of Suharto was made some months before Gestapu.67

The U.S. Moves Against Sukarno

Many people in Washington, especially in the CIA Plans Directorate, had long desired the "removal" of Sukarno as well as of the PKI.68 By 1961 key policy hard-liners, notably Guy Pauker, had also turned against Nasution.69 Nevertheless, despite last-minute memoranda from the outgoing Eisenhower administration which would have opposed "whatever regime" in Indonesia was "increasingly friendly toward the Sino-Soviet bloc," the Kennedy administration stepped up aid to both Sukarno and the army.70
However, Lyndon Johnson's accession to the presidency was followed almost immediately by a shift to a more anti-Sukarno policy. This is clear from Johnson's decision in December 1963 to withhold economic aid which (according to Ambassador Jones) Kennedy would have supplied "almost as a matter of routine."71 This refusal suggests that the U.S. aggravation of Indonesia's economic woes in 1963-65 was a matter of policy rather than inadvertence. Indeed, if the CIA's overthrow of Allende is a relevant analogy, then one would expect someday to learn that the CIA, through currency speculations and other hostile acts, contributed actively to the radical destabilization of the Indonesian economy in the weeks just before the coup, when "the price of rice quadrupled between June 30 and October 1, and the black market price of the dollar skyrocketed, particularly in September."72
As was the case in Chile, the gradual cutoff of all economic aid to Indonesia in the years 1962-65 was accompanied by a shift in military aid to friendly elements in the Indonesian Army: U.S. military aid amounted to $39.5 million in the four years 1962-65 (with a peak of $16.3 million in 1962) as opposed to $28.3 million for the thirteen years 1949-61.73 After March 1964, when Sukarno told the U.S., "go to hell with your aid," it became increasingly difficult to extract any aid from the U.S. congress: those persons not aware of what was developing found it hard to understand why the U.S. should help arm a country which was nationalizing U.S. economic interests, and using immense aid subsidies from the Soviet Union to confront the British in Malaysia.
Thus a public image was created that under Johnson "all United States aid to Indonesia was stopped," a claim so buttressed by misleading documentation that competent scholars have repeated it.74 In fact, Congress had agreed to treat U.S. funding of the Indonesian military (unlike aid to any other country) as a covert matter, restricting congressional review of the president's determinations on Indonesian aid to two Senate committees, and the House Speaker, who were concurrently involved in oversight of the CIA.75
Ambassador Jones' more candid account admits that "suspension" meant "the U.S. government undertook no new commitments of assistance, although it continued with ongoing programs.... By maintaining our modest assistance to [the Indonesian Army and the police brigade], we fortified them for a virtually inevitable showdown with the burgeoning PKI."76
Only from recently released documents do we learn that new military aid was en route as late as July 1965, in the form of a secret contract to deliver two hundred Aero-Commanders to the Indonesian Army: these were light aircraft suitable for use in "civic action" or counterinsurgency operations, presumably by the Army Flying Corps whose senior officers were virtually all trained in the U.S.77 By this time, the publicly admitted U.S. aid was virtually limited to the completion of an army communications system and to "civic action" training. It was by using the army's new communications system, rather than the civilian system in the hands of Sukarno loyalists, that Suharto on October 1, 1965 was able to implement his swift purge of Sukarno-Yani loyalists and leftists, while "civic action" officers formed the hard core of lower-level Gestapu officers in Central Java.78
Before turning to the more covert aspects of U.S. military aid to Indonesia in 1963-65, let us review the overall changes in U.S.-Indonesian relations. Economic aid was now in abeyance, and military aid tightly channeled so as to strengthen the army domestically. U.S. government funding had obviously shifted from the Indonesian state to one of its least loyal components. As a result of agreements beginning with martial law in 1957, but accelerated by the U.S.-negotiated oil agreement of 1963, we see exactly the same shift in the flow of payments from U.S. oil companies. Instead of token royalties to the Sukarno government, the two big U.S. oil companies in Indonesia, Stanvac and Caltex, now made much larger payments to the army's oil company, Permina, headed by an eventual political ally of Suharto, General Ibnu Sutowo; and to a second company, Pertamin, headed by the anti-PKI and pro-U.S. politician, Chaerul Saleh.79 After Suharto's overthrow of Sukarno, Fortune wrote that "Sutowo's still small company played a key part in bankrolling those crucial operations, and the army has never forgotten it."80

U.S. Support for the Suharto Faction Before Gestapu

American officials commenting on the role of U.S. aid in this period have taken credit for assisting the anti-Communist seizure of power, without ever hinting at any degree of conspiratorial responsibility in the planning of the bloodbath. The impression created is that U.S. officials remained aloof from the actual planning of events, and we can see from recently declassified cable traffic how carefully the U.S. government fostered this image of detachment from what was happening in Indonesia.81
In fact, however, the U.S. government was lying about its involvement. In Fiscal Year 1965, a period when The New York Times claimed "all United States aid to Indonesia was stopped," the number of MAP (Military Assistance Program) personnel in Jakarta actually increased, beyond what had been projected, to an unprecedented high.82 According to figures released in 1966,83 from FY 1963 to FY 1965 the value of MAP deliveries fell from about fourteen million dollars to just over two million dollars. Despite this decline, the number of MAP military personnel remained almost unchanged, approximately thirty, while in FY 1965 civilian personnel (fifteen) were present for the first time. Whether or not one doubts that aid deliveries fell off as sharply as the figures would suggest, the MILTAG personnel figures indicate that their "civic action" program was being escalated, not decreased.84 We have seen that some months before Gestapu, a Suharto emissary with past CIA connections (Colonel Jan Walandouw) made contact with the U.S. government. From as early as May 1965, U.S. military suppliers with CIA connections (principally Lockheed) were negotiating equipment sales with payoffs to middlemen, in such a way as to generate payoffs to backers of the hitherto little-known leader of a new third faction in the army, Major-General Suharto -- rather than to those backing Nasution or Yani, the titular leaders of the armed forces. Only in the last year has it been confirmed that secret funds administered by the U.S. Air Force (possibly on behalf of the CIA) were laundered as "commissions" on sales of Lockheed equipment and services, in order to make political payoffs to the military personnel of foreign countries.85
A 1976 Senate investigation into these payoffs revealed, almost inadvertently, that in May 1965, over the legal objections of Lockheed's counsel, Lockheed commissions in Indonesia had been redirected to a new contract and company set up by the firm's long-time local agent or middleman.86 Its internal memos at the time show no reasons for the change, but in a later memo the economic counselor of the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta is reported as saying that there were "some political considerations behind it."87 If this is true, it would suggest that in May 1965, five months before the coup, Lockheed had redirected its payoffs to a new political eminence, at the risk (as its assistant chief counsel pointed out) of being sued for default on its former contractual obligations.
The Indonesian middleman, August Munir Dasaad, was "known to have assisted Sukarno financially since the 1930's."88 In 1965, however, Dasaad was building connections with the Suharto forces, via a family relative, General Alamsjah, who had served briefly under Suharto in 1960, after Suharto completed his term at SESKOAD. Via the new contract, Lockheed, Dasaad and Alamsjah were apparently hitching their wagons to Suharto's rising star:
When the coup was made during which Suharto replaced Sukarno, Alamsjah, who controlled certain considerable funds, at once made these available to Suharto, which obviously earned him the gratitude of the new President. In due course he was appointed to a position of trust and confidence and today Alamsjah is, one might say, the second important man after the President.89
Thus in 1966 the U.S. Embassy advised Lockheed it should "continue to use" the Dasaad-Alamsjah-Suharto connection.90
In July 1965, at the alleged nadir of U.S.-Indonesian aid relations, Rockwell-Standard had a contractual agreement to deliver two hundred light aircraft (Aero-Commanders) to the Indonesian Army (not the Air Force) in the next two months.91 Once again the commission agent on the deal, Bob Hasan, was a political associate (and eventual business partner) of Suharto.92 More specifically, Suharto and Bob Hasan established two shipping companies to be operated by the Central Java army division, Diponegoro. This division, as has long been noticed, supplied the bulk of the personnel on both sides of the Gestapu coup drama -- both those staging the coup attempt, and those putting it down. And one of the three leaders in the Central Java Gestapu movement was Lt. Col. Usman Sastrodibroto, chief of the Diponegoro Division's "section dealing with extramilitary functions."93
Thus of the two known U.S. military sales contracts from the eve of the Gestapu Putsch, both involved political payoffs to persons who emerged after Gestapu as close Suharto allies. The use of this traditional channel for CIA patronage suggests that the U.S. was not at arm's length from the ugly political developments of 1965, despite the public indications, from both government spokesmen and the U.S. business press, that Indonesia was now virtually lost to communism and nothing could be done about it.
The actions of some U.S. corporations, moreover, made it clear that by early 1965 they expected a significant boost to the U.S. standing in Indonesia. For example, a recently declassified cable reveals that Freeport Sulphur had by April 1965 reached a preliminary "arrangement" with Indonesian officials for what would become a $500 million investment in West Papua copper. This gives the lie to the public claim that the company did not initiate negotiations with Indonesians (the inevitable Ibnu Sutowo) until February 1966.94 And in September 1965, shortly after World Oil reported that "indonesia's gas and oil industry appeared to be slipping deeper into the political morass,"95 the president of a small oil company (Asamera) in a joint venture with Ibnu Sutowo's Permina purchased $50,000 worth of shares in his own ostensibly-threatened company. Ironically this double purchase (on September 9 and September 21) was reported in the Wall Street Journal of September 30, 1965, the day of Gestapu.

The CIA's "[One Word Deleted] Operation" in 1965

Less than a year after Gestapu and the bloodbath, James Reston wrote appreciatively about them as "A Gleam of Light in Asia":
Washington is being careful not to claim any credit for this change in the sixth most populous and one of the richest nations in the world, but this does not mean that Washington had nothing to do with it. There was a great deal more contact between the anti-Communist forces in that country and at least one very high official in Washington before and during the Indonesian massacre than is generally realized.96
As for the CIA in 1965, we have the testimony of former CIA officer Ralph McGehee, curiously corroborated by the selective censorship of his former CIA employers:
Where the necessary circumstances or proofs are lacking to support U.S. intervention, the C.I.A. creates the appropriate situations or else invents them and disseminates its distortions worldwide via its media operations.
A prominent example would be Chile.... Disturbed at the Chilean military's unwillingness to take action against Allende, the C.I.A. forged a document purporting to reveal a leftist plot to murder Chilean military leaders. The discovery of this "plot" was headlined in the media and Allende was deposed and murdered.
There is a similarity between events that precipitated the overthrow of Allende and what happened in Indonesia in 1965. Estimates of the number of deaths that occurred as a result of the latter C.I.A. [one word deleted] operation run from one-half million to more than one million people.97
McGehee claims to have once seen, while reviewing CIA documents in Washington, a highly classified report on the agency's role in provoking the destruction of the PKI after Gestapu. It seems appropriate to ask for congressional review and publication of any such report. If, as is alleged, it recommended such murderous techniques as a model for future operations, it would appear to document a major turning-point in the agency's operation history: towards the systematic exploitation of the death squad operations which, absent during the Brazilian coup of 1964, made the Vietnam Phoenix counterinsurgency program notorious after 1967, and after 1968 spread from Guatemala to the rest of Latin America.98
McGehee's claims of a CIA psychological warfare operation against Allende are corroborated by Tad Szulc:
CIA agents in Santiago assisted Chilean military intelligence in drafting bogus Z-plan documents alleging that Allende and his supporters were planning to behead Chilean military commanders. These were issued by the junta to justify the coup.99
Indeed the CIA deception operations against Allende appear to have gone even farther, terrifying both the left and the right with the fear of incipient slaughter by their enemies. Thus militant trade-unionists as well as conservative generals in Chile received small cards printed with the ominous words Djakarta se acerca (Jakarta is approaching).100
This is a model destabilization plan -- to persuade all concerned that they no longer can hope to be protected by the status quo, and hence weaken the center, while inducing both right and left towards more violent provocation of each other. Such a plan appears to have been followed in Laos in 1959-61, where a CIA officer explained to a reporter that the aim "was to polarize Laos."101 It appears to have been followed in Indonesia in 1965. Observers like Sundhaussen confirm that to understand the coup story of October 1965 we must look first of all at the "rumour market" which in 1965 ... turned out the wildest stories."102 On September 14, two weeks before the coup, the army was warned that there was a plot to assassinate army leaders four days later; a second such report was discussed at army headquarters on September 30.103 But a year earlier an alleged PKI document, which the PKI denounced as a forgery, had purported to describe a plan to overthrow "Nasutionists" through infiltration of the army. This "document," which was reported in a Malaysian newspaper after being publicized by the pro-U.S. politician Chaerul Saleh104 in mid-December 1964, must have lent credence to Suharto's call for an army unity meeting the next month.105
The army's anxiety was increased by rumors, throughout 1965, that mainland China was smuggling arms to the PKI for an imminent revolt. Two weeks before Gestapu, a story to this effect also appeared in a Malaysian newspaper, citing Bangkok sources which relied in turn on Hong Kong sources.106 Such international untraceability is the stylistic hallmark of stories emanating in this period from what CIA insiders called their "mighty Wurlitzer," the world-wide network of press "assets" through which the CIA, or sister agencies such as Britain's MI-6, could plant unattributable disinformation.107 PKI demands for a popular militia or "fifth force," and the training of PKI youth at Lubang Buaja, seemed much more sinister to the Indonesian army in the light of the Chinese arms stories.
But for months before the coup, the paranoia of the PKI had also been played on, by recurring reports that a CIA-backed "Council of Generals" was plotting to suppress the PKI. It was this mythical council, of course, that Untung announced as the target of his allegedly anti-CIA Gestapu coup. But such rumors did not just originate from anti-American sources; on the contrary, the first authoritative published reference to such a council was in a column of the Washington journalists Evans and Novak:
As far back as March, General Ibrahim Adjie, commander of the Siliwangi Division, had been quoted by two American journalists as saying of the Communists: "we knocked them out before [at Madiun]. We check them and check them again." The same journalists claimed to have information that "...the Army has quietly established an advisory commission of five general officers to report to General Jani ... and General Nasution ... on PKI activities."108
Mortimer sees the coincidence that five generals besides Yani were killed by Gestapu as possibly significant.
But we should also be struck by the revival in the United States of the image of Yani and Nasution as anti-PKI planners, long after the CIA and U.S. press stories had in fact written them off as unwilling to act against Sukarno.109 If the elimination by Gestapu of Suharto's political competitors in the army was to be blamed on the left, then the scenario required just such a revival of the generals' forgotten anti-Communist image in opposition to Sukarno. An anomalous unsigned August 1965 profile of Nasution in The New York Times, based on an 1963 interview but published only after a verbal attack by Nasution on British bases in Singapore, does just this: it claims (quite incongruously, given the context) that Nasution is "considered the strongest opponent of Communism in Indonesia"; and adds that Sukarno, backed by the PKI, "has been pursuing a campaign to neutralize the ... army as an anti-Communist force."110
In the same month of August 1965, fear of an imminent showdown between "the PKI and the Nasution group" was fomented in Indonesia by an underground pamphlet; this was distributed by the CIA's long-time asset, the PSI, whose cadres were by now deeply involved:
The PKI is combat ready. The Nasution group hope the PKI will be the first to draw the trigger, but this the PKI will not do. The PKI will not allow itself to be provoked as in the Madiun Incident. In the end, however, there will be only two forces left: the PKI and the Nasution group. The middle will have no alternative but to choose and get protection from the stronger force.111
One could hardly hope to find a better epitome of the propaganda necessary for the CIA's program of engineering paranoia.
McGehee's article, after censorship by the CIA, focuses more narrowly on the CIA's role in anti-PKI propaganda alone:
The Agency seized upon this opportunity [Suharto's response to Gestapu] and set out to destroy the P.K.I.... [eight sentences deleted].... Media fabrications played a key role in stirring up popular resentment against the P.K.I. Photographs of the bodies of the dead generals -- badly decomposed -- were featured in all the newspapers and on television. Stories accompanying the pictures falsely claimed that the generals had been castrated and their eyes gouged out by Communist women. This cynically manufactured campaign was designed to foment public anger against the Communists and set the stage for a massacre.112
McGehee might have added that the propaganda stories of torture by hysterical women with razor blades, which serious scholars dismiss as groundless, were revived in a more sophisticated version by a U.S. journalist, John Hughes, who is now the chief spokesman for the State Department.113
Suharto's forces, particularly Col. Sarwo Edhie of the RPKAD commandos, were overtly involved in the cynical exploitation of the victims' bodies.114 But some aspects of the massive propaganda campaign appear to have been orchestrated by non-Indonesians. A case in point is the disputed editorial in support of Gestapu which appeared in the October 2 issue of the PKI newspaper Harian Rakjat. Professors Benedict Anderson and Ruth McVey, who have questioned the authenticity of this issue, have also ruled out the possibility that the newspaper was "an Army falsification," on the grounds that the army's "competence ... at falsifying party documents has always been abysmally low."115
The questions raised by Anderson and McVey have not yet been adequately answered. Why did the PKI show no support for the Gestapu coup while it was in progress, then rashly editorialize in support of Gestapu after it had been crushed? Why did the PKI, whose editorial gave support to Gestapu, fail to mobilize its followers to act on Gestapu's behalf? Why did Suharto, by then in control of Jakarta, close down all newspapers except this one, and one other left-leaning newspaper which also served his propaganda ends?116 Why, in other words, did Suharto on October 2 allow the publication of only two Jakarta newspapers, two which were on the point of being closed down forever?
As was stated at the outset, it would be foolish to suggest that in 1965 the only violence came from the U.S. government, the Indonesian military, and their mutual contacts in British and Japanese intelligence. A longer paper could also discuss the provocative actions of the PKI, and of Sukarno himself, in this tragedy of social breakdown. Assuredly, from one point of view, no one was securely in control of events in this troubled period.117
And yet for two reasons such a fashionably objective summation of events seems inappropriate. In the first place, as the CIA's own study concedes, we are talking about "one of the ghastliest and most concentrated bloodlettings of current times," one whose scale of violence seems out of all proportion to such well-publicized left-wing acts as the murder of an army lieutenant at the Bandar Betsy plantation in May 1965,118 And, in the second place, the scenario described by McGehee for 1965 can be seen as not merely responding to the provocations, paranoia, and sheer noise of events in that year, but as actively encouraging and channeling them.
It should be noted that former CIA Director William Colby has repeatedly denied that there was CIA or other U.S. involvement in the massacre of 1965. (In the absence of a special CIA Task Force, Colby, as head of the CIA's Far Eastern Division from 1962-66, would normally have been responsible for the CIA's operations in Indonesia.) Colby's denial is however linked to the discredited story of a PKI plot to seize political power, a story that he revived in 1978:
Indonesia exploded, with a bid for power by the largest Communist Party in the world outside the curtain, which killed the leadership of the army with Sukarno's tacit approval and then was decimated in reprisal. CIA provided a steady flow of reports on the process in Indonesia, although it did not have any role in the course of events themselves.119
It is important to resolve the issue of U.S. involvement in this systematic murder operation, and particularly to learn more about the CIA account of this which McGehee claims to have seen. McGehee tells us: "The Agency was extremely proud of its successful [one word deleted] and recommended it as a model for future operations [one-half sentence deleted]."120 Ambassador Green reports of an interview with Nixon in 1967:
The Indonesian experience had been one of particular interest to [Nixon] because things had gone well in Indonesia. I think he was very interested in that whole experience as pointing to the way we [!] should handle our relationships on a wider basis in Southeast Asia generally, and maybe in the world.121
Such unchallenged assessments help explain the role of Indonesians in the Nixon-sponsored overthrow of Sihanouk in Cambodia in 1970, the use of the Jakarta scenario for the overthrow of Allende in Chile in 1973, and the U.S. sponsorship today of the death squad regimes in Central America.122
University of California, Berkeley, U.S.A., December 1984

1. The difficulties of this analysis, based chiefly on the so-called "evidence" presented at the Mahmilub trials, will be obvious to anyone who has tried to reconcile the conflicting accounts of Gestapu in, e.g., the official Suharto account by Nugroho Notosusanto and Ismail Saleh, and the somewhat less fanciful CIA study of 1968, both referred to later. I shall draw only on those parts of the Mahmilub evidence which limit or discredit their anti-PKI thesis. For interpretation of the Mahmilub data, cf. especially Coen Holtzappel, "The 30 September Movement," Journal of Contemporary Asia, IX, 2 (1979), pp. 216-40. The case for general skepticism is argued by Rex Mortimer, Indonesian Communism Under Sukarno (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1974), pp. 421-3; and more forcefully, by Julie Southwood and Patrick Flanagan, Indonesia: Law, Propaganda, and Terror (London: Zed Press, 1983), pp. 126-34.
2. At his long-delayed trial in 1978, Gestapu plotter Latief confirmed earlier revelations that he had visited his old commander Suharto on the eve of the Gestapu kidnappings. He claimed that he raised with Suharto the existence of an alleged right-wing "Council of Generals" plotting to seize power, and informed him "of a movement which was intended to thwart the plan of the generals' council for a coup d'etat" (Anon., "The Latief Case: Suharto's Involvement Revealed," Journal of Contemporary Asia, IX, 2 [1979], pp. 248-50). For a more comprehensive view of Suharto's involvement in Gestapu, cf. especially W.F. Wertheim, "Whose Plot? New Light on the 1965 Events," Journal of Contemporary Asia, IX, 2 (1979), pp. 197-215; Holtzappel, "The 30 September," in contrast, points more particularly to intelligence officers close to the banned Murba party of Chaerul Saleh and Adam Malik: cf. fn. 104.
3. The three phases are: (1) "Gestapu," the induced left-wing "coup"; (2) "KAP-Gestapu," or the anti-Gestapu "response," massacring the PKI; (3) the progressive erosion of Sukarno's remaining power. This paper will chiefly discuss Gestapu / KAP-Gestapu, the first two phases. To call the first phase by itself a "coup" is in my view an abuse of terminology: there is no real evidence that in this phase political power changed hands or that this was the intention.
4. U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Research Study: Indonesia -- The Coup that Backfired, 1968 (cited hereafter as CIA Study), p. 71n.
5. Harold Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1978), pp. 79-81.
6. In addition, one of the two Gestapu victims in Central Java (Colonel Katamso) was the only non-PKI official of rank to attend the PKI's nineteenth anniversary celebration in Jogjakarta in May 1964: Mortimer, Indonesian Communism, p. 432. Ironically, the belated "discovery" of his corpse was used to trigger off the purge of his PKI contacts.
7. Four of the six pro-Yani representatives in January were killed along with Yani on October 1. Of the five anti-Yani representatives in January, we shall see that at least three were prominent in "putting down" Gestapu and completing the elimination of the Yani-Sukarno loyalists (the three were Suharto, Basuki Rachmat, and Sudirman of SESKOAD, the Indonesian Army Staff and Command School): Crouch, The Army, p. 81n.
8. While Nasution's daughter and aide were murdered, he was able to escape without serious injury, and support the ensuing purge.
9. Indonesia, 22 (October 1976), p. 165 (CIA Memorandum of 22 March 1961 from Richard M. Bissell, Attachment B). By 1965 this disillusionment was heightened by Nasution's deep opposition to the U.S. involvement in Vietnam.
10. Crouch, The Army, p. 40; Brian May, The Indonesian Tragedy (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978), pp. 221-2.
11. I shall assume for this condensed argument that Untung was the author, or at least approved, of the statements issued in his name. Scholars who see Untung as a dupe of Gestapu's controllers note that Untung was nowhere near the radio station broadcasting in his name, and that he appears to have had little or no influence over the task force which occupied it (under Captain Suradi of the intelligence service of Colonel Latief's Brigade): Holtzappel, pp. 218, 231-2, 236-7. I have no reason to contradict those careful analysts of Gestapu -- such as Wertheim, "Whose Plot?" p. 212, and Holtzappel, "The 30 September," p. 231 -- who conclude that Untung personally was sincere, and manipulated by other dalangs such as Sjam.
12. Broadcast of 7:15 a.m. October 1; Indonesia 1 (April 1966), p. 134; Ulf Sundhaussen, The Road to Power: Indonesian Military Politics, 1945-1967 (Kuala Lumpur and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 196.
13. Ibid., p. 201.
14. Broadcasts of October 1 and 4, 1965; Indonesia 1 (April 1966), pp. 158-9.
15. CIA Study, p. 2; O.G. Roeder, The Smiling General: President Soeharto of Indonesia (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1970), p. 12, quoting Suharto himself: "On my way to KOSTRAD HQ [Suharto's HQ] I passed soldiers in green berets who were placed under KOSTRAD command but who did not salute me."
16. Anderson and McVey concluded that Sukarno, Air Force Chief Omar Dhani, PKI Chairman Aidit (the three principal political targets of Suharto's anti-Gestapu "response") were rounded up by the Gestapu plotters in the middle of the night, and taken to Halim air force base, about one mile from the well at Lubang Buaja where the generals' corpses were discovered. In 1966 they surmised that this was "to seal the conspirators' control of the bases," and to persuade Sukarno "to go along with" the conspirators' plans (Benedict Anderson and Ruth McVey, A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965, Coup in Indonesia [Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1971], pp. 19-21). An alternative hypothesis of course is that Gestapu, by bringing these men together against their will, created the semblance of a PKI-air force-Sukarno conspiracy which would later be exploited by Suharto. Sukarno's presence at Halim "was later to provide Sukarno's critics with some of their handiest ammunition" (John Hughes, The End of Sukarno [London: Angus and Robertson, 1978], p. 54).
17. CIA Study, p. 2; cf. p. 65: "At the height of the coup ... the troops of the rebels [in Central Java] were estimated to have the strength of only one battalion; during the next two days, these forces gradually melted away."
18. Rudolf Mrazek, The United States and the Indonesian Military, 1945-1966 (Prague: Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, 1978), vol. II, p. 172. These battalions, comprising the bulk of the 3rd Paratroop Brigade, also supplied the bulk of the troops used to put down Gestapu in Jakarta. The subordination of these two factions in this supposed civil war to a single close command structure under Suharto is cited to explain how Suharto was able to restore order in the city without gunfire. Meanwhile out at the Halim air force base an alleged gun battle between the 454th (Green Beret) and RPKAD (Red Beret) paratroops went off "without the loss of a single man" (CIA Study, p. 60). In Central Java, also, power "changed hands silently and peacefully," with "an astonishing lack of violence" (CIA Study, p. 66).
19. Ibid., p. 60n; Arthur J. Dommen, "The Attempted Coup in Indonesia," China Quarterly, January-March 1966, p. 147. The first "get-acquainted" meeting of the Gestapu plotters is placed in the Indonesian chronology of events from "sometimes before August 17, 1965"; cf. Nugroho Notosusanto and Ismail Saleh, The Coup Attempt of the "September 30 Movement" in Indonesia (Jakarta: [Pembimbing Masa, 1968], p. 13); in the CIA Study, this meeting is dated September 6 (p. 112). Neither account allows more than a few weeks to plot a coup in the world's fifth most populous country.
20. Mortimer, Indonesian Communism, p. 429.
21. Of the six General Staff officers appointed along with Yani, three (Suprapto, D.I. Pandjaitan, and S. Parman) were murdered. Of the three survivors, two (Mursjid and Pranoto) were removed by Suharto in the next eight months. The last member of Yani's staff, Djamin Gintings, was used by Suharto during the establishment of the New Order, and ignored thereafter.
22. Howard Palfrey Jones, Indonesia: The Possible Dream (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1971), p. 391; cf. Arnold Brackman, The Communist Collapse in Indonesia (New York: Norton, 1969), pp. 118-9.
23. Crouch, The Army, p. 150n.
24. Ibid., pp. 140-53; for the disputed case of Bali, even Robert Shaplen, a journalist close to U.S. official sources, concedes that "The Army began it" (Time Out of Hand [New York: Harper and Row, 1969], p. 125). The slaughter in East Java "also really got started when the RPKAD arrived, not just Central Java and Bali" (letter from Benedict Anderson).
25. Sundhaussen, The Road, pp. 171, 178-9, 210, 228; Donald Hindley, "Alirans and the Fall of the Older Order," Indonesia, 25 (April 1970), pp. 40-41.
26. Sundhaussen, The Road, p. 219.
27. "In 1965 it [the BND, or intelligence service of the Federal Republic of Germany] assisted Indonesia's military secret service to suppress a left-wing Putsch in Djakarta, delivering sub-machine guns, radio equipment and money to the value of 300,000 marks" (Heinz Hoehne and Hermann Zolling, The General Was a Spy [New York: Bantam, 1972], p. xxxiii).
28. We should not be misled by the CIA's support of the 1958 rebellion into assuming that all U.S. Government plotting against Sukarno and the PKI must have been CIA-based (cf. fn. 122).
29. Daniel Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy: Indonesian Politics, 1957-1959 (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University press, 1966), p. 12. For John Foster Dulles' hostility to Indonesian unity in 1953, cf. Leonard Mosley, Dulles (New York: The Dial Press / James Wade, 1978), p. 437.
30. Declassified Documents Quarterly Catalogue (Woodbridge, Connecticut: Research Publications, 1982), 001191.
31. As the head of the PKI's secret Special Bureau, responsible only to Aidit, Sjam by his own testimony provided leadership to the "progressive officers" of Gestapu. The issue of PKI involvement in Gestapu thus rests on the question of whether Sjam was manipulating the Gestapu leadership on behalf of the PKI, or the PKI leadership on behalf of the army. There seems to be no disagreement that Sjam was (according to the CIA Study, p. 107) a longtime "double agent" and professed "informer for the Djakarta Military Command." Wertheim (p. 203) notes that in the 1950s Sjam "was a cadre of the PSI," and "had also been in touch with Lt. Col. Suharto, today's President, who often came to stay in his house in Jogja." This might help explain why in the 1970s, after having been sentenced to death, Sjam and his co-conspirator Supeno were reportedly "allowed out [of prison] from time to time and wrote reports for the army on the political situation" (May, The Indonesian, p. 114). Additionally, the "Sjam" who actually testified and was convicted, after being "captured" on March 9, 1967, was the third individual to be identified by the army as the "Sjam" of whom Untung had spoken: Declassified Documents Retrospective Collection (Washington, D.C.: Carrollton Press, 1976), 613C; Hughes, p. 25.
32. Wertheim, "Whose Plot?" p. 203; Mortimer, Indonesian Communism, p. 431 (Sjam); Sundhaussen, The Road, p. 228 (Suwarto and Sarwo Edhie).
33. Joseph B. Smith, Portrait of a Cold Warrior (New York: Putnam, 1976), p. 205; cf. Thomas Powers, The Man Who Kept the Secrets (New York: Knopf, 1979), p. 89.
34. U.S., Congress, Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. "Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders," 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 1975 (Senate Report No. 94-465), p. 4n; personal communications.
35. Declassified Documents Quarterly Catalogue, 1982, 002386; 1981, 367A.
36. Ibid., 1982, 002386 (JCS Memo for SecDef, 22 September 1958).
37. Indonesia, 22 (October 1976), p. 164 (CIA Memorandum of 22 March 1961, Attachment A, p. 6).
38. Scholars are divided over interpretations of Madiun as they are over Gestapu. Few Americans have endorsed the conclusion of Wertheim that "the so-called communist revolt of Madiun ... was probably more or less provoked by anti-communist elements"; yet Kahin has suggested that the events leading to Madiun "may have been symptomatic of a general and widespread government drive aimed at cutting down the military strength of the PKI" (W.F. Wertheim, Indonesian Society in Transition [The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1956], p. 82; George McT. Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia [Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1970], p. 288). Cf. Southwood and Flanagan, Indonesia: Law, pp. 26-30.
39. Southwood and Flanagan, Indonesia: Law, p. 68; cf. Nasution's statement to students on November 12, 1965, reprinted in Indonesia, 1 (April 1966), p. 183: "We are obliged and dutybound to wipe them [the PKI] from the soil of Indonesia."
40. Examples in Peter Dale Scott, "Exporting Military-Economic Development," in Malcolm Caldwell, ed., Ten Years' Military Terror in Indonesia (Nottingham, England: Spokesman Books, 1975), pp. 227-32.
41. David Ransom, "Ford Country: Building an Elite for Indonesia," in Steve Weissman, ed., The Trojan Horse (San Francisco, California: Ramparts Press, 1974), p. 97; cf. p. 101. Pauker brought Suwarto to RAND in 1962.
42. John H. Johnson, ed., The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1962), pp. 222-4. The foreword to the book is by Klaus Knorr, who worked for the CIA while teaching at Princeton.
43. Shaplen, Time, p. 118; Hughes, The End, p. 119; Southwood and Flanagan, Indonesia: Law, pp. 75-6; Scott, "Exporting," p. 231. William Kintner, a CIA (OPC) senior staff officer from 1950-52, and later Nixon's ambassador to Thailand, also wrote in favor of "liquidating" the PKI while working at a CIA-subsidized think-tank, the Foreign Policy Research Institute, on the University of Pennsylvania campus (William Kintner and Joseph Kornfeder, The New Frontier of War [London: Frederick Muller, 1963], pp. 233, 237-8): "If the PKI is able to maintain its legal existence and Soviet influence continues to grow, it is possible that Indonesia may be the first Southeast Asia country to be taken over by a popularly based, legally elected communist government.... In the meantime, with Western help, free Asian political leaders -- together with the military -- must not only hold on and manage, but reform and advance while liquidating the enemy's political and guerrilla armies."
44. Ransom, "Ford Country," pp. 95-103; Southwood and Flanagan, Indonesia: Law, pp. 34-6; Scott, "Exporting," pp. 227-35.
45. Sundhaussen, The Road, pp. 141, 175.
46. Published U.S. accounts of the Civic Mission / "civic action" programs describe them as devoted to "civic projects -- rehabilitating canals, draining swampland to create new rice paddies, building bridges and roads, and so on (Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation [Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1967], p. 377). But a memo to President Johnson from Secretary of State Rusk, on July 17, 1964, makes it clear that at that time the chief importance of MILTAG was for its contact with anti-Communist elements in the Indonesian Army and its Territorial Organization: "Our aid to Indonesia ... we are satisfied ... is not helping Indonesia militarily. It is however, permitting us to maintain some contact with key elements in Indonesia which are interested in and capable of resisting Communist takeover. We think this is of vital importance to the entire Free World" (Declassified Documents Quarterly Catalogue, 1982, 001786 [DOS Memo for President of July 17, 1964; italics in original]).
47. Southwood and Flanagan, Indonesia: Law, p. 35; Scott, "Exporting," p. 233.
48. Ransom, "Ford Country," pp. 101-2, quoting Willis G. Ethel; cited in Scott, "Exporting," p. 235.
49. Sundhaussen, The Road, p. 141. There was also the army's "own securely controlled paramilitary organization of students -- modelled on the U.S.R.O.T.C. and commanded by an army colonel [Djuhartono] fresh from the U.S. army intelligence course in Hawaii": Mrazek, The United States, vol. II, p. 139, citing interview of Nasution with George Kahin, July 8, 1963.
50. Pauker, though modest in assessing his own political influence, does claim that a RAND paper he wrote on counterinsurgency and social justice, ignored by the U.S. military for whom it was intended, was influential in the development of his friend Suwarto's Civic Mission doctrine.
51. Noam Chomsky and E.S. Herman, The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism (Boston, Massachusetts: South End Press, 1979), p. 206; David Mozingo, Chinese Policy Toward Indonesia (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1976), p. 178.
52. Sundhaussen, The Road, pp. 178-9. The PSI of course was neither monolithic nor a simple instrument of U.S. policy. But the real point is that, in this 1963 incident as in others, we see conspiratorial activity relevant to the military takeover, involving PSI and other individuals who were at the focus of U.S. training programs, and who would play an important role in 1965.
53. Sundhaussen, The Road, pp. 228-33: in January 1966 the "PSI activists" in Bandung "knew exactly what they were aiming at, which was nothing less than the overthrow of Sukarno. Moreover, they had the protection of much of the Siliwangi officer corps" Once again, I use Sundhaussen's term "PSI-leaning" to denote a milieu, not to explain it. Sarwo Edhie was a long-time CIA contact, while Kemal Idris' role in 1965 may owe much to his former PETA commander the Japanese intelligence officer Yanagawa. Cf. Masashi Nishihara, The Japanese and Sukarno's Indonesia (Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1976), pp. 138, 212.
54. Sundhaussen, The Road, pp. 99-101. Lubis was also a leader in the November 1957 assassination attempt against Sukarno, and the 1958 rebellion.
55. Ibid., 188; cf. p. 159n.
56. Suharto's "student" status does not of course mean that he was a mere pawn in the hands of those with whom he established contact at SESKOAD. For example, Suharto's independence from the PSI and those close to them became quite evident in January 1974, when he and Ali Murtopo cracked down on those responsible for army-tolerated student riots reminiscent of the one in May 1963. Cf. Crouch, The Army, pp. 309-17.
57. Sundhaussen, The Road, pp. 228, 241-43. In the same period SESKOAD was used for the political re-education of generals like Surjosumpeno, who, although anti-Communist, were guilty of loyalty to Sukarno (p. 238).
58. Crouch, The Army, p. 80; at this time Suharto was already unhappy with Sukarno's "rising pro-communist policy" (Roeder, The Smiling, p. 9).
59. Crouch, The Army, p. 81; cf. Mrazek, The United States, vol. II, pp. 149-51.
60. Sundhaussen, The Road, pp. 241-3.
61. Through his intelligence group OPSUS (headed by Ali Murtopo) Suharto made contact with Malaysian leaders; in two accounts former PSI and PRRI / Permesta personnel in Malaysia played a role in setting up this sensitive political liaison: Crouch, The Army, p. 74; Nishihara, The Japanese, p. 149.
62. Sundhaussen, The Road, pp. 188.
63. Mrazek, The United States, vol. II, p. 152.
64. Cf. Edward Luttwak, Coup D'Etat: A Practical Handbook (London: Allen Lane / Penguin Press, 1968), p. 61: "though Communist-infiltrated army units were very powerful they were in the wrong place; while they sat in the Borneo jungles the anti-Communist paratroops and marines took over Jakarta, and the country." What is most interesting in this informed account by Luttwak (who has worked for years with the CIA) is that "the anti-Communist paratroops" included not only the RPKAD but those who staged the Gestapu uprising in Jakarta, before putting it down.
65. Nishihara, The Japanese, pp. 142, 149.
66.Ibid., p. 202, cf. p. 207. The PRRI / Permesta veterans engaged in the OPSUS peace feelers, Daan Mogot and Willy Pesik, had with Jan Walandouw been part of a 1958 PRRI secret mission to Japan, a mission detailed in the inside account by former CIA officer Joseph B. Smith (Portrait of a Cold Warrior [New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1976], p. 245), following which Walandouw flew on "to Taipeh, then Manila and New York."
67. Personal communication. If the account of Neville Maxwell (senior research officer at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, Oxford University) can be believed, then the planning of the Gestapu / anti-Gestapu scenario may well have begun in 1964 (Journal of Contemporary Asia, IX, 2 [1979], pp. 251-2; reprinted in Southwood and Flanagan, Indonesia: Law, p. 13): "A few years ago I was researching in Pakistan into the diplomatic background of the 1965 Indo-Pakistan conflict, and in foreign ministry papers to which I had been given access came across a letter to the then foreign minister, Mr. Bhutto, from one of his ambassadors in Europe ... reporting a conversation with a Dutch intelligence officer with NATO. According to my note of that letter, the officer had remarked to the Pakistani diplomat that 'Indonesia was going to fall into the Western lap like a rotten apple.' Western intelligence agencies, he said, would organize a 'premature communist coup ... [which would be] foredoomed to fail, providing a legitimate and welcome opportunity to the army to crush the communists and make Soekarno a prisoner of the army's goodwill.' The ambassador's report was dated December 1964."
68. Indonesia, 22 (October 1976), p. 164 (CIA Memo of March 27, 1961, Appendix A, p. 8); cf. Powers, The Man, p. 89.
69. Indonesia, 22 (October 1976), p. 165 (CIA Memo of March 27, 1961).
70. The lame-duck Eisenhower NSC memo would have committed the U.S. to oppose not just the PKI in Indonesia, but "a policy increasingly friendly toward the Sino-Soviet bloc on the part of whatever regime is in power." "The size and importance of Indonesia," it concluded, "dictate [!] a vigorous U.S. effort to prevent these contingencies": Declassified Documents Quarterly Catalogue, 1982, 000592 (NSC 6023 of 19 December, 1960). For other U.S. intrigues at this time to induce a more vigorous U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia, cf. Declassified Documents Quarterly Catalogue, 1983, 001285-86; Peter Dale Scott, The War Conspiracy (New York: Bobbs Merrill, 1972), pp. 12-14, 17-20.
71. Jones, Indonesia: The Possible Dream, p. 299.
72. Mortimer, Indonesian Communism, pp. 385-6.
73. U.S. Department of Defense, Military Assistance Facts, May 1, 1966. Before 1963 the existence as well as the amount of the MAP in Indonesia was withheld from the public; retroactively, figures were published. After 1962 the total deliveries of military aid declined dramatically, but were aimed more and more particularly at anti-PKI and anti-Sukarno plotters in the army; cf. fns. 46, 76 and 83.
74. The New York Times, August 5, 1965, p. 3; cf. Nishihara, The Japanese, p. 149; Mrazek, vol. II, p. 121.
75. A Senate amendment in 1964 to cut off all aid to Indonesia unconditionally was quietly killed in conference committee, on the misleading ground that the Foreign Assistance Act "requires the President to report fully and concurrently to both Houses of the Congress on any assistance furnished to Indonesia" (U.S. Cong., Senate, Report No. 88-1925, Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, p. 11). In fact the act's requirement that the president report "to Congress" applied to eighteen other countries, but in the case of Indonesia he was to report to two Senate Committees and the speaker of the House: Foreign Assistance Act, Section 620(j).
76. Jones, Indonesia: The Possible Dream, p. 324.
77. U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Multinational Corporations and United States Foreign Policy, Hearings (cited hereafter as Church Committee Hearings), 94th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1978, p. 941; Mrazek, The United States, vol. II, p. 22. Mrazek quotes Lt. Col. Juono of the corps as saying that "we are completely dependent on the assistance of the United States."
78. Notosusanto and Saleh, The Coup, pp. 43, 46.
79. Nishihara, The Japanese (pp. 171, 194, 202), shows the role in the 1965-66 anti-Sukarno conspiracy of the small faction (including Ibnu Sutowo, Adam Malik, and the influential Japanese oilman Nishijima) who interposed themselves as negotiators between the 1958 PRRI Rebellion and the central government. Alamsjah, mentioned below, was another member of this group; he joined Suharto's staff in 1960. For Murba and CIA, cf. fn. 104.
80. Fortune, July 1973, p. 154, cf. Wall Street Journal, April 18, 1967; both in Scott, "Exporting," pp. 239, 258.
81. Declassified Documents Retrospective Collection, 609A (Embassy Cable 1002 of October 14, 1965); 613A (Embassy Cable 1353 of November 7, 1965).
82. The New York Times, August 5, 1965, p. 3.
83. U.S. Department of Defense, Military Assistance Facts, May 1, 1966. The thirty-two military personnel in FY 1965 represent an increase over the projected figure in March 1964 of twenty-nine. Most of them were apparently Green Beret U.S. Special Forces, whose forward base on Okinawa was visited in August 1965 by Gestapu plotter Saherman. Cf. fn. 122.
84. George Benson, an associate of Guy Pauker who headed the Military Training Advisory Group (MILTAG) in Jakarta, was later hired by Ibnu Sutowo to act as a lobbyist for the army's oil company (renamed Pertamina) in Washington: The New York Times, December 6, 1981, p. 1.
85. San Francisco Chronicle, October 24, 1983, p. 22, describes one such USAF-Lockheed operation in Southeast Asia, "code-named 'Operation Buttercup' that operated out of Norton Air Force Base in California from 1965 to 1972." For the CIA's close involvement in Lockheed payoffs, cf. Anthony Sampson, The Arms Bazaar (New York: Viking, 1977), pp. 137, 227-8, 238.
86. Church Committee Hearings, pp. 943-51.
87. Ibid., p. 960.
88. Nishihara, The Japanese, p. 153.
89. Lockheed Aircraft International, memo of Fred C. Meuser to Erle M. Constable, 19 July 1968, in Church Committee Hearings, p. 962.
90. Ibid., p. 954; cf. p. 957. In 1968, when Alamsjah suffered a decline in power, Lockheed did away with the middleman and paid its agents' fees directly to a group of military officers (pp. 342, 977).
91. Church Committee Hearings, p. 941; cf. p. 955.
92. Southwood and Flanagan, Indonesia: Law, p. 59.
93. Crouch, The Army, p. 114.
94. Declassified Documents Quarterly Catalogue, 1982, 002507 (Cable of April 15, 1965, from U.S. Delegation to U.N.); cf. Forbes Wilson, The Conquest of Copper Mountain (New York: Atheneum, 1981), pp. 153-5.
95. World Oil, August 15, 1965, p. 209.
96. The New York Times, June 19, 1966, IV, 4.
97. Ralph McGehee, "The C.I.A. and the White Paper on El Salvador," The Nation, April 11, 1981, p. 423. The deleted word would appear from its context to be "deception." Cf. Roger Morris and Richard Mauzy, "Following the Scenario," in Robert L. Borosage and John Marks, eds., The CIA File (New York: Grossman / Viking, 1976), p. 39: "Thus the fear of Communist subversion, which erupted to a frenzy of killing in 1965-1966, had been encouraged in the 'penetration' propaganda of the Agency in Indonesia.... 'All I know,' said one former intelligence officer of the Indonesia events, 'is that the Agency rolled in some of its top people and that things broke big and very favorable, as far as we were concerned.'"
All references to deletions appear in the original text as printed in The Nation. These bracketed portions, shown in this article in bold-face type, reflect censorship by the CIA.

98. Victor Marchetti and John Marks, The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence (New York: Knopf, 1974), p. 245. For a list of twenty-five U.S. operatives transferred from Vietnam to Guatemala in the 1964-73 period, cf. Susanne Jonas and David Tobis, Guatemala (Berkeley, California, and New York: North American Congress on Latin America, 1974), p. 201.
99. Tad Szulc, The Illusion of Peace (New York: Viking, 1978), p. 724. The top CIA operative in charge of the 1970 anti-Allende operation, Sam Halpern, had previously served as chief executive officer on the CIA's anti-Sukarno operation of 1957-58: Seymour Hersh, The Price of Power (New York: Summit Books, 1983), p. 277; Powers, The Man, p. 91.
100. Donald Freed and Fred Simon Landis, Death in Washington (Westport, Connecticut: Lawrence Hill, 1980), pp. 104-5.
101. Time, March 17, 1961.
102. Sundhaussen, The Road, p. 195.
103. Jones, Indonesia: The Possible Dream, p. 374; Justus M. van der Kroef, "Origins of the 1965 Coup in Indonesia: Probabilities and Alternatives," Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, III, 2 (September 1972), p. 282. Three generals were alleged targeted in the first report (Suharto, Mursjid, and Sukendro); all survived Gestapu.
104. Chaerul Saleh's Murba Party, including the pro-U.S. Adam Malik, was also promoting the anti-Communist "Body to Support Sukarnoism" (BPS), which was banned by Sukarno on December 17, 1964. (Subandrio "is reported to have supplied Sukarno with information purporting to show U.S. Central Intelligence Agency influence behind the BPS" [Mortimer, p. 377]; it clearly did have support from the CIA- and army-backed labor organization SOKSI.) Shortly afterwards, Murba itself was banned, and promptly "became active as a disseminator of rumours and unrest" (Holtzappel, p. 238).
105. Sundhaussen, The Road, p. 183; Mortimer, Indonesian Communism, pp. 376-77; Singapore Straits Times, December 24, 1964; quoted in Van der Kroef, "Origins," p. 283.
106. Sabah Times, September 14, 1965; quoted in Van der Kroef, "Origins," p. 296. Mozingo, Chinese Policy (p. 242) dismisses charges such as these with a contemptuous footnote.
107. Powers, The Man, p. 80; cf. Senate Report No. 94-755, Foreign and Military Intelligence, p. 192. CIA-sponsored channels also disseminated the Chinese arms story at this time inside the United States -- e.g., Brian Crozier, "Indonesia's Civil War," New Leader, November 1965, p. 4.
108. Mortimer, Indonesian Communism, p. 386. The Evans and Novak column coincided with the surfacing of the so-called "Gilchrist letter," in which the British ambassador purportedly wrote about a U.S.-U.K. anti-Sukarno plot to be executed "together with local army friends." All accounts agree that the letter was a forgery. However it distracted attention from a more incriminating letter from Ambassador Gilchrist, which Sukarno had discussed with Lyndon Johnson's envoy Michael Forrestal in mid-February 1965, and whose authenticity Forrestal (who knew of the letter) did not deny (Declassified Documents Retrospective Collection, 594H [Embassy Cable 1583 of February 13, 1965]).
109. Cf. Denis Warner, Reporter, March 28, 1963, pp. 62-63: "Yet with General A.H. Nasution, the defense minister, and General Jani, the army chief of staff, now out-Sukarnoing Sukarno in the dispute with Malaya over Malaysia ... Mr. Brackman and all other serious students of Indonesia must be troubled by the growing irresponsibility of the army leadership."
110. The New York Times, August 12, 1965, p. 2.
111. Brackman, The Communist, p. 40.
112. McGehee, "The C.I.A.," p. 423.
113. Hughes, The End, pp. 43-50; cf. Crouch, The Army, p. 140n: "No evidence supports these stories."
114. Hughes, The End, p. 150, also tells how Sarwo Edhie exploited the corpse of Colonel Katamso as a pretext for provoking a massacre of the PKI in Central Java; cf. Crouch, p. 154n; also fn. 6.
115. Anderson and McVey, A Preliminary, p. 133.
116. Benedict Anderson and Ruth McVey, "What Happened in Indonesia?" New York Review of Books, June 1, 1978, p. 41; personal communication from Anderson. A second newspaper, Suluh Indonesia, told its PNI readers that the PNI did not support Gestapu, and thus served to neutralize potential opposition to Suharto's seizure of power.
117. Thus defenders of the U.S. role in this period might point out that where "civic action" had been most deeply implanted, in West Java, the number of civilians murdered was relatively (!) small; and that the most indiscriminate slaughter occurred where civic action programs had been only recently introduced. This does not, in my view, diminish the U.S. share of responsibility for the slaughter.
118. CIA Study, p. 70; Sundhaussen, The Road, p. 185.
119. William Colby, Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978), p. 227. Crouch, The Army (p. 108), finds no suggestion in the Mahmilub evidence "that the PKI aimed at taking over the government," only that it hoped to protect itself from the Council of Generals.
120. McGehee, "The C.I.A.," p. 424.
121. Szulc, The Illusion, p. 16.
122. Southwood and Flanagan, Indonesia: Law, pp. 38-9 (Cambodia). According to a former U.S. Navy intelligence specialist, the initial U.S. military plan to overthrow Sihanouk "included a request for authorization to insert a U.S.-trained assassination team disguised as Vietcong insurgents into Phnom Penh to kill Prince Sihanouk as a pretext for revolution" (Hersh, The Price, p. 179). As Hersh points out, Green Beret assassination teams that operated inside South Vietnam routinely dressed as Vietcong cadre while on missions. Thus the alleged U.S. plan of 1968, which was reportedly approved "shortly after Nixon's inauguration ... 'at the highest level of government,'" called for an assassination of a moderate at the center by apparent leftists, as a pretext for a right-wing seizure of power. This raises an interesting question, albeit outlandish: did the earlier anti-Sukarno operation call for foreign elements to be infiltrated into the Gestapu forces murdering the generals? Holtzappel ("The 30 September," p. 222) has suspected "the use of outsiders who are given suitable disguises to do a dirty job." He points to trial witnesses from Untung's battalion and the murder team who "declared under oath not to have known ... their battalion commander." Though these witnesses themselves would not have been foreigners, foreigners could have infiltrated more easily into their ranks than into a regular battalion.







Lampiran III


The IndependentThe Independent
How we destroyed Sukarno
Foreign Office `dirty tricks' helped overthrow Indonesia's President Sukarno in 1966. Over the next 30 years, half a million people died.
Tuesday 01 December 1998
In autumn 1965, Norman Reddaway, a lean and erudite rising star of the Foreign Office, was briefed for a special mission. The British Ambassador to Indonesia, Sir Andrew Gilchrist, had just visited London for discussions with the head of the Foreign Office, Joe Garner. Covert operations to undermine Sukarno, the troublesome and independently minded President of Indonesia, were not going well. Garner was persuaded to send Reddaway, the FO's propaganda expert, to Indonesia. His task: to take on anti-Sukarno propaganda operations run by the Foreign Office and M16. Garner gave Reddaway pounds 100,000 in cash "to do anything I could do to get rid of Sukarno", he says.
Reddaway thus joined the loose amalgam of groups from the Foreign Office, M16, the State Department and the CIA in the Far East, all striving to depose Sukarno in diffuse and devious ways. For the next six months he and his colleagues chipped away at Sukarno's regime, undermining his reputation and assisting his enemies in the army. By March 1966 Sukarno's power base was in tatters and he was forced to hand over his presidential authority to General Suharto, the head of the army, who was already running a campaign of mass murder against alleged communists.
According to Reddaway, the overthrow of Sukarno was one of the Foreign Office's "most successful" coups, which they have kept a secret until now. The British intervention in Indonesia, alongside complimentary CIA operations, shows how far the Foreign Office was prepared to go in intervening in other countries' affairs during the Cold War. Indonesia was important both economically and strategically. In 1952 the US noted that if Indonesia fell out of Western influence, neighbours such as Malaya might follow, resulting in the loss of the "principal world source of natural rubber and tin and a producer of petroleum and other strategically important commodities".
The Japanese occupation during the Second World War, which to the Indonesians amounted to another period of colonial rule, had revitalised the nationalist movement which after the war, declared independence and assumed power. Ahmed Sukarno became Indonesia's first president. Western concern regarding Sukarno's regime grew owing to the strength of the Indonesian communist party, the PKI, which at its peak had a membership of over 10 million, the largest communist party in the non-communist world. Concerns were not allayed by Sukarno's internal and external policies, including nationalising Western assets and a governmental role for the PKI.
By the early Sixties Sukarno had become a major thorn in the side of both the British and the Americans. They believed there was a real danger that Indonesia would fall to the communists. To balance the army's growing power, Sukarno aligned himself closer to the PKI.
The first indication of British interest in removing Sukarno appears in a CIA memorandum of 1962. Prime Minister Macmillan and President Kennedy agreed to "liquidate President Sukarno, depending on the situation and available opportunities".
Hostility to Sukarno was intensified by Indonesian objections to the Malaysian Federation. Sukarno complained the project was "a neo-colonial plot, pointing out that the Federation was a project for Malayan expansionism and continuing British influence in the region.
In 1963 his objections crystallised in his policy of Konfrontasi, a breaking off of all relations with Malaysia, soon coupled with low-level military intervention. A protracted border war began along the 700-mile-long front in Borneo.
According to Foreign Office sources the decision to get rid of Sukarno had been taken by Macmillan's Conservative government and carried through during Wilson's 1964 Labour government. The Foreign Office had worked in conjunction with their American counterparts on a plan to oust the turbulent Sukarno. A covert operation and psychological warfare strategy was instigated, based at Phoenix Park, in Singapore, the British headquarters in the region. The M16 team kept close links with key elements in the Indonesian army through the British Embassy. One of these was Ali Murtopo, later General Suharto's intelligence chief, and M16 officers constantly travelled back and forth between Singapore and Jakarta.
The Foreign Office's Information Research Department (IRD) also worked out of Phoenix Park, reinforcing the work of M16 and the military psychological warfare experts.
IRD had been established by the Labour government in 1948 to conduct an anti-communist propaganda war against the Soviets, but had swiftly become enlisted in various anti-independence movement operations in the declining British Empire. By the Sixties, IRD had a staff of around 400 in London and information officers around the world influencing media coverage in areas of British interest.
According to Roland Challis, the BBC correspondent at the time in Singapore, journalists were open to manipulation by IRD, owing, ironically, to Sukarno's own policies: "In a curious way, by keeping correspondents out of the country Sukarno made them the victims of official channels, because almost the only information you could get was from the British ambassador in Jakarta." The opportunity to isolate Sukarno and the PKI came in October 1965 when an alleged PKI coup attempt was the pretext for the army to sideline Sukarno and eradicate the PKI. Who exactly instigated the coup and for what purposes remains a matter of speculation. However, within days the coup had been crushed and the army was firmly in control. Suharto accused the PKI of being behind the coup, and set about suppressing them.
Following the attempted coup Britain set about exploiting the situation. On 5 October, Alec Adams, political adviser to the Commander-in-Chief, Far East, advised the Foreign Office: "We should have no hesitation in doing what we can surreptitiously to blacken the PKI in the eyes of the army and the people of Indonesia." The Foreign Office agreed and suggested "suitable propaganda themes" such as PKI atrocities and Chinese intervention.
One of the main themes pursued by IRD was the threat posed by the PKI and "Chinese communists". Newspaper reports continually emphasised the danger of the PKI. Drawing upon their experience in Malaya in the Fifties, the British emphasised the Chinese nature of the communist threat. Roland Challis said: "One of the more successful things which the West wished on to the non-communist politicians in Indonesia was to transfer the whole idea of communism onto the Chinese minority in Indonesia. It turned it into an ethnic thing. It is a terrible thing to have done to incite the Indonesians to rise and slaughter the Chinese."
But it was the involvement of Sukarno with the PKI in the bloody months following the coup that was to be the British trump card. According to Reddaway: "The communist leader, Aidit, went on the run and Sukarno, being a great politician, went to the front of the palace and said that the communist leader Aidit must be hunted down and brought to justice. From the side door of the palace, he was dealing with him every day by courier."
This information was revealed by the signal intelligence of Britain's GCHQ. The Indonesians didn't have a clue about radio silence and this double-dealing was picked up by GCHQ; the British had its main eavesdropping base in Hong Kong tuned into events in Indonesia.
The discrediting of Sukarno was of fundamental importance. Sukarno remained a respected and popular leader against whom Suharto could not move openly until the conditions were right. The constant barrage of bad international coverage and Sukarno's plummeting political position fatally undermined him. On 10 March 1966, Sukarno was forced to sign over his powers to General Suharto. Now perceived as closely associated with the attempted coup and the PKI, Sukarno had been discredited to the point where the army felt able to act. The PKI was eliminated as a significant force and a pro-Western military dictatorship firmly established.
It was not long before Suharto quietly ended the inactive policy of Konfrontasi resulting in a swift improvement in Anglo-Indonesian relations, which continue to be close to this day.
From: `Britain's Secret Propaganda War 1948-77', by Paul Lashmar and James Oliver, to be published by Sutton on 7 December





********

 


Lampiran IV


This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Intelligence and National Security in 2001, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/ 
DOI:10.1080/714002893

British Intelligence and Propaganda during
the ‘Confrontation’, 1963-1966.

DAVID EASTER


The 1963-1966 ‘Confrontation’, or undeclared war between Britain, Malaysia and Indonesia, provides a good example of a successful counter-insurgency campaign. Indonesia’s attempt to break up the Malaysian federation by sponsoring a guerrilla movement in Borneo was decisively defeated. Explanations for this victory have tended to focus on Britain’s military tactics. A recent study concluded that Britain and Malaysia’s success was mainly due to the mobility provided for British and Commonwealth troops by helicopters, the effects of secret ‘Claret’ cross-border operations and field intelligence.[i]

However, evidence has also emerged of British propaganda and wider intelligence work during the Confrontation and these were important factors in Britain’s victory. British strategy and policy was heavily influenced by human and signals intelligence. In particular, signals intelligence gave Britain the confidence to launch the Claret cross-border raids into Indonesia, which were so crucial in containing the Indonesian guerrillas.  At the same time Britain carried out an aggressive propaganda campaign against  Indonesia that might have played a major role in the removal of the Indonesian leader, Achmed Sukarno, and affected  Jakarta’s decision to end the Confrontation in 1966.

To understand the significance of British intelligence and propaganda it is necessary to briefly explain what the Confrontation was. In 1961 Britain and the Malayan Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, decided to create a federation of Malaysia by merging the British colonies in Borneo and the island colony of Singapore with already independent Malaya. London was attracted to this scheme because it saw Malaysia as a way of preserving its major military base in Singapore. The pro-Western Tunku would become the Prime Minister of Malaysia and he was prepared to let Britain carry on using the Singapore base.

From January 1962 President Sukarno of Indonesia openly opposed the Malaysia plan. He denounced Malaysia as a neo-colonialist plot to maintain a British presence in the region and claimed that it denied Borneans their legitimate right to self-determination. Under Sukarno’s leadership Indonesia embarked on a policy of ‘Confrontation’, exerting diplomatic, economic, political and military pressure against London and Kuala Lumpur. From April 1963 guerrillas made raids into Borneo from the neighbouring Indonesian territory of Kalimantan. Malaysia was nonetheless set up in September 1963 but Sukarno carried on and even escalated his Confrontation campaign; from August 1964 Indonesian guerrillas made landings in peninsula Malaya. British and Commonwealth troops defended Malaysia against the Indonesian attacks, and although Singapore split from Malaysia in 1965, Confrontation proved a failure. Indonesia was forced to accept the new state.


INTELLIGENCE

Britain had several sources of intelligence during the Confrontation. On a local, tactical level cross-border reconnaissance by British and Commonwealth troops and co-operation with the indigenous border peoples provided important information on the activities of the Indonesian guerrillas. Other tactical intelligence came from the interrogation of Indonesian prisoners and analysis of captured documents.[ii]
                                     
On a broader scale Britain had access to strategic intelligence; intelligence that could be used to shape Britain’s overall policy and military strategy in the Confrontation. This intelligence was gathered through three main sources: air photo-reconnaissance, human agents (Humint) and intercepted Indonesian signals (Sigint). From 1963 until 1966 RAF planes carried out secret overflights of Indonesia, photographing border areas, airfields and guerrilla infiltration bases, and obtaining useful information on Indonesian military deployments[iii].

A variety of sources offer evidence for Humint and Sigint operations. A former British official, who did not wish to be identified, has confirmed that Britain had agents within the Indonesian government and military.[iv] There are also hints in released British documents that London broke the Indonesian ciphers. For example in 1965 the Foreign Office was concerned over the possible sale of advanced American communications equipment to the Indonesians because of the ‘intercept aspect’. The Foreign Office wished to ensure that ‘the GCHQ interests are fully appreciated’.[v]  In 1969, after the conflict had ended, the Chiefs of Staff discussed whether Sigint should be included in a prospective official history of the Confrontation.[vi]

More evidence for British Sigint is provided by Spycatcher, the memoirs of former MI5 officer Peter Wright. In his book Wright described ways of intercepting and deciphering encoded messages by placing listening devices in or outside foreign embassies. He recalled that ‘We operated in the same way against the Indonesian Embassy at the time of the Indonesian/Malaysian confrontation, and read the cipher continuously through the conflict.’[vii] Again a former British government official has confirmed that Britain did break the Indonesian ciphers during the Confrontation and was able to read both diplomatic and military traffic.[viii] In addition to intercept operations against the Indonesian Embassy in London Britain could target Indonesian communications from listening stations in Hong Kong and at Phoenix Park in Singapore. The collected intelligence on Indonesia was then shared with the Americans, who had their own, high quality sources of information.[ix]

The extent of Britain’s intelligence penetration does appear impressive and certainly the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) received ‘ministerial commendation on the quality of its reporting on Malaysia’.[x] However, it is hard to establish the exact value of this intelligence to British policymakers during the Confrontation. Released JIC assessments of Indonesian intentions and capabilities conceal the sources of their information, making it difficult to see what material the air reconnaissance, Sigint and Humint was actually providing.[xi] Nonetheless with the fragmentary evidence available some preliminary conclusions can be drawn.

Firstly, the strategic intelligence seems to have confirmed the British in their view that Indonesia was implacably hostile to the creation of Malaysia. For example, in January 1963 the British High Commission in Kuala Lumpur informed London about the latest reports from ‘our friends and their friends’ [often a euphemism for the intelligence services], which indicated ‘increasing determination on the part of Indonesians to unmask Tunku as arch-neo-imperialist and to frustrate Malaysia.’[xii] In August 1963 a decrypted Indonesian telegram stated unambiguously that ‘The anti Malaysia movement (actions) is aimed at the overthrowing of British power in South East Asia’.[xiii] When Singapore separated from Malaysia in August 1965 London found that ‘Instructions from Djakarta to Indonesian posts suggest, as expected, intention to treat Singapore secession as result and first fruit of confrontation; further fruits to be gathered include Borneo wind falls and withdrawal of British base’.[xiv]

These reports fed a general British belief that it was futile to seriously negotiate with the Indonesians over Confrontation because Sukarno was determined to destroy Malaysia and remove British influence from the region.  A Foreign Office paper presented to the Cabinet in January 1964 warned that in talks Indonesia might ask for restrictions on Britain’s use of the Singapore military base or demand a plebiscite in Borneo on whether the territory should remain part of Malaysia. Unless Britain and Malaysia were prepared to make these kinds of dangerous concessions it would be useless for them to contemplate a negotiated solution until ‘Indonesia had first been brought to her knees by a prolonged process of attrition’.[xv] A joint Foreign Office/Commonwealth Relations Office paper produced for the new Labour government in January 1965 was even more suspicious of Indonesian intentions. It claimed that Indonesian opposition to Malaysia was ‘inevitable’ because Sukarno had ‘a long-cherished ambition to seize Malaya, politically if not territorially’.[xvi] The paper argued that there was not likely to be a sincere Indonesian desire for negotiations in the near future. Britain would have to maintain the defence of Malaysia and ignore any diplomatic approaches from Sukarno.

This tough line in the Confrontation was not initially supported by all of Britain’s allies. The United States in particular wanted to establish a modus vivendi with Sukarno because of Indonesia’s strategic importance in the Cold War. Consequently during 1963 the State Department and the White House pressed for talks between Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta, in the hope that Sukarno might drop his opposition to Malaysia if some kind of face saving political formula could be found.[xvii] London regarded all these efforts as tantamount to appeasement and tried to rein in Washington. It was here that Britain again seems to have made use of its strategic intelligence sources. Intelligence on Indonesia was passed on to American policymakers in order to convince them of Indonesia’s deep-set hostility towards Malaysia. In September 1963 the Foreign Office suspected that Averell Harriman, the American Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, did not believe Sukarno was determined to destroy Malaysia through Confrontation.[xviii] In order to convince him, the Foreign Office told the British Ambassador to show Harriman a ‘Top Secret document’ which demonstrated that ‘the Indonesian Government have set their face against coming to a settlement with Malaysia or seeking to maintain tolerable relations with Her Majesty’s Government.’[xix]

In January 1964, after the Americans had surprised London by sending Robert Kennedy, the Attorney General, to South East Asia to arrange negotiations, Britain went a stage further. When Kennedy stopped off in London on his way back to Washington British officials showed him the raw Sigint material.[xx]  These efforts may have had some effect because by the autumn of 1964 American policy towards Indonesia had fallen more in line with the British position. However, this seems to have been due more to Sukarno’s own increasingly aggressive and anti-American behaviour than Britain’s lobbying use of intelligence.[xxi]

Britain also used her intelligence sources to gather information on the state of Sukarno’s health. This rather morbid interest was caused by Britain’s strategic predicament – as there appeared no chance of an acceptable political settlement while Sukarno was in power, London hoped that his early death might open up a way to end the Confrontation. This was not merely wishful thinking, for Sukarno was believed to be suffering from a kidney stone. Confirmation of this came in December 1964 when a ‘CX report’, a Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) intelligence report, showed that Sukarno did have a kidney stone. The CX report revealed that Sukarno's Viennese specialist had recommended more X-rays before the stone could be removed in an operation.[xxii]  Britain also managed to covertly obtain X-rays of the Indonesian leader.[xxiii]

Unfortunately for London the medical intelligence proved to be of only limited value. In January 1965 the JIC made a prognosis that without an operation on his kidney Sukarno was unlikely to live more than a year. If he had a successful operation he might last as long as two to three years.[xxiv] However, the JIC’s forecast turned out to be overly optimistic, for although he had persistent kidney problems Sukarno lived on until July 1970. Analysis of Sukarno’s health had also indicated that he might have uraemia, a form of blood poisoning caused by chronic kidney failure. The British Chiefs of Staff (COS) were warned in January 1965 that Sukarno’s uraemia ‘could lead to a condition bordering on mania and the consequently far greater possibility of his making rash decisions’, something which dictated a certain degree of caution in Britain’s actions.[xxv] For example the COS advised that if ministers wanted to initiate a war of nerves in the Confrontation it would have to be directed at the Indonesian army rather than Sukarno, because of his ‘known irrationality’. 

Sukarno’s possible uraemia illustrated a wider problem that hindered the use of Britain’s strategic intelligence sources. Whatever his actual medical condition, the Indonesian dictator was certainly volatile, impulsive and prone to sudden grandiloquent gestures, so even with the benefit of good intelligence it was hard for Britain to predict what Indonesia would do next in the Confrontation. Perhaps because of this on occasions Britain’s intelligence sources failed to correctly anticipate Indonesian military and political moves in the conflict. In August 1964 Jakarta was able to surprise London and Kuala Lumpur, and dramatically escalate the Confrontation, by landing guerrillas for the first time in peninsula Malaya.[xxvi] Britain was also taken unawares by Sukarno’s abrupt announcement in January 1965 that Indonesia was going to leave the United Nations.[xxvii] As withdrawal from the UN seemed totally counter productive to Indonesian interests British officials speculated that Sukarno might have taken the decision while under the effects of uraemia.[xxviii]

At other times outbursts by Sukarno may have led Britain’s intelligence sources to give misleading information. In May 1964 a SIS CX report warned that at a meeting with the Chiefs of the Indonesian armed forces on 9 May, Sukarno had said he would order the start of ‘local war’ or ‘limited war’ against ‘Malaysian-Borneo’, including air attacks on oil installations in the neighbouring Sultanate of Brunei, if the results of a forthcoming summit meeting with the Tunku were unsatisfactory.[xxix] This report caused a minor panic in London and led the Commonwealth Relations Office to request an urgent appraisal from the JIC. But despite the subsequent failure of the summit an Indonesian attack failed to materialise nor were there any signs that one was seriously being prepared. Sukarno’s comments were perhaps said in the heat of moment and the idea then dropped. Alternatively the JIC suggested that they could have been a deliberate leak to intensify a war of nerves. Sukarno might have made the threat assuming that it would leak out and thereby influence the British and Malaysians ahead of the summit.

Notwithstanding the difficulties caused by Sukarno’s mercurial personality and his medical condition, Britain’s strategic intelligence did provide London with useful insights into Indonesian thinking. In particular it allowed British policymakers to see how Indonesia reacted to British military actions in the Confrontation. After the Indonesian landings in peninsula Malaya in August 1964 Britain despatched considerable troop and aircraft reinforcements to Singapore and provocatively sent the aircraft carrier HMS Victorious through Indonesian claimed waters. Strategic intelligence sources showed that these counter measures had worried Jakarta: Indonesia dispersed shipping and re-deployed aircraft during the passage of Victorious and London discovered that Sukarno had nervously asked his attaches in Western capitals to report on British intentions.[xxx] The Chairman of the JIC concluded that Sukarno had been convinced that Britain was determined and able to retaliate if there were further attacks. He commented that ‘We know…that our recent actions impressed them [the Indonesians] far more than any words could have done - or had done, over the whole confrontation period’.[xxxi]

In the same way intelligence was useful to Britain in the area of cross-border operations. In April 1964 London had authorised British troops to cross the border in hot pursuit of guerrillas and in July this permission was extended to allow offensive patrols by British forces up to 3,000 yards over the border into Kalimantan, the Indonesian part of Borneo.[xxxii] But these steps were not taken without much trepidation. The Foreign Office and the COS were worried that if the patrols became public they could be used by Sukarno to rally Indonesian morale.[xxxiii] To avoid creating propaganda opportunities for Jakarta the cross-border operations had to be deniable, in the sense that Indonesia could not prove that the border had been crossed.[xxxiv] The British government could then maintain the fiction that its soldiers never knowingly crossed the frontier.[xxxv]

In November 1964 Admiral Sir Varyl Begg, the British Commander-in-Chief in the Far East, asked for permission to extend the range of the deniable patrols to 5 miles inside Kalimantan but this request was rejected by the COS.[xxxvi]  The Chiefs feared that deeper operations might not be credibly deniable and could encourage Indonesia to escalate the conflict. In January 1965 a build up of Indonesian forces in Kalimantan and Sumatra led Begg to again request an extension of the cross-border patrols and this time he was able to use Sigint to support his case. Decrypted Indonesian military signals showed that the local commanders in Kalimantan always reported any clash, even those in which their troops were defeated, as a great victory.[xxxvii] As Begg pointed out to the COS on 12 January, it had not been necessary for Britain to ever deny a cross-border operation and this ‘might be due to the fact that local Indonesian commanders were loath to report such occurrences, describing imaginary assaults of their own instead.’[xxxviii] Therefore, Begg argued, larger British cross-border raids, attacking Indonesian camps, staging areas and supply dumps up to a depth of 10,000 yards, offered no greater risk, as the ‘[Indonesian] High Command might well remain in ignorance of them.’

The COS accepted Begg’s argument and recommended that cross border operations be extended up to 10,000 yards, including attacks on specific targets. On 13 January senior ministers gave permission for these deeper, ‘Claret’ cross-border raids, a clear example of Sigint influencing Britain’s military strategy in the Confrontation.[xxxix] This example was especially significant because the Claret operations allowed British and Commonwealth forces to win control of the border region and greatly reduce the level of Indonesian guerrilla attacks.[xl]

In general then the strategic intelligence helped British policymakers to gauge how much military force they could or should apply in the Confrontation.  London could try to calibrate the use of force so as to deter or counter act Indonesian aggression while at the same time not being so military aggressive itself so as to provoke Sukarno into escalating the conflict. It also meant that Britain could make the most battle and cost effective use of her sometimes strained military resources, a point that was appreciated by the British military commanders. At the close of the conflict in June 1966 Air Marshall Sir Peter Wykeham, the RAF Commander in the Far East, reportedly claimed that
…it had been a war where Intelligence had played the vital role. Had it not been for the quality of our Intelligence the forces needed, the states of readiness required and the deployments for reinforcements would have been far higher than had proved necessary.[xli]

PROPAGANDA

This section will concentrate on covert and unattributable propaganda, that is propaganda where the government source of the information is concealed. Both sides in the Confrontation made extensive use of this type of propaganda. Indonesia, for example, operated ‘black’ radio stations to whip up popular support for the guerrillas in Borneo. In March 1963 Radio Kalimantan Utara, ‘the voice of the Freedom Fighters of North Borneo’, began broadcasting.[xlii] Based at Bogor near Jakarta, the station carried speeches and messages allegedly from rebel leaders and it urged support for the guerrillas in the struggle against Malaysia. It also broadcast propaganda to British service men in the region. At one point the Tunku was said to be regular listener to Radio Kalimantan Utara.[xliii] Another Indonesian pirate station, Radio Kemam, operated from Sumatra, using Radio Malaya’s wavelength and carrying anti-Malaysia and anti-Tunku material.[xliv]

In addition the Indonesians successfully used propaganda to aggravate racial tensions in Malaysia between Chinese and Malays. After bloody race riots in Singapore in July 1964 that left 22 dead, the Joint Intelligence Committee (Far East) noted that
…since April Indonesian intelligence had been conducting a series of psychological warfare operations in Malaya and Singapore by means of pamphlets, “black newspapers”, the spreading of rumour and the writing of slogans on walls.[xlv]

Indonesia’s black radio stations also played a part in stirring up racial hatred. On 17 July 1964, four days before the Singapore riots, Radio Kemam claimed that the Chinese in peninsula Malaya had killed a Malay Muslim with ‘a pork butcher’s knife’ and forced Malays to eat pork.[xlvi]

Britain replied in a similar fashion, employing propaganda to influence three different sets of audiences during the Confrontation.[xlvii] Firstly, London used propaganda to win diplomatic support for Malaysia from other countries and especially the newly independent Afro-Asian states. Secondly, propaganda was used internally in Borneo to counter act Indonesian subversion, particularly amongst the Chinese community in Sarawak. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, propaganda was directed at Indonesia itself in order to cause divisions and undermine support for the Confrontation policy.

The co-ordination of British propaganda in the Confrontation was initially carried out by the Counter Subversion Committee, an informal Foreign Office body set up in 1962 to help co-ordinate counter subversion activities.[xlviii] The actual propaganda work in the field was mainly done by officials from the Foreign Office’s Information Research Department (IRD) which specialised in unattributable propaganda, although some ‘black’ operations were conducted by the SIS and army psychological warfare teams.[xlix] In April 1963, before the creation of Malaysia, an IRD official was sent to the Borneo colonies to help counter hostile Indonesian propaganda and to advise the colonial governors on the use of unattributable propaganda.[l]   The IRD started to prepare a series of radio feature programmes for Radio Sarawak to appeal to disaffected Chinese youth in the colony.[li] The IRD officer also stimulated a flow of information material to London for use in reducing opposition to Malaysia at the United Nations and amongst Afro-Asian states.[lii]

In September 1963 the Borneo colonies and Singapore reached full independence by joining Malaya to form Malaysia and Kuala Lumpur took on more responsibility for the propaganda work. However, the Malaysians lacked the necessary funds, equipment and staff for these types of operations.[liii] To help them, in November 1963 the Counter Subversion Committee was given a £50,000 subvention from the Secret Vote for use against Indonesian propaganda and subversion.[liv] Money from this ‘Special Counter Subversion Fund for Malaysia’ was channelled via the British High Commission in Kuala Lumpur to the Malaysian government. An extra IRD officer was also sent to Kuala Lumpur.[lv] The Counter Subversion Committee itself was upgraded – in January 1964 it was turned into an interdepartmental official committee reporting to the new official Cabinet Defence and Oversea Policy Committee.[lvi]

By this time the British and Malaysians had several outlets for their propaganda against Indonesia.  The Foreign Office and Commonwealth Relations Office routinely supplied the BBC with telegrams from British overseas delegations that contained information on the Confrontation.[lvii] The BBC could then use this information in its vernacular radio programmes. The diplomatic telegrams were also passed on by the British High Commission in Canberra to the Australian Radio Authority and sent via IRD channels to Radio Malaysia, for use in overseas broadcasts to Indonesia.[lviii] The Counter Subversion Committee felt that the function of the BBC and Australian Radio transmissions to Indonesia was to provide ‘the steady pressure of true facts, the supply of which to the BBC was an important responsibility of the C.R.O. and the F.O.’[lix] For ‘more pointed propaganda’ Radio Malaysia could be used and it did seem to be effective in this role, for by November 1963 the Indonesian Government had banned its citizens from listening to it, although this ban was widely flouted.[lx] The Malaysians were also operating their own ‘black’ radio station against Indonesia, ‘Radio Free Indonesia’, which masqueraded as the work of Indonesian émigrés.[lxi]

Aside from radio, other outlets for propaganda were being used. In late 1963, after a United Nations report had concluded that the majority of the Borneans supported the creation of Malaysia, the IRD paid for the printing of the report in the Indonesian language.[lxii] The IRD then helped drop copies along the border in Borneo. In December 1963 a British official also reported that the Malaysians were running ‘a covert campaign to spread disaffection amongst the Chinese in Indonesian territory’.[lxiii] Indonesian guerrilla infiltration bases were targeted as well. On 2 November 1964 RAF and Malaysian planes dropped leaflets on the Indonesian bases used to support guerrilla landings in peninsula Malaya.[lxiv] The Malaysians carried out further leaflet drops in April 1965.[lxv]

The propaganda pushed several themes. British officials generally agreed that in propaganda aimed at Indonesia, it was pointless to attack Sukarno personally because of his still immense popularity in the country.[lxvi] Instead propaganda should criticise ‘bad advisers’, ’ruling cliques’ and  ‘the Djakarta gang’. A particular target was the Indonesian communist party, the PKI. Although the PKI was loathed and feared by the Indonesian army, it was a major force in Indonesian politics and had a strong influence on Sukarno. The communists were also enthusiastic supporters of the Confrontation campaign against Malaysia and in its unattributable propaganda the IRD stressed the PKI’s involvement.  An IRD pamphlet sent to the Malaysian Commercial Association in the summer of 1964 warned that the PKI was encouraging Confrontation, and thereby breaking Indonesia’s ties with the West, in order to smooth the way for a communist take over.[lxvii]

Another theme of British propaganda was the untrustworthiness of Indonesian propaganda. Once British troops started to cross the border into Kalimantan in April 1964 London wanted to make it as difficult as possible for the Indonesians to publicly protest about the incursions. The Foreign Office therefore tried to pre-empt any Indonesian complaints by giving Jakarta a reputation for mendacity, exaggeration and distortion. The IRD prepared ‘unattributable material designed to discredit Indonesian propaganda’.[lxviii] Admittedly this was not difficult to do, since the Indonesian news agency Antara almost daily carried entirely fictitious accounts of British aggression and guerrilla victories.

As the Confrontation progressed through 1964 and 1965 Britain reorganised its propaganda machinery and devoted extra resources to a more active propaganda campaign against Indonesia. This process started in September 1964 with an IRD proposal to create a special propaganda unit in Singapore.[lxix] The special unit would
…engage in covert propaganda operations against Indonesia with the aim partly of stirring up dissension between different factions inside Indonesia and partly of giving the impression that the various dissident groups inside Indonesia are stronger than they in fact are.[lxx]

In connection with the last point, it is worth noting that by July 1964 the British and Malaysians were giving covert aid to rebels against the central government in the outer Indonesian islands of Sulawesi, Sumatra and Kalimantan.[lxxi]

The IRD proposal was strongly supported by the British High Commissioner in Kuala Lumpur and quickly approved by ministers.[lxxii] However, there were delays before the special unit could be set up as the IRD had problems in finding politically reliable and secure Indonesian writers to staff the unit. By December 1964 this problem seemed to have been overcome and Sir Burke Trend, the Cabinet Secretary, could report that the project was going forward.[lxxiii]

At the same time the propaganda co-ordinating machinery was restructured in Whitehall. In October 1964 the Foreign Office and the Commonwealth Relations Office created a Joint Malaysia-Indonesia Department (JMID) to deal with external affairs relating to the Confrontation.[lxxiv] The JMID took over from the Counter Subversion Committee the roles of sanctioning counter subversion projects and authorising spending from the Special Counter Subversion Fund for Malaysia.[lxxv] In February 1965 the special fund was increased to £85,000, a sign of the increased effort being given to propaganda.

There was also more explicit political direction. In February-March 1965 senior ministers approved paper JA(65) 9 (Final) produced by the Joint Action Committee.[lxxvi] JA(65) 9 (Final) was intended to be a general statement of Britain’s aims in the Confrontation that could provide guidelines for more detailed tactical planning, especially psychological warfare and propaganda from Singapore.[lxxvii]

The paper defined Britain’s ultimate aim as to have a non-communist Indonesia living in good relations with Malaysia.[lxxviii] To achieve this goal British ‘covert propaganda and clandestine operations’ should try to
Undermine the will of the Indonesian forces to attack Malaysia, by representing that their real enemies are the PKI and China and bring home to them that their incursions have consistently failed and that there is no popular support for them inside Malaysia.

In addition, covert propaganda should aid and encourage dissident groups in the outer Indonesian islands in order to weaken the Indonesian military effort against Malaysia. Finally, covert propaganda should
Discredit any potential successor to Sukarno (since Sukarno’s own position is invulnerable) whose accession to power might benefit the PKI. Any attempt to build up an anti-PKI candidate would be counter-productive.

The emphasis in JA (65) 9 (Final) on covert propaganda against the PKI reflected concerns in London about growing communist influences in Indonesia. Sukarno was cultivating closer links with Red China and allowing the PKI to becoming more and more powerful domestically. The Foreign Office feared that the longer he remained in power the more likely it was that he would be succeeded by a PKI government.[lxxix]  This would put paid to British hopes of being able to find a settlement to Confrontation when Sukarno died, as a PKI led Indonesia was likely to be just as hostile to Britain and Malaysia. The fall of Indonesia to communism would also be a major geo-political defeat for the West in the Cold War.

The last part of the reorganisation of Britain’s propaganda apparatus was the appointment of a Political Warfare Co-ordinator in Singapore. Sir Andrew Gilchrist, the British Ambassador to Indonesia, and Lord Mountbatten, the Chief of Defence Staff, had asked for a senior officer to co-ordinate British propaganda and political and psychological warfare.[lxxx] In July 1965 this post was approved and Norman Reddaway, the Regional Information Officer in Beirut, was selected for the position.[lxxxi]

Reddaway did not take up the job until November 1965 and by that time political events in Indonesia had completely transformed the situation.  On 1 October 1965 a Lieutenant-Colonel Untung attempted a coup d’etat in Jakarta.[lxxxii] Troops loyal to Major-General Suharto, the commander of the army’s strategic reserve, swiftly put down the rebels but not before they had killed six leading Indonesian army generals. The coup’s origins were obscure but circumstantial evidence suggested that the PKI and Sukarno might have been involved. Certainly the Indonesian army professed to believe this and it arrested PKI members in Jakarta and banned communist newspapers. Suharto also began to gradually challenge Sukarno for political power.

For Britain the tumult in Indonesia presented an excellent opportunity to disrupt the Confrontation campaign and smash the PKI, and it quickly made use of its enhanced propaganda machinery. On the 8 October the Foreign Office gave Singapore guidance on the propaganda to be directed at Indonesia at this crucial time. It advised that
Our objectives are to encourage anti-Communist Indonesians to more vigorous action in the hope of crushing Communism in Indonesia altogether, even if only temporarily, and, to this end and for its own sake, to spread alarm and despondency in Indonesia to prevent, or at any rate delay, re-emergence of Nasakom Government [government including the PKI] under Sukarno.[lxxxiii]

Suitable propaganda themes to achieve these goals were
…PKI brutality in murdering Generals and families, Chinese interference, particularly arms shipments, PKI subverting Indonesia as agents of foreign Communists; fact that Aidit [the PKI’s leader] and other prominent Communists went to ground; the virtual kidnapping of Sukarno by Untung etc’.[lxxxiv]

As well as smearing the PKI and communist China with unproven accusations, propaganda should build up the army leaders by portraying them as patriotic Indonesians.

In order to put across these themes the IRD was trying to stimulate broadcasts to Indonesia by the BBC, Radio Malaysia, Radio Australia and the Voice of America.[lxxxv] The press was also being approached, as the IRD tried to get material into newspapers read in Indonesia such as the Straits Times. The same anti-PKI message was to be spread by more clandestine outlets, such as a ‘“black transmitter”’, presumably the one operated by the Malaysians, and ‘I.R.D.’s regular newsletter’, which seems to have been directed at Indonesian troops.[lxxxvi] On the next day, the 9 October, the JMID reported that it was mounting some ‘short term unattributable ploys designed to keep the Indonesian pot boiling’.[lxxxvii]

To continue with the JMID’s glib metaphor, over the next few months the Indonesian ‘pot’ completely boiled over. From the middle of October the Indonesian army launched a savage campaign to destroy the PKI, ignoring protests from Sukarno who wanted to protect the party. The army captured and killed Aidit, it encouraged the mass killings of communists by religious groups in Sumatra and Bali, and in Java Indonesian soldiers rounded up and massacred thousands of PKI cadres. In the chaos older hatreds surfaced as Indonesians attacked ethnic Chinese in the country. When the killings subsided at the end of December the PKI had been physically exterminated as an effective political force and an estimated 500,000 people had been slaughtered.[lxxxviii]

Throughout this period London did all it could to encourage the destruction of the PKI and strengthen the Indonesian military leaders. On 25 November a draft JMID brief revealed that Britain had been
blackening the PKI’s reputation within Indonesia and outside, by feeding into the ordinary publicity media news from Indonesia that associates the PKI and the Chinese with Untung’s treachery plus corresponding covert activity;

trying in our publicity to present the Generals as Indonesian patriots, and in no way Western stooges, but rather good anti-imperialists.[lxxxix]


Much of this propaganda work was being done in Singapore. The IRD’s special propaganda unit there prepared the ‘Black Indonesian newsletter’ and provided services for psychological warfare operations.[xc] It had minimal contacts with journalists and broadcasters, leaving this to Reddaway, who was newly installed as Political Warfare Co-ordinator. Reddaway received news on the situation in Indonesia from British overseas missions, especially the Embassy in Jakarta, and from ‘intelligence available in Phoenix Park’, which was almost certainly Sigint.[xci]  He would then supply information that suited British purposes to news agencies, newspapers and radio via contacts in Singapore, Kuala Lumpur and Hong Kong. The news would be carried out into in the world’s media and return to Indonesia, allowing Britain to influence Indonesian opinion.  Reddaway claimed that information in telegrams from Ambassador Gilchrist in Jakarta was ‘put almost instantly back into Indonesia via the B.B.C.’[xcii] Many of the stories had an anti-PKI slant: Reddaway recalled that a story of ‘P.K.I systematic preparations before the coup – the carving of the town into districts for systematic slaughter…was carried by [news] agencies’. The story seems to have been untrue.


While the elimination of the PKI removed some of the most vocal opponents of  Malaysia and weakened Sukarno, it did not guarantee that Jakarta would end its Confrontation campaign. British propaganda therefore also focused on other targets, attacking advocates of Confrontation such as the Foreign Minister Raden Subandrio and increasingly even Sukarno himself, and promoting the development of a military regime. Reddaway plugged themes such as
…the disadvantages of the Djakarta/Peking axis, the guilt of Subandrio & co., the incompatibility of reconstruction and confrontasi [Confrontation] and the advantages for Indonesia of switching to good neighbour policies.[xciii]

Subandrio was linked to the communists by a story of a messenger plying between him and Aidit, which was carried by newspapers, agencies and radio.[xciv] Details of money accumulated abroad by Subandrio and Sukarno came out in Hong Kong and were widely publicised.

During the spring of 1966 the Indonesian army began to move against Sukarno and Subandrio and in March it effectively carried out a coup d’etat. Sukarno was forced to grant Suharto sweeping political powers, Subandrio was arrested and the PKI was formally dissolved. As the new military government consolidated its position Britain scaled back its propaganda activities, in case they might prove counter productive in the new political climate.[xcv] Instead London would rely on diplomacy, mainly conducted by the Malaysians, to negotiate a settlement with the more amenable Suharto.  A settlement was quickly reached. At the end of May Indonesia and Malaysia signed an agreement to end the Confrontation and despite some last ditch delaying tactics by Sukarno, the agreement was ratified in August.

Britain had got the result it wanted – a non-communist Indonesia that renounced Confrontation and was ready to live peacefully with Malaysia. But to what extent was this due to British  propaganda? This question admits of no easy answer but two points do seem to stand out. Firstly, credit (or blame) for events in Indonesia could not be claimed by Britain alone, for she was not the only outside party trying to influence Indonesian opinion. As mentioned above, Malaysia was also carrying out propaganda operations and they did appear to have an impact. In November 1965 an Indonesian military leader told the Malaysians that even Sukarno listened every day to Radio Malaysia’s overseas broadcasts.[xcvi] There are also signs that the Americans may have been using propaganda against the PKI after Untung’s abortive coup.[xcvii]

The second point is that an accurate assessment of the effectiveness of British propaganda depends partly on the intentions of the Indonesian army leadership. After the coup attempt Suharto and the other generals may not have needed any encouragement to wipe out the PKI, remove Sukarno and Subandrio and end the Confrontation. British propaganda might have been pushing at an open door, urging the army to do things that it was going to do anyway. Too little is known of Suharto’s initial intentions to be able to come to a definite conclusion on this, but it is notable that British policymakers were cautious about how much influence their propaganda had on the generals. In November 1965 the JMID made the modest assessment that the propaganda ‘may have contributed marginally towards keeping the Generals going against the PKI and causing friction with China’.[xcviii]

Certainly it would be wrong to see the army as merely passive recipients of British propaganda. Indeed they quickly set in motion their own propaganda campaign against the PKI. From 8 October 1965 army sponsored newspapers in Indonesia alleged that the six generals killed in the coup attempt had been tortured and their sexual organs mutilated by members of the PKI’s women’s organisation, Gerwani. These claims were false, as Suharto well knew, for he had attended the autopsy of the dead generals on 4 October.[xcix] But they served to inflame feelings against the PKI.

Furthermore the army leaders actively sought Malaysian help in putting across their propaganda message. On 2-3 November 1965 Indonesian Brigadier-General Sukendro had secret talks in Bangkok with Dato Ghazali Shafie, the Permanent Secretary at the Malaysian Ministry of External Affairs.[c] Sukendro explained that the army needed six months to consolidate its position. In this period it would try to widen the basis of its support in Indonesia ‘by re-conditioning the people’s mind to win them to its side’.  Malaysian help would be needed to do this; Sukendro said Radio Malaysia should  emphasise PKI atrocities and the party’s role in the coup. The station should not give the army ‘too much credit’ or attack Sukarno directly. Sukendro even gave the Malaysians tape recorded statements by Untung in connection with the coup, which could be used as material for broadcasts. He also claimed that the army was trying to discredit the Confrontation policy by linking it with the PKI. A document had been ‘exposed’  showing a plan of the PKI to put pressure on Sukarno to fight Malaysia. More such exposures were planned. Finally, Sukendro said that
…means and ways must be obtained to remove SUBANDRIO. Towards this end, KEN requested for assistance in the character and political assassination of SUBANDRIO. He would send us materials of background information which could be used by us in whatever way suitable.

We have then the unusual situation of an army conspiring with the supposed enemy to remove its own foreign minister.

 In light of the above it seems likely that the British propaganda had a greater effect on the Indonesian public rather than the already sympathetic army leaders. Through its manipulation of the international media and its covert propaganda Britain ensured that  news coming into Indonesia supported the stories being spread by the Indonesian army. It helped incite people against the PKI, damaged Subandrio and Sukarno’s image in the country and undermined popular support for the Confrontation campaign.

Nonetheless it is still hard to measure how important this propaganda was. Potentially it could have been a key factor in removing the PKI and Sukarno and clearing the way for the army to end Confrontation. If so, it would have been a major achievement for British propagandists, comparable to coups in the past such as influencing American opinion in the First World War with the Zimmerman Telegram. By the end of Confrontation British officials were more convinced that their propaganda had been effective. In the summer of 1966 Alec Adams, the Political Advisor to the Commander in Chief in Singapore, summed up Reddaway’s activities and wrote that their ‘impact has been considerable.’[ci]  Yet Adams provided no evidence to substantiate this claim and at present we lack such basic information as polling data on Indonesian public attitudes towards the PKI, Sukarno and the Confrontation or listener and readership figures for British propaganda outlets in Indonesia. This sort of information may not exist anyway but without it it is impossible to establish with certainty whether British propaganda did cause the downfall of Sukarno and end the Confrontation.

Intelligence and propaganda were not in themselves war winning weapons. Ultimately Britain’s victory in the Confrontation was due to the ability of Commonwealth soldiers fighting in Borneo to contain and drive back the Indonesian guerrillas, and the political instability in Indonesia which brought down Sukarno. But good intelligence enabled Britain to deploy its limited military resources for the greatest effect. And when a political opening appeared in Indonesia in October 1965, Britain used propaganda against the supporters of Confrontation, although this was not without a terrible human cost.




NOTES


[i]    Peter Dennis and Jeffrey Grey, Emergency and Confrontation (Sydney: Allen and
     Unwin, 1996) p.246-253. Dennis and Grey do mention Britain’s use of Sigint but they
     do not assess how important it was in defeating Confrontation. 
[ii]    Ibid
[iii]    Public Records Office (PRO) DEFE 13/385, Minute Kyle to Thorneycroft, 19 Mar.
     1964. PRO DEFE 13/498 Minute M015/2/1 Healey to Stewart, 3 Jan. 1966.
[iv]    This former Commonwealth Relations Office official will henceforth be cited as
     ‘Official A’.
[v]    PRO DEFE 25/166, Minute Wright to Acting Chief of Defence Staff, 26 July 1965.
[vi]     PRO AIR 8/2441 COS(69) 7th Meeting, (4), 11 Feb.1969.
[vii]    Peter Wright, Spycatcher (New York: Viking Penguin 1987) p. 113.
[viii]    This former Foreign Office official did not wish to be identified. Henceforth     
      cited as ‘Official B’.
[ix]    Letter from Official A. For evidence of CIA intelligence being shared with the British   
      see PRO DEFE 4/174, COS(65) 57th Meeting, (5), 22 Sept. 1964 and Declassified    
      Documents Reference System (DDRS) 1975 (53C), CIA Tel TDCS 314/02920-64,
      Jakarta to Washington, 11 Sept. 1964. 
[x]   PRO CAB 159/41, JIC(64) 41st Meeting (9) 13 Aug. 1964.
[xi]   PRO PREM 13/2718, JIC/796/65 ‘Special Assessment - Indonesia’, 4 Oct. 1965.
      PRO  CAB 158/46, JIC(62) 58 (Final) ‘Indonesian Aims and Intentions’, 28
      Jan.1963.
[xii]   PRO DO 169/237, Tel 105 Kuala Lumpur to CRO, 24 Jan. 1963.
[xiii]   PRO CAB 21/5520, ‘Foreign Office telegram 897/8 from Djakarta refer’, not dated.
      The word in brackets appears to be an alternative phrasing suggested by the
      translator.
[xiv]   PRO DEFE 25/209, Minute Burlace to APS/Secretary of State, 9 Sept 1965.
[xv]   PRO CAB 129/116, CP(64)5, 6 Jan. 1964.
[xvi]   PRO CAB 148/19, OPD (65) 25, 26 Jan. 1965.
[xvii]   PRO PREM 11/4349, Tel. 7462 FO to Washington, 4 Aug. 1963. PRO DO     
     169/278,  Tel. 1676 Dean to FO, 6 Oct. 1963. Interestingly the CIA, which had access     
      to British intelligence and its own sources, supported British policy and agreed with       
      British assessments of Indonesian motives. See John Subritzky, Confronting Sukarno
      (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), p. 66-67. However, it seems that the State Dept
      and the White House ignored the CIA’s views.
[xviii]   PRO DO 169/241, Warner to Trench, 24 Sept. 1963. 
[xix]   PRO PREM 11/4870, Tel. 9489 FO to Washington, 24 Sept. 1963.
[xx]   Interview and letter from Official A. Corroborating evidence is provided by PRO           
      PREM 11/4906, ‘Report of a conversation between the Foreign Secretary and Mr
      Robert Kennedy, the United States Attorney General on January 24, 1964’, 27 Jan.
      1964. This records that the British ‘showed Mr Kennedy certain evidence which,      
      coupled with President Sukarno’s speech caused us to doubt Indonesian good faith.’
[xxi]   J. Subritzky, op cit, p 121-124.
[xxii]   PRO DEFE 25/164, Memo. by D.1.34C, 17 Dec. 1964.
[xxiii]   This information was provided by a former Foreign Office official who did not want    
      to be identified. Henceforth cited as Official C.
[xxiv]   PRO DEFE 31/54, Minute DCDS(I) to Chief of Defence Staff, 27 Jan. 1965. The CIA
      made a similar prognosis in January 1965. According to a CIA memorandum
     ‘Sukarno’s Viennese doctors believe that unless he undergoes surgery for removal of a
      kidney stone in the near future he will die within a year or two – possibly sooner and
      suddenly.’ DDRS, 1981, (274C), Office of National Estimates Special Memorandum
      4-65, 26 Jan. 1965.
[xxv]   PRO DEFE 4/179, COS(65) 3rd Meeting (1A), 12 Jan.1965.
[xxvi]   PRO PREM 11/4909, Tel. 1917 CRO to Head, 17 Aug. 1964.
[xxvii]   PRO FO 371/181560, Tel. 11 Gilchrist to FO, 2 Jan. 1965; Tel. 17 Gilchrist to FO, 3
      Jan. 1965.
[xxviii]   PRO DEFE 4/179, COS(65)1st Meeting (1A), 5 Jan. 1965. It seems to have been the     
      drugs used to treat the uraemia rather than the illness itself that would cause the
      manic state.
[xxix]   PRO DEFE 25/157, Minute Golds to Wright, 29 May 1964. PRO CAB 158/53, JIC
     (64) 54 ‘Indonesian air attacks against oil installations in Brunei’, 15 June 1964.
[xxx]   PRO DEFE 4/174, COS(65) 57th Meeting (5A), 22 Sept. 1964. PRO DEFE 4/175,
      COS(65) 58th Meeting (4A), 29 Sept. 1964.
[xxxi]   PRO DEFE 25/161, Minute COS 3052/13/10/64 Annex Lapsley to COS, 12 Oct.
      1964.
[xxxii]   PRO DEFE 4/169, COS(64) 33rd Meeting (7), 5 May 1964. PRO DEFE 13/385, Tel.
      COSSEA 143 MOD to Begg, 1 July 1964.
[xxxiii]   PRO DEFE 4/167, COS(64) 27th Meeting (4), 7 April 1964. PRO FO 371/179120,
      Brief by Peck, 7 April 1964.
[xxxiv]   PRO DEFE 13/385, Tel. COSSEA 143 MOD to Begg, 1 July 1964.
[xxxv]   PRO PREM 11/4908, Tel. 5560 FO to Washington, 24 April 1964.
[xxxvi]   PRO DEFE 4/177, COS(64) 70th Meeting (2A), 26 Nov. 1964.
[xxxvii]   Letters from Officials A and B.
[xxxviii]   PRO DEFE 4/179, COS(65) 3rd Meeting (1B), 12 Jan. 1965. It is not clear why the
      Indonesian commanders acted in this way. Defence Secretary Denis Healey suggested
      to a Labour MP in 1965 that the Indonesians did not publicise Britain’s cross border
      operations ‘probably because the army did not wish to accept the loss of prestige that
      would accompany such an admission’. PRO DEFE 25/170, MO/25/3 ‘Note of a
      discussion between the Secretary of State for Defence…and Mr Tam Dalyell MP on
      Wednesday, 13 October 1965.’, 14 Oct. 1965. However, the Indonesian army was
      also deliberately obstructing Indonesian operations that might provoke Britain and
      escalate the conflict. See Harold Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia (Ithaca:
      Cornell University, 1978), p. 69-75. Furthermore in secret contacts with the British
      and Malaysians in the spring of 1965, army leaders stressed that they did not want to
      escalate the fighting. PRO FO 371/181498, Tel. 713, CRO to Kuala Lumpur, 4 March
      1965. PRO FO 371/181499, Tel. 700 Head to CRO, 20 April 1965.Conceivably then
      the Indonesian army did not inform Sukarno about the British raids in case he reacted
      violently and triggered off a wider war.
[xxxix]   PRO CAB 148/19, OPD(65) 8, 12 Jan. 1965. PRO CAB 148/18, OPD(65) 1st
      Meeting, 13 Jan. 1965. PRO FO 371/181525, Tel. 142 CRO to Kuala Lumpur, 14
      Jan.1965.
[xl]   PRO DEFE 4/198, COS(66) 18th Meeting (2), Minute COS 1394/30/3/66 Lapsley to
      COS, 31 March 1966.
[xli]   PRO DEFE 13/476, Minute Strong to Healey, 22 June 1966.
[xlii]   PRO DEFE 4/179, COS(65) 3rd Meeting (1B), 12 Jan. 1965. PRO CAB 21/5520,       
      ‘Draft White Paper – Indonesia and Malaysia’, 28 June 1963. PRO FO 371/169737,    
      Memo by Cable, 8 Mar. 1963, Tel. 218 Singapore to FO, 29 April 1963.
[xliii]   PRO FO 371/169693 ‘Note of a Conversation between Mr Lee Kuan Yew and Mr
      Moore held on 15th October, 1963.’ Not dated.
[xliv]   PRO DEFE 7/2388 ‘Draft White Paper – Indonesian and the British Borneo
      Territories’, not dated.
[xlv]   PRO DEFE 5/154, COS (64) 273, 8 Oct. 1964.
[xlvi]    D. Hyde, Confrontation in the East (London: The Bodley Head, 1965), p. 100.
[xlvii]   PRO FO 953/2176, ‘Counter Subversion Committee Record of a Meeting held on
      May 12, 1964 in the Commonwealth Relations Office.’, 14 May 1964.
[xlviii]   PRO DEFE 28/145, Minute COS 1350/12/2/64 Watkins to COS, 12 Feb. 1964;
      ‘Review of activities of Counter Subversion Committee, 1961-64’, 8 Jan. 1965.
[xlix]   Paul Lashmar and James Oliver, Britain’s Secret Propaganda War (Stroud: Sutton
      Publishing, 1998) p. 1, 5.
[l]   PRO DEFE 11/236, Minute Wild to COS, 19 April 1963. PRO CAB 21/4851, Minute
      Huijsman to de Zulueta, 11 March 1963.
[li]   PRO DEFE 28/153, ‘Report on Mr P. H. Roberts’ Tour of Duty in the Borneo
      Territories’, not dated.
[lii]   PRO DEFE 28/144, Draft letter Chairman of the Counter Subversion Committee to
      Trend, not dated.
[liii]    Ibid., Minute Wild to Secretary Counter Subversion Committee, 27 Sept. 1963.
[liv]   PRO DEFE 28/145, Minute COS 1350/12/2/64 Watkins to COS, 12 Feb. 1964. PRO
      CAB 134/3326, SV(66) 19, 22 Aug. 1966.
[lv]   PRO FO 953/2176, ‘Counter Subversion Committee Record of a Meeting held on
      May 12, 1964, in the Commonwealth Relations Office, 14 May 1964.
[lvi]   PRO CAB 21/5379, Minute Caccia to Trend, 10 Oct. 1963. SV(64) 1, 1 Jan. 1964.
[lvii]   PRO FO 953/2129, Letter D1041/21/63 Joseph to Secretariat Kuching, 2 Mar. 1963.
      PRO FO 953/2128, Letter P5453/4 Stevenson to Micklethwait, 20 Mar. 1963.
[lviii]   PRO FO 953/2176, ‘Counter Subversion Committee Record of a Meeting held on
      May 12, 1964 in the Commonwealth Relations Office.’ 14 May 1964. PRO DO
      169/518, Pilcher to Glass, 5 April 1964. PRO FO 953/2132, Letter SPE30/35/1 Budd
      to Gauntlett, 4 Jan. 1964.
[lix]   PRO FO 953/2176, ‘Counter Subversion Committee Record of Meeting held on
      February 11, 1964, in the Commonwealth Relations Office.’ 14 Feb. 1964.
[lx]   Ibid. PRO FO 953/2132, Letter 071/63 Gauntlett to Rivet-Carnac, 25 Nov. 1963.
[lxi]   PRO DEFE 28/144, Minute Drew to PS/Minister, 19 Dec. 1963.  PRO FO 953/2140,
      Tel. 2380 Kuala Lumpur to CRO, 25 Oct. 1963. PRO FO 953/2176, ‘Counter
      Subversion Committee Record of Meeting held on February 11, 1964, in the
      Commonwealth Relations Office.’,14 Feb. 1964.
[lxii]   PRO DEFE 28/144, Letter SPE38/30/1 Bottomley to Costley-White, 21 Dec. 1963.
[lxiii]   Ibid., Minute Drew to PS/Minister, 19 Dec. 1963.
[lxiv]   PRO FO 371/181556, Tel. 208 Adams to FO, 30 March 1965.
[lxv]   Ibid., Tel. SEACOS 80 CINCFE to Chief of Defence Staff, 11 April 1965. Tel      
      SEACOS 82 CINCFE to Chief of Defence Staff, 12 April 1965.
[lxvi]   PRO FO 953/2132, Letter 071/63 Gaunlett to Rivet-Carnac, 25 Nov. 1963; Letter    
      SPE30/35/1 Budd to Gaunlett, 4 Jan. 1964. PRO DEFE 28/144, ‘Malaysian Seminar  
      on Counter Subversion’, 22 Oct. 1963.
[lxvii]   PRO DO 169/516, Letter 2FE/04/51/1 Jenkins to King, 8 Sept. 1964; B712 (R) 
     ‘Communists Smoothing Path to power in Indonesia’, June 1964.
[lxviii]   PRO DO 169/518, Letter 2FE/50/30/1 Golds to Bottomley, 23 April 1964.
[lxix]   PRO CAB 21/5584, Minute Nicholls to Trend, 28 Sept. 1964
[lxx]   PRO DEFE 25/218, Minute Drew to Wyldbore-Smith, 11 Sept. 1964.
[lxxi]   David Easter ‘British and Malaysian Covert Support for Rebel Movements in
      Indonesian during the ‘Confrontation’, 1963-66,’ in Intelligence and National
      Security Vol 14, 4/4 (1999) p. 195-208.
[lxxii]   PRO CAB 21/5584, Minute Nicholls to Trend, 28 Sept. 1964.
[lxxiii]   Ibid., Minute Nicholls to Gordon, 29 Oct. 1964, Minute Trend to Nicholls, 3 Dec.  
      1964.
[lxxiv]   PRO FO 371/176501 Golds to Bottomley, 21 Oct. 1964.
[lxxv]   PRO CAB 134/3326, SV(66) 19, 22 Aug 1966.
[lxxvi]   PRO PREM 13/430, Minute Trend to Wilson on ‘Malaysia’, not dated; Minute
      PM/65/32, Stewart to Wilson, 26 Feb. 1965; Minute Healey to Wilson, 1 March 1965.
[lxxvii]   PRO FO 371/181503, Golds to King, 1 April 1965.
[lxxviii]   PRO DEFE 5/162, COS (65) 162 Appendix 1, 20 Sept. 1965.
[lxxix]   PRO CAB 148/19, OPD(65) 25, 26 Jan. 1965.
[lxxx]   PRO FO 371/181530, Tel. 2645 CRO to Kuala Lumpur, 19 Oct. 1965. PRO FO   
      371/187587, Letter 90440/2/66G Adams to Murray, 19 May 1966.
[lxxxi]   PRO FO 371/187587, Minute Stanley to Edmonds, 17 June 1966.
[lxxxii]   H. Crouch, op cit, p 97-134.
[lxxxiii]   PRO DEFE 25/170, Tel. 1863 FO to Singapore, 8 Oct. 1965.
[lxxxiv]   PRO FO 371/181455, Tel. 2679 CRO to Canberra, 13 Oct. 1965.
[lxxxv]   Ibid., PRO DEFE 25/170, Tel. 1863 FO to Singapore, 8 Oct. 1965.
[lxxxvi]   Ibid. A breakdown of spending by the Special Counter Subversion Fund for Malaysia   
      mentions a ‘Newsletter for Indonesian troops’. It also reveals spending on ‘Rupiah    
      notes as “bait” in magazine aimed at Indonesian troops’ and ‘Polythene sealing
      machine for floating leaflets down Borneo rivers.’ See PRO CAB 134/3326, SV(66)1,   
     10 Jan. 1966; SV(66) 24, 30 Nov. 1966
[lxxxvii]   PRO FO 371/181530, Tel. 1460 Stanley to Reddaway, 9 Oct. 1965.
[lxxxviii]   H. Crouch, op cit, p 155.
[lxxxix]   PRO FO 371/181457, Minute Stanley to Peck, 25 Nov. 1965.
[xc]   PRO FO 371/187587, Letter 90440/10/66G Adams to de la Mare, attached diagram
      2 June 1966. PRO FO 371/186956, ‘Hong Kong Heads of Mission Conference
      Information Policy towards South East Asia and the Far East.’ Not dated.
[xci]   PRO FO 371/187587, Letter 90440/2/66G Adams to Murray, 19 May 1966.
      P. Lashmar and J. Oliver, op cit, p 6-9.
[xcii]   Gilchrist Papers GILC 13/K(iii), Letter Reddaway to Gilchrist, 18 July 1966,
      Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge University.
[xciii]   PRO FO 371/187587, Letter 90440/10/66G Adams to de la Mare, 2 June 1966.
[xciv]   Gilchrist Papers GILC 13/K(iii), Letter Reddaway to Gilchrist, 18 July 1966,
      Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge University.
[xcv]   PRO CAB 134/3326, SV(66) 2nd Meeting (1), 18 May 1966. PRO FO 371/187587,
      Minute Stanley to Edmonds, 17 June 1966.
[xcvi]   PRO FO 371/181457, ‘Record of Meeting between Dato M. Ghazali and Brig-
      General Sukendro on 2nd and 3rd November 1965 at Bangkok’, 10 Nov. 1965
[xcvii]   H.W. Brands ‘The Limits of Manipulation: How the United States Didn’t Topple
      Sukarno’, in The Journal of American History Vol 76, 3/4 (1989) p. 802. Brands
      quotes the US ambassador to Indonesia as recommending on 5 October 1965 covert
      efforts ‘to spread the story of the PKI’s guilt, treachery and brutality.’
[xcviii]   PRO FO 371/181457, Minute Stanley to Peck, 25 Nov. 1965.
[xcix]   H. Crouch, op cit, p 140. Geoff Simons, Indonesia: The Long Oppression
      (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), p 173-4. 
[c]  PRO FO 371/181457, ‘Record of Meeting between Dato M. Ghazali and Brig-
      General Sukendro on 2nd and 3rd November 1965 at Bangkok’, 10 Nov. 1965.
[ci]  PRO FO 371/187587 Letter 90440/2/66G Adams to de la Mare, 19 May 1966.



                       ********





Lampiran V

MI6 spread lies to put killer in power
THE WORLD'S press was systematically manipulated by British intelligence as part of a plot to overthrow Indonesia's President Sukarno in the 1960s, according to Foreign Office documents. The BBC, the Observer and Reuters news agency were all duped into carrying stories manufactured by agents working for the Foreign Office.  Last night, Denis Healey, Labour's defence secretary at the time, admitted the intelligence war had spun out of control in Indonesia. At one point the British were planting false documents on dead soldiers. Lord Healey even had to stop service chiefs from taking military action. He said: "I would not let the RAF drop a single bomb although they were very anxious to get involved."  The left-leaning Sukarno was overthrown in 1966 and up to half a million people were massacred by the new regime. Now a Foreign Office document obtained by the Independent on Sunday reveals the full extent of the "dirty tricks" campaign orchestrated from London, and how the world's journalists were manipulated.
A letter marked "secret and personal" from propaganda expert Norman Reddaway to Britain's Jakarta ambassador, Sir Andrew Gilchrist, brags about the campaign which aimed to destabilise Mr Sukarno by suggesting his rule would lead to a communist takeover. One story "went all over the world and back again", writes Reddaway, while information from Gilchrist was "put almost instantly back into Indonesia via the BBC".  This included an allegation, with no apparent basis in reality, that Indonesian communists were planning to slaughter the citizens of Jakarta.
Reddaway, a specialist with the FO's Information Research Department (IRD), writes: "I wondered whether this was the first time in history that an ambassador had been able to address the people of his country of work almost at will and virtually instantaneously."  Showing his low opinion of journalists, he boasts that "newsmen would take anything from here, and pestered us for copy". He had been sent to Singapore to bolster British efforts to overthrow the Indonesian president and support General Suharto. His brief from London had been "to do whatever I could do to get rid of Sukarno", he revealed before his death last year. He therefore embarked on an extensive campaign of placing favourable stories with news wires, foreign correspondents and the BBC, and also used the pages of Encounter, an influential magazine for the liberal intelligentsia which, it later emerged, had been funded and controlled by the CIA.
His letter even suggests that the Observer newspaper had been persuaded to take the Foreign Office "angle" on the Indonesian takeover by reporting a "kid glove coup without butchery".
Last month, Abdurrahman Wahid, the country's current president, gave his support to a judicial inquiry into the massacres of 1965-66 and, in an interview broadcast on state television, promised to punish those found guilty.
Newly discovered cabinet papers show that British agencies, including MI6, had supported Islamic guerrillas and other dissident groups in an effort to destabilise Sukarno. The disorder fostered by the British led to General Suharto's takeover and dictatorship, and a wave of violence unseen since the Second World War. The massacre set the stage for almost 35 years of violent suppression, including the 1975 invasion of East Timor, which was only reversed last year.
The cabinet documents (which are separate from the revelations of Reddaway) were uncovered by David Easter, a historian at the London School of Economics. His research - which is published this week in the journal Intelligence and National Security - shows that the cabinet's defence and overseas policy committee asked the head of MI6, Dick White, to draw up plans for covert operations against Indonesia in January 1964. According to Dr Easter, these operations began in the spring of that year and included supplying arms to separatists in the Indonesian provinces of Aceh and Sulawesi. These actions were complemented by a propaganda campaign run out of Britain's Far East HQ in Singapore by the IRD, which had close connections with MI6. The unit was behind stories that Sukarno and his tolerance of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) would lead to a communist dictatorship in Indonesia.
Reddaway was a key part of this. His letter, written in July 1966, was released to Churchill College, Cambridge, which holds the private papers of Sir Andrew Gilchrist. Last night, Lord Healey owned up to the Foreign Office misinformation campaign.
Lord Healey said: "Norman Reddaway had an office in Singapore. They began to put out false information and I think that, to my horror on one occasion, they put forged documents on the bodies of Indonesian soldiers we had taken. I confronted Reddaway over this.
"The key thing here is that Indonesia was infiltrating its troops into Borneo and had organised a coup against the Sultan of Brunei with whom we had a treaty. So we reacted similarly. I think it has been long known that British Special Forces - the SAS, SBS and Gurkhas - were used to tackle the Indonesians. But everything was done on the ground. I would not let the RAF drop a single bomb although they were very anxious to get involved." Lord Healey denied any personal knowledge of the wider MI6 campaign to arm opponents of Sukarno. But, he added: "I would certainly have supported it."
According to one of the country's leading commentators on security matters - Richard Aldrich, a professor at Nottingham University - the episode shows Britain's post-war operations at their most effective. "It represents one of the supreme achievements of the British clandestine services," he said. "In contrast with the American CIA, they remained politically accountable and low-key. Britain has a preference for bribing people rather than blowing them up."
Professor Aldrich added that modern journalistic deadlines had made today's media even more open to manipulation than it was 30 years ago.

********


Lampiran VI

AN ANATOMY OF THE RECENT
ANTI ETHNIC-CHINESE RIOTS IN INDONESIA

Somewhere in Southeast Asia, 20 March, 1998.
by: Michael Ocorandi.
1.  Recent manifestations against ethnic-Chinese in Indonesia took two forms. Firstly, Muslim activists stepped up pressure against Sofyan Wanandi, an ethnic Chinese Indonesian, accusing him of financing a student movement to topple the government. This was political/religious in nature.  Secondly, a wave of economically motivated riots directed against ethnic-Chinese Indonesian swept 40 towns across the archipelago.
The crusade against Wanandi.
2.  In order to understand the crusade by Muslim activists against Sofyan Wanandi, one should go back to 1965. In 1965, after the attempted coup in by communists in which six top anti communist  generals were brutally murdered (Suharto miraculously escaped the grisly massacre as he went fishing all night), a coalition was born consisting of students associated with the Catholic/Chinese, the Protestant and the Muslim student association (the PMKRI, the GMKI and the HMI).  These students launch anti Sukarno and anti communists demonstrations.  They were backed by the anti-communist army led by Suharto, and tacitly supported by the USA.  The daily student demonstrations backed by the army, finally brought down Sukarno, on 11 March 1972.   It is no coincidence that this year Suharto was re-elected on 11 March 1998. In the process, pogroms by anti-communist people massacred 500,000 to 800,000 members of the communist party and their wives and children, including babies.
3.  CNN has not yet gone worldwide and anyway little mention was made in the press because the "good guys" slaughtered the "bad guys".  There was also the six days war at the same time. Suharto was patted in the back by the US for getting rid of the communists and doing a great favor to the free world.  Nobody in those days talked about democracy or human rights as long as the abuse was directed against communists.  Because of the alleged role of China in the aborted coup, with whom the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) was affiliated, a drive against Chinese culture took place.  Chinese written language was not allowed in public, the celebration of Chinese New Year and other festivals were banned and the ethnic-Chinese Indonesians were strongly "persuaded" to adopt Indonesian names.

4.  Meanwhile, although the Catholic students constituted just a small fraction of the Muslim students and masses,  their role became all important as, under the tutelage of a staunch anti-communist Dutch priest Romo Beek, they mapped out the strategy of attack, and provided Suharto's's army and the students and masses with valuable data on communists and communist suspects from their data base, benefitting from the network of Catholic churches throughout Indonesia.  Suharto rewarded this group with many privileges. Their leaders, including the brothers Yusuf and Sofyan Wanandi, (Lim Bian Kie and Liem Bian Koen) were given economic and political privileges while the think tank established by the group, the Center for Strategic and International Studies provided intellectual backstopping for the Suharto government and became all powerful under General Ali Moerdopo, backed by Catholic General Benny Moerdani.  Many Muslims felt disadvantaged by Suharto who listened more to this group than to the Muslims under the principle that Indonesia is a secular and not a Muslim state. Habibi, a bright scholar returning from studies in Germany, and last week named Vice President, tried to correct the balance by establishing the ICMI (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim
Indonesia, Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Association) in 1990.  Nevertheless, CSIS continued to flourish as a think tank but Suharto listens more and more to Habibi and the Muslims.
5.  Gradually, CSIS and its leaders became more and more critical of the way the Suharto government ruled.  As the economy progressed at a rapid pace, it was accompanied by ever escalating privileges and monopolies for Suharto's family and Chinese conglomerates.  CSIS, the principal backer of Suharto against Sukarno, quietly opposed the government. On January 26, 1998 the Jakarta military command alleged that Sofyan Wanandi was tied to a bomb blast involving students associated with the outlawed People's Democracy Party. He was brought in for questioning while more than a hundred students wearing Ararat style scarves and white caps demanded that CSIS be closed down. Jakarta's military commander, Syafrie Syamsuddin, said that an E-mail was found in a laptop proving the link. Meanwhile, other prominent Muslim
personalities also stepped up the campaign against Sofyan and other Chinese tycoons at a huge rally at Sunda Kelapa mosque in Jakarta.  At the rally outspoken anti ethnic-Chinese Indonesians like Adi Sasono, Husein Umar, Sri Eddy Swasono and Achmad Tirtosudiro condemned ethnic-Chinese Indonesians. A close aide to Suharto, General Syarwan Hamid, who is considered a hard liner, also spoke against the need to eradicate rats (obviously referring to ethnic-Chinese Indonesians).  The powerful but moderate Amien Rais, leader of the 28 million strong Muhammadiah, a staunch government critic and not a known anti-Chinese, reminded Syarwan that there are all kinds of rats, including big rodents (tikus got).
6.  Sofyan Wanandi, who himself is a wealthy businessman benefitting from facilities awarded him by Suharto earlier denied the charges and hinted that the questioning as well as the media bashing against him was an attempt to create the impression that all ethnic-Chinese Indonesians are subversives.  The 21st Century Islam Foundation, in Bandung claimed that Muslims have no choice but to crush these conspiratory tycoons ( referring to ethnic-Chinese Indonesians) who even dare to say that they will bring the rupiah down to 20,000 to the dollar if anti-Chinese Habibi were elected vice president.

The food riots.
7.  The ascendancy of Suharto to political power was accompanied by rapid and uninterrupted economic development implemented by Suharto's government.  More pats on the back for Suharto from the US, joined in by the World Bank and IMF. The oil boom helped a lot and the liberalization of exchange control coupled with high interest rates  brought in an avalanche of private capital including hot money into Indonesia.  Suharto and his children, in cooperation with conglomerates, most of them of Chinese descent,  all got rich and gradually became super rich.  Resentment built up among the predominantly Moslem masses against this privileged class associated with the Suharto family and with ethnic-Chinese and with Christians in general. The Chinese are either Christian or Buddhist/Taoists.  Sporadic but sometimes violent riots against Chinese/Christians took place throughout the postwar period.  During  1995-97, before the financial crisis, 131 Christian churches were attacked and untold Chinese owned shops, cars and homes burned and/or destroyed. However, during those days, resentment could not dislodge Suharto from power as the rapid economic development produced a trickle down effect and living conditions improved for the poor, almost eradicating absolute poverty, while 20 million Indonesians became middle class (more than the entire populations of Australia or Malaysia each).

8.  This continued until July 1997 when the financial crisis suddenly
erupted, and enormous capital flowed out of Indonesia, Thailand and South Korea leaving these countries with a shattered exchange rate and massive private foreign debts to cope with.  All three became sick ( and to a  lesser extend Malaysia and the Philippines as well)  but Indonesia became mortally ill.  This was because in Indonesia the economic crisis was aggravated by political factors including the uncertainty surrounding Suharto's illness in December and his political future.  Beginning with the devaluation of the Thai baht on July 2, 1997, the currency turmoil quickly spread to most countries of East and Southeast Asia.  Since July, and until the first quarter of this year, currencies of East and Southeast Asia have depreciated an alarming manner: the hardest hit, the Indonesian rupiah by 78%, the Thai baht by 50% and the Korean won by 42%.
9.  After having enjoyed rising per capita incomes over a period of three decades in which absolute poverty was almost eradicated, the poor people suffered when the rupiah plunged from Rp.2,500 to the dollar in July 1998 to Rp.10,000 today.  Unemployment soared while the nine essential commodities including rice skyrocketed in price.  As if to add insult to injury, an unusual drought this year produced a deficit of 3 million tons in rice production which had to be imported which also hurt the farmer.  Rice quadrupled in price while Sustagen baby formula moved from 10,000 rupiahs to 60,000 rupiahs. Imported medicines disappeared or became very expensive. It was very easy to blame this to the ethnic Chinese who control the retail trade everywhere as nobody in rural Indonesia has ever heard of the IMF or of massive private capital inflows.
10.  The riots against ethnic-Chinese Indonesians spread from one town to the other and devastated Chinese property and churches in about forty towns in January/ February of 1998.  In Pamanukan, one of the worst hit towns, on February 14, angry mobs targeted stores and homes owned by ethnic Chinese Indonesians in sporadic looting, dumping groceries, cookware and clothing into the streets despite police and army patrols in the riot-torn town. The looting came a day after hundreds of shops and houses in about a dozen locations were wrecked in the worst violence since the onset of Indonesia's biggest economic crisis in three decades.
11.  Mobs were venting their anger against ethnic-Chinese Indonesian traders they blame for the rising prices that came with mass unemployment after the plunge in value of the rupiah. A heavy security presence brought an uneasy calm to most trouble spots, but isolated disturbances continued.  In Patok Besi, a village about 50 miles east of Jakarta, more than 200 looters ransacked a store owned by an ethnic Chinese Indonesian. Some ran away with stolen goods. Others dumped wares - the general stores sell everything from crockery to soap - into the street as onlookers cheered and laughed. Police directed traffic close by but did nothing to intervene. ``The Chinese have put up the prices of everything way too quickly,'' one looter told The Associated Press.  In other towns, crowds picked through wreckage and took away merchandise from shops abandoned by their frightened owners.``All these economic problems are the fault of the Chinese,'' said one man in Pamanukan, about 55 miles east of Jakarta.``The Chinese keep raising prices,'' said another. ``We want the government to lower prices.''  One ethnic-Chinese Indonesian storekeeper wept as she surveyed the damage to her store.  This picture was shown on frontpages of newspapers all over the world.
 12.  Many ethnic Chinese-Indonesians hid in friends' homes or took shelter in police stations.  Other traders packed up and left, saying they wouldn't return until the situation calmed.  Eng Nori, an ethnic-Chinese Indonesian woman, said a mob locked her and her two children in a room for two and a half hours and ransacked her shop and home in Sukamandi, 45 miles east of Jakarta. They escaped after the looters left. ``We have to get out of town. But we don't know where to go,'' she said with tears in her eyes.  Riots took place in the following towns: In Java: Jember, Tamanan. Kalibaru, Balung, Bagorejo, Pakisaji, Kasiyan, Rembang, Kragan, Pamanukan, Jaiwangi, Kuningan, Losari, Tanjung, Bulakamba, Sarang, Padangan, Tuba, Tambakboyo, Margasari, Brebes, Jatirogo, Palang, Cirebon. In other islands: Ende in Flores, Bima in West Sumbawa, Padangsidempuan in Sumatra, Ujungpandang, Donggala  and Kendari in South Sulawesi, and Praya in Central Lombok.  Riots did not take place in Hindu Bali, nor in Christian areas such as Manado, Tapanuli, Kalimantan Dayak area, East Indonesia (Timor, West Irian and Maluku).  Ende is on Catholic Flores island but eyewitnesses said that the 8 February rioting was perpetrated by a thousand Muslim Florinese who burned down 21 shops and damaging or looting 71 others.

13. It was quite puzzling how these riots started.  Many residents of the rural towns themselves were stunned.  Their ethnic-Chinese Indonesian neighbors lived in their midst for generations, spoke Indonesian and unlike in Malaysia, many spoke no Chinese at all.  All ate Indonesian food daily and have Indonesian names.  It was under strange circumstances that mobs suddenly appeared from nowhere.  This led to some suspicion: were they instigated and organized to deflect the blame away from the government and onto the approximately 6 million ethnic Chinese Indonesians? The instigation of rioters in small towns by outsiders was evident by mobs showing up from nowhere to inflame locals who were already upset with sky rocketing prices of essentials.  Why did the government not issue a warning against rioters and offered an explanation that the economic hardship was not caused by local merchants but was an externally induced crisis?
14.  Diplomats in Jakarta points to signs of rising sentiments against ethnic-Chinese Indonesians in some quarters in the Indonesian military.  Human Rights Watch, in a report, said that former armed forces commander General Feisal Tanjung, now coordinating minister for Defense in the new cabinet, and new army strategic reserve chief Lt. General Prabowo Subianto, a son-in-law of the president, and the leader of the military parliamentary faction Syarwan Hamid, have incited racial tension by hinting that: "any shop-owner who closes his shop for fear of violence or refuses to sell at pre-crisis prices is deliberately making goods scarce to keep prices high." The ethnic-Chinese Indonesians were accused of jacking up prices and illegally stocking up on goods.  The definition of hoarding was arbitrary and left to the local police to define.  This led to great abuse. General Prabowo organized a buka puasa (break the fast)event in which thousands of Moslem clergy were invited and anti ethnic-Chinese rhetoric was the main course.  The anti ethnic-Chinese riots also took on anti Christian overtones.  The total number of churches destroyed by fanatical Muslims during 1995 to 1997 numbered 131.  Another 37 were destroyed in the last riots.
15.  It is strange that these riots abruptly stopped in mid-February when General Feisal  Tanjung, an Acehnese, was replaced by the more moderate General Wiranto, a Javanese, as Chief of Staff.  Both are Suharto men but Wiranto was the only general who warned against all riots, including SARA (religious, communal and ethnic conflicts).  In the new cabinet announced this week, Feisal Tanjung was named coordinating minister for defense and Wiranto Minister of Defense.  Concomitantly, the massive campaign of food aid in which ethnic-Chinese Indonesian conglomerates donated essential commodities in aid packages worth millions of dollars to the most affected people in riot stricken towns also helped to ease the tension.
16.  Since then, the riots against ethnic-Chinese Indonesians gave way to a wave of on campus student demonstrations, which were clearly anti-government in nature and is still ongoing.  Slogans called for political reform and a lowering of prices.  No slogans against ethnic Chinese Indonesians were displayed or uttered. So far no ethnic-Chinese property was destroyed by the students. It started on one campus and now spreads across the entire archipelago.  It was joined by professors other intellectuals and the general public. Students are demonstrating to alleviate the suffering of the people.  They wear the same yellow jackets as in 1965, their hallmark of protest.  However, the situation today differs markedly from 1965. Unlike in 1965, when the army was solidly behind the students, the army today appears to be solidly behind Suharto.  So far the demonstrations have been confined in campuses but during the last few days they ventured outside and were met by a phalanx of army and police.  Casualties started to fall which could alter the situation.
The riots are a symptom of a deeper problem.


Sofyan Wanandi Under Threat
May 28, 2002 06:07 PM, Editor
Laksamana.Net -  The persistence of the government in continuing a case against businessman and head of the Gemala group Sofyan Wanandi represents a significant attack on the former New Order elite.

The man who controls a business empire based on automotive batteries but extending into truck trailer manufacture business in North America looks to be under pressure. Though Wanandi is still only a witness in the case, it is claimed by prosecutors that he, as a commissioner of Bank Dana Hutama, signed an application to receive an emergency loan from Bank Indonesia during the financial crisis of 1998. It is alleged that some of this money went to businesses affiliated with the bank.

Wanandi is also the owner of PT Pakarti Yoga, a company that took Rp 8.25 billion from its account at the bank.

Activist credentials
Sofyan Wanandi’s role in bringing down the founding President Sukarno came with his role as a leading member of the Indonesian Catholics Student Association (PMKRI).

He and his young friends came under the wing of staunchly anti-communist Dutch Priest Romo Beek. Together with Romo Beek, the group of activists mapped out the strategy of attack. Beek later passed data on communists and communist suspects to Suharto generals.

By 1996 Wanandi was appearing on stage as part of the Suharto inner circle.

As the protégé of Suharto’s personal staff, General Ali Murtopo, from the very beginning of Suharto’s rise to power in 1966-67, Wanandi was very close to the military establishment under the influence of the Army Strategic Reserve Command (Kostrad).

As Ali Murtopo strengthened his power base through his strength in the intelligence section of Kostrad, Wanadi logically opened up business connections in the regiment.

Kostrad-linked companies reached their financial peak under Wanandi’s management.

A major vehicle was the Dharma Putera foundation. This became wealthy after Suharto took power, receiving financial support from the Chinese businessmen most closely connected with him during his periods as commander of the Central Java Division and Kostrad commander, such as Liem Swi Liong and Bob Hasan.

Dharma Putera foundation was one of the earliest military foundations set up in Jakarta, and was founded personally by Suharto on April 28, 1964, while Sukarno was still president, and while Suharto was Kostrad commander, just down the road from the palace.

Sofyan Wanandi (Lim Bian Koen) started out with the Kostrad businesses at PT Garuda Mataram, the Volkswagen sole agency, where he was in partnership with the Mantrust group headed by Tan Kiong Liep.

From his work with Kostrad companies, Wanandi was able to build his own family conglomerate, the Gemala Group. That was fortunate for Wanandi, because his work with Kostrad proved short-lived.

In the late ‘80s, when Suharto divorced his right-wing Catholic supporters to turn to the newly formed power base led by the Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI)-linked, the Kostrad companies drifted away. Wanandi built his own power base with fellow Sino-Indonesian-led conglomerates.

The heart of the empire they built lay with the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a think tank and power base built originally by Ali Murtopo, and run by Chinese Catholic intellectuals with whom Ali Murtopo had become associated during the anti-Sukarno actions the mid ‘60s. With big brother Jusuf at the helm of CSIS, Sofyan Wanandi was instrumental as a fund raiser.

Under Murtopo’s direction, Sofyan Wanandi played from an early stage both a business and a political role. Murtopo at that time headed a shadowy Special Operations (Opsus) unit.

In the run up to elections in 1971, Wanandi joined BAPILU, a crucial organization tasked with winning control of Golkar at any cost. BAPILU members consisted of military intelligence personnel (Ali Murtopo and Sudjono Humandhani), and former Catholic student leaders including Sofyan and Yusuf Wanandi, Cosmas Batubara, Rachman Toleng and David Napitupulu. By way of his involvement in BAPILU and the Opsus unit run by Murtopo, Sofyan Wanandi quickly became seen as part of a New Order team who curtailed and crippled the political parties potentially opposed to Suharto and developed Golkar as their personal base.
The prominence of the Catholic group caused jealousy from the Islamic political groupings, who had done just as much work on the streets to bring down Sukarno.

CSIS’s Catholic base became increasingly a target for grumbling from Muslim groups, who in the late ‘80s moved to establish their own institutions, many linked to the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI). Inevitably, the association with ICMI of such a powerful military figure as Gen. L.B. Murdani led to theories among Muslims of a Catholoic bloodless coup.

ICMI, founded in 1990, marked an important shift in power. It became a strong platform for Muslim politicians and marked a rise in the influence of the political clique around then Minister for Research and Technology B.J. Habibie.

Sofyan Wanandi also served as the unofficial spokesman for a large part of the Indonesian Chinese business community. Also open to visits by journalists, he has taken a much lower key position under the new ‘reform’ era but has spoken out on issues such as the need to restrain labor costs. He is well known as a conservative in management. He made a surprising statement in a meeting with the American Chamber of Commerce (see Vedy R Hadiz, Reformasi Total? Labor After Suharto, Indonesia 66, October 1998):

“Yes, we underpay the workers. We must keep the workers weak. If they become too strong, if the military cannot control them. It is not the Indonesian government nor the US government who will suffer. It is we who will be destroyed.”

The role as spokesman began with an event in February 1990 at Suharto’s Tapos ranch. Called to pay attention were members of 31 large business groups, representing a significant part of Indonesia’s assets. At the forum, Suharto appealed to the business operators to transfer up to 25% of their equity to cooperatives. In Suharto’s view, such an action was needed to reduce social jealousy.

Sofyan Wanandi emerged out of the shockwave as the spokesman of the Chinese tycoons. Wanandi clearly stated the group’s disagreement with Suharto’s demands. Over the next few years, he was strongly critical of Suharto in both on and off record interviews.

The distancing from Suharto upset the careful stability of the CSIS era. Sofyan Wanandi personally has faced criticism from both Muslim and nationalist political forces. Now he faces a grilling from the courts. 



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Lampiran VII

PMKRI Online

Rekonstruksi Kaderisasi Politik
2004-01-29 00:00:00 wib   by : E. Melkiades Laka Lena,Sekjend PP PMKRI
 KEKUATAN kalangan Katolik walaupun kecil tetapi cukup diperhitungkan karena kemampuan intelektual, ketrampilan, dan karakter yang dimiliki. Kemampuan itu diperoleh antara lain melalui pendidikan (khusus) yang melibatkan hirarki Gereja. Potensi kaum muda generasi 60-an yang dibina secara efektif dengan sistem dan pola tertentu, melibatkan hirarki Gereja seperti Pater Beek, Pater Dijkstra, Pater Daniels, dan keluasan interaksi yang dibangun membuat hasil pendidikan (baca: kaderisasi) ketika itu menghasilkan pemikir dan aktivis politik berkemampuan di atas rata-rata.Kekuatan kalangan Katolik yang sejak kemerdekaan konsisten memperjuangkan "ideologi" Pancasila membutuhkan serangkaian kekuatan yang kuat untuk menopangnya. Kekuatan itu harus melintasi pelbagai biding dengan titik berat pada bidang tertentu yang dianggap strategis sedangkan bidang lain sebagai penunjang. Bidang strategis yang perlu digarap serius yaitu politik dan ekonomi, dengan sektor penunjang seperti pendidikan dan kesehatan. Untuk itu, harus ada kaderisasi yang efektif dan kontinu serta melibatkan stake holders kunci.. Mengurai benang kusut Kekuatan kalangan Katolik kini mengalami kemacetan kaderisasi: Kemacetan tersebut paling tidak terjadi karena empat sebab berikut: konflik masa lalu dan elit awam Katolik, sistem pendidikan yang kehilangan relevansi dan tidak kontekstual, koordinasi masing-masing. kelompok sangat tethatas, dan minimnya keterlibatan hirarki terutama dalam aspek membangun moralspiritual kaderisasi.Penyebab pertama, kemacetatan kaderisasi awam disebabkan oleh konflik para senior. Yang belum -tuntas benar. Pilihan untuk mengambil bagian-dalam kekuasaan dengan aksentuasi pada wilayah intelektual, terlibat dan bersama masyarakat, mendirikan perguruan tinggi yang bermutu, mempengaruhi opini publik melalui media massa, merupakan variasi pola gerakan awam Katolik-pasca rezim Orde Lama tumbang. Lahirlah Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) dengan tokohnya Harry Tjan Silalahi, Bina Swadaya dengan tokohnya Bambang Ismawan, Atma Jaya Jakarta dengan tokohnya Frans Seda, dan Kompas dengan tokohnya Jacob Oetama. Konflik terjadi ketika merumuskan hubungan antarawam dalam konteks orientasi politik Gereja serta bagaimana hal itu harus diekspresikan. Kaderisasi tidak berjalan karena energi lebih banyak dialokasikan untuk konflik intern kalangan Katolik daripada bersinergi untuk menghasilkan kader-kader muda. Penyebab kedua, kaderisasi kehilangan relevansi dan tidak kontekstual karena ketiadaan dukungan senior awam Katolik untuk menyambung kaderisasi yang dilakukan dengan realitas kemasyarakatan. Kaum muda kehilangan teman untuk secara bersama menangani kaderisasi. Kaderisasi yang dilakukan pada akhimya kehilangan relevansi dan tidak kontekstual karena kader selalu bermimpi tentang keberhasilan seniornya di masa lalu. Awam senior mempunyai potensi untuk mengarahkan kaderisasi menggapai kepemimpinan pada tempat-tempat strategis tersebut. Ketiadaan "penghubung" membuat kaderisasi awam Katolik tidak relevan dan tidak kontekstual dengan dinamika masyarakat serta menggaami kemacetan terutama di bidang politik. Penyebab ketika, kemacetan kaderisasi terjadi karena tiadanya koordinasi masing-masing kelompok untuk membangun sinergi bersama. Organisasi massa Katolik seperti Perhimpunan Mahasiswa Katolik Republik Indonesia, Pemuda Katolik, Ikatan Sarjana .Katolik Indonesia, Wanita Katolik Republik Indonesia,_ atau dua organisasi-yang muncul belakongan Forum Masyarakat Katolik Indonesia,- dan Solidaritas Demokrat Katolik Indonesia, mempunyai sistem kaderisasi yang bisa saling singgung. Demikian halnya kelompok lain, dengan basis Katolik atau plural seperti Kelompok Karyawan Muda Katolik, Mudika, Gereja Mahasiswa, Kasebul (yang berubah menjadi Madha) atau kelompok binaan Unisosdem. Kelompok binaan hirarki Gereja baik bersifat individual, dalam kelompok sesuai ordo atau gabungan beberapa pastor, atau bersifat teritorial yang dilakukan oleh keuskupan, bertebaran di seluruh Indonesia. Gambaran ini menunjuk kan bahwa kaderisasi yang dilakukan oleh Gereja Katolik (hirarki dan awam) merupakan kekuatan besar yang belum bersinergi. Koordinasi yang lemah menyebabkan kaderisasi macet karena baik proses maupun hasilnya bersifat parsial, berserakan, dan tidak berkelanjutan. Penyebab keempat terkait dengan keterlibatan hirarki yang makin minim pasca menguatnya pelembagaan pola gerakan awam Katolik. Kehadiran pastor yang dulu membantu secara intensif dalam aspek moral-spiritual. pemikiran, finansial, jaringan terhadap organisasi massa kaum muda kini tidak lagi. Kasus ini terjadi secara merata di tingkat nasional maupun di tingkat lokal. organisasi kaum muda mengalaami kesulitan untuk mendapat pastor yang mengerti benar tentang dinamika kemahasiswaan-kepemudaan. Keterlibatan seorang pastor sangat penting bagi organisasi kaum muda yang intens berhubungan dengan pihak non Katolik seperti PMKRI dan Pemuda Katolik. Minimnya keterlibatan hirarki dalam kaderisasi kaum muda dalam tiga dasawarsa terakhir turut menjadi penyebab kemacetan_kaderisasi yang dilakukan. Mencermati empat penyebab tersebut, paling tidak perlu segera dilakukan empat langkah berikut untuk menerobos kemacetan kaderisasi awam Katolik. Langkah pertama; harus dilakukan koordinasi antara kelompok-individu (stake holders kunci) yang melakukan kaderisasi, terutama yang mempunyai infrastruktur dan bersifat nasionalregional. Koordinasi dilakukan dengan mempertemukan simpul-simpul utarma dari setiap kelompok. Koordinasi tersebut untuk menggagas platform bersama tentang kaderisasi politik sekaligus membuka ruang pengertian terhadap perbedaan sistem kaderisasi masing-masing kelompok. Inisiatif untuk melakukan pertemuan ini bisa diprakarsai oleh salah satun pimpinan kelompok dan mengundang semua stake holders kunci kaderisasi untuk membangun banyak pusat kaderisasi (plurieenn-is) dan banyak bentuk kaderisasi (plurifonnis) tetapi sekaligus terkoordinasi secara regional dan nasional. Langkah kedua. perlu komitmen dan keterlibatan hirarki pada aspek tertentu terhadap kaderisasi vang dilakukan. Tahap ini perlu dilakukan karena pengalaman menunjukkan bahwa intervensi hirarki yang tidak proporsional dalam kaderisasi menimbulkan dampak buruk seperti yang kita alami saat ini. Komitmen ini meliputi komitmen antarawam dan hirarki maupun antara hirarki satu sama lain. baik yang berbeda ordo atau keuskupan. Keterlibatan hirarki Gereja pada aspek tertentu harus merupakan kesepakatan bersama antara pimpinan hirarki (ordo dan keuskupan) dan perwakilan awam Katolik dari pelbagai kelompok dan jenjang genersi. Integrasi kerja kaderisasi antarkeduanya terutama dan yang terpenting yaitu peran hirarki dalam aspek moral-spritual. menunjang jaringan (internasional) dan mengajak keterlibatan pengusaha Katolik. Aspek pemikiran diberikan pada sekelompok awam Katolik senior yang kompeten di bidangnya. Langkah ketiga, merumuskan ulang sistem kaderisasi yang dilakukan. Sistem kaderisasi yang dimaksud antara lain mencakup kurikulum, metode, fasilitator kaderisasi maupun keberlanjutannya. Kurikuium dan metode kaderisasi hares menyesuaikan diri dengan perkembangan zaman. Materi yang diberikan dan metode kaderisasi yang dilakukan harus menjawab kebutuhan masyarakat dan sekaligus menyiapkan pemimpin untuk mengambil bagian dalam bidang-bidang strategis bangsa. Kaderisasi tidak dapat dibebankan hanya kepada para fasilitator kaderisasi kini. Semua stake holders kaderisasi harus menyepakati pecan dan sumbangan yang hares diberikan dalam kerja besar ini. Kaum muda sebagai subyek kaderisasi perlu dibantu secara pemikiran, finansial, jaringan, dan moral-spiritual. Kaderisasi purna organisasi hares tetap dilakukan untuk menjaga keberlanjutan dan efek-tivitas. Kaderisasi merupakan proses berlanjut dan tidak hanya berhenti pada titik tertentu dan untuk kepentingan sesaat.Langkah keempat, seturut dengan semangat pluricentris-plurifortnis terkoordinasi maka masing-masing kelompok yang melakukan kaderisasi harus diberi mandat khusus hasil kesepakatan semua stake holders kunci. Konsekuensi dari mandat khusus tersebut maka masing-masing organisasi mendapat peran spesifik dan karenanya mendapat dukungan tertentu. Mandat khusus ini tidak bermaksud untuk mengurangi kinerja kaderisasi yang sudah dimiliki dan diprogramkan sesuai kepentingan masing-masing. Sebagai contoh, hasil pengkajian dan kesepakatan stake holders kunci memutuskan PMKRI diberi tugas mengkader pemimpin politik, ekonomi, dan intelektual. Di satu sisi, PMKRI hares menformat kaderisasinya sesuai tugas yang diberikan dan untuk itu harus mendapat dukungan terkait mandat yang diperoleh. Di sisi lain, PMKRI tetap dapat melakukan kaderisasi untuk kepentingannya sesuai kebutuhan dan program yang sudah dirumuskan. E. Melkiades Laka Lena, Sekjend PP PMKRI 2002-2004




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Lampiran VIII


De jezuïetachterSoeharto

Documentaire over pater JoopBeek
21 september 2015
JurgenTiekstra
Pater JoopBeek© Still
De IndonesischeleiderSoehartokreegsteunuitonverwachtehoek: de Nederlandse pater JoopBeekdiendealseensoort spin-doctor. De documentaire 'De coup van '65' gaat over de rol van de pater na de coup van 1965 in Indonesië.
De veelgeprezendocumentaireThe Act of Killinguit 2012 van filmmaker Joshua Oppenheimer kan in Indonesiënietzonderproblemenvertoondworden. Het verhaaldaterinverteldwordt, over de bloedigezuiveringna de misluktemilitairestaatsgreep van 1965, blijftertecontroversieel. De coup van toen was aanleidingvoorSoeharto – gesteund door de VS en nietgehinderd door Nederland – vooreensystematischeaanval op communisten en hen die daarvooraangezienwerden, waarbijnaarschattingeen half miljoendodenzijngevallen.

Eindseptember is het vijftigjaargeledendatdezezwartebladzijde in de Indonesischegeschiedeniswerdopgeslagen. Aad van den Heuvel was in die tijdverslaggeverbijBrandpunt en ging in het gezelschap van journalist Ed van Westerloogeregeldnaar het land toe. Het rijkearchiefmateriaaluit die periodevormt de basis voor de terugblikkendedocumentaireDe coup van ’65, die hijeen halve eeuw later maakte met collegaAart Zeeman. Rechtsenkele reportages die zij in 1966 in Indonesiëmaakten.

Hoofdpersoon van de documentaire is uitgerekendiemand die de verslaggevertoentertijdnooitvoor de camera gekregenheeft: jezuïetenpaterJoopBeek. Via eenstagiairbij de KRO kwam Van den Heuvel in contact met de Nederlander die destijds in Jakarta eensleuteladviseurbleektezijn van de kersverse president Soeharto. ‘JoopBeek was eenintrigerende man,’ verteltAart Zeeman, die voor de nieuwedocumentairenaarIndonesiëafreisde. ‘HijzeitegenAad: ikwil je welwatvertellen, maar je mag nooitmijnnaamnoemen. Later bleekwaarom: alseensoortspindoctorzat de pater achterveeldingen die toengebeurdzijn. Aadverteldedathij op eenavondbij hem aan het bureau zat en vroeg: vanavondhoudt de president eentoespraak, weetjijwaar die over zalgaan? JoopBeekzatachtereengrote Remington-schrijfmachinetetikken en zei: nee, datweetikniet, want ik ben ernogmeebezig.
Aad van den Heuvel (3-11-1966)
© ANP
Beekzatookachter de vorming van de politiekepartijGolkar.Datkonhijallemaaldoendoordathijkatholiekestudenten van hem, die hijeenSpartaanseopleiding had gegeven, op belangrijkepositiesachter de schermen had wetentekrijgen. Die studentenzijnuiteindelijk de adviseurs van Soehartogeworden en hebben de lijnen in Indonesiëuitgezet.’

De rol van de Nederlandsejezuïet is in Nederland nogsteedstamelijkonbekend. Welzond VPRO-radioprogramma OVT in 2009 eenportret van hem uit. In Indonesië is datanders, vertelt Zeeman: de sterfdag van JoopBeekwordternogherdacht. Pater Beek was doodsbangvoor het communisme. Daaromliethijzijnstudentendemonstrerentegen de regering van president Soekarno en gafhijsteunaanlegergeneraalSoeharto.

Datdezegeschiedenisinderdaaduiterstgevoeligligt, merkteook Zeeman.Hijsprak in Indonesië met nabestaanden. ‘Tot vandaaglaatwattoen is gebeurddiepesporenna. En dieNederlandse pater heeftdaareenbelangrijkerol in gespeeld.’
De Coup van '65. Vrijdag 25 september, 21.05-22.00 uur, NPO2
Sumber:


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VIDEO!!!


Jakarta, september 1965. Eenlinksestaatsgreeptegen president Sukarno wordtverijdeld. Direct daarnadoetAad van den Heuvelvoor KRO Brandpuntverslag van de gevolgenvoorIndonesië. Hijkrijgtallehulp van eenman diebuitenbeeldblijft: de Nederlandse pater JoopBeek. De missionarisheeftinvloed in de hoogstekringenrond Suharto, die na de Coup van '65 de machtgrijpt. Beekopentalledeurenvoor de Brandpunt-ploeg.Aad van den Heuvel mag later Indonesiënietmeer in, wegenskritischeberichtgeving. Daaromreist de huidigeBrandpunt-verslaggeverAart Zeeman, een halve eeuwnadato, afnaar Java. HijspreektIndonesiërs die erbijwaren over de bloedigegevolgen van de Coup van '65 en de grotepolitiekerol van Pater Beek. Aad van den Heuvel (80) bespreekt de actualiteiten van toen met de historischekennis van nu.

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VIDEO!!!
De coup van '65
Jakarta, september 1965. Eenlinksestaatsgreeptegen president Sukarno wordtverijdeld. Direct daarnadoetAad van den Heuvelvoor KRO Brandpuntverslag van de gevolgenvoorIndonesië. Hijkrijgtallehulp van eenman diebuitenbeeldblijft: de Nederlandse pater JoopBeek. De missionarisheeftinvloed in de hoogstekringenrond Suharto, die na de Coup van '65 de machtgrijpt. Beekopentalledeurenvoor de Brandpunt-ploeg.Aad van den Heuvel mag later Indonesiënietmeer in, wegenskritischeberichtgeving. Daaromreist de huidigeBrandpunt-verslaggeverAart Zeeman, een halve eeuwnadato, afnaar Java. HijspreektIndonesiërs die erbijwaren over de bloedigegevolgen van de Coup van '65 en de grotepolitiekerol van Pater Beek. Aad van den Heuvel (80) bespreekt de actualiteiten van toen met de historischekennis van nu.
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VIDEO!!!

45 min
OVT 1 februari 2009 uur 2 (45 min)
Het Spoor terug: Pater JoopBeek
Het Spoor terug: De man achterSoeharto. Eenportret van Pater JoopBeek, die van 1938 tot zijndood in 1983 in Indonesiëverbleef. Alsstudentenpastor en later alsdirecteur van de Mariacongregatiebouwdehijeengeheimnetwerk van volgelingen op. Na de mislukte coup in 1965 steundehijgeneraalSoeharto en zorgdeervoordatzijnkatholiekevolgelingeneenmachtsfactor van betekeniswerden in diensNieuweOrde. Samenstelling: Paul van der Gaa
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